Public Interest: Group support is key weight-loss tool

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Cavaliere
Keyword(s):  
Weight Loss ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Group Support

Leaders' Communications in Public-interest and Material-interest Groups

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-540
Author(s):  
R. A. Young ◽  
Shirley M. Forsyth
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Material Interest ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
Internal Communications ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractThis article analyzes the internal communications between interest group leaders and their memberships. The case is Bill C-22, which increased patent protection for Pharmaceuticals in Canada. The object was to test for differences between “material” groups seeking benefits for their members and “purposive” groups pursuing policies which will benefit others. Significant differences were found in the kinds of appeals made by group leaders. This implies that it can be realistic and useful to distinguish between types of group according to their purposes and the motivations of their members. The findings also provide some insight into the language of policy debates and allow some speculation about the perennial question of why people adhere to large public-interest groups.

Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group Mobilization

1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Nownes ◽  
Grant Neeley
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Group Mobilization

Pride and Prejudice in Prague: Understanding Early Policy Error and Belated Reform in the Czech Economic Transition

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shale Horowitz ◽  
Martin Petráš
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Group Support ◽  
Pride And Prejudice ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Economic Ideology

Failed banking sector policies and weak regulatory policies are the keys to the collapse of the Czech economic “miracle.” Why were these policy errors made? Why has it taken so long to correct them? We examine the roles of economic interest groups, political institutions, technocratic economic ideology, and political leadership. Initially, economic interest group support provided broad liberal constraints on economic policy making. Within this context, neither political institutions nor technocratic economic ideology prevented political leaders from making the key early policy errors. A change in technocratic ideology made eventual error correction difficult to avoid. But stable economic interest group support and institutional divisions made it possible for responsible leaders to delay the corrections.

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