Executive Directors Column: Ask Not What Psychology Can Do for You...

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Salinger
Keyword(s):  
GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-52
Author(s):  
Karam Pal Narwal ◽  
Sonia Jindal

The paper empirically examines the impact of corporate governance on the cash holding of the firms. The components of corporate governance are measured by board size, board meeting, audit committee members, directors remuneration and non executive directors and the cash holding is measured with the log of average cash and size is taken as control variable for the control effect on the dependent variables. Moreover, correlation and panel regression model were employed to examine the relationship between the corporate governance and cash holding. Empirical data was collected from 96 firms over the period of 2004-05 to 2013-14. The results show that directors remuneration and the number of audit committee members positively influence the cash holding and the board size also positively influences the cash holding whereas, the non executive directors and the board meetings do not play any role in enhancing the cash holding.


GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-09
Author(s):  
Asma Rafique Chughtai ◽  
Afifa Naseer ◽  
Asma Hassan

The crucial role that implementation of Code of Corporate Governance plays on protecting the rights of minorities, shareholders, local as well as foreign investors cannot be denied. Companies all over the world are required to implement their respective Code of Corporate Governance for avoiding agency conflicts between companies management and stakeholders and for assuring transparency in accountability. This paper aims at exploring the impact of implementation of corporate governance practices (designed by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan) have on the financial position of companies. For explanatory variables of the study, composition of the board as per the Code of Corporate Governance that comprises of presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors has been taken into consideration. Return on equity has been taken as an indicator of firms profitability i.e. the dependent variable. For this study, companies listed on food producing sector of Karachi Stock Exchange have been screened for excogitation of the relationship. It is an empirical research based on nine years data from 2007–2015. Using Hausman Test for selecting the data analysis technique between Fixed or Random, Fixed Cross Sectional Panel Analysis has been used for analysis of the data collected. Findings indicate that presence of independent, executive and non-executive directors as per the code requirements levies a significant impact on the profitability of companies indicated by return on equity. It is, thus concluded that companies should ensure compliance with code of governance practices to reduce not only the agency issues but also to increase their profitability.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Lewis Moorhead ◽  
Trevor Clark ◽  
Alan Brener ◽  
Paul Gilbert ◽  
Steven Vaughan

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 483-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Brown ◽  
Katharine D. Drake

ABSTRACT This study examines (1) whether network ties help explain variation in tax avoidance, and (2) how the relation between network ties and tax avoidance varies depending on the nature and context of those ties. We posit that information on a range of tax-avoidance strategies is shared among firms through their social network connections. Using board interlocks to proxy for these connections, we find that firms with greater board ties to low-tax firms have lower cash ETRs themselves. Ties to low-tax firms are more influential when the focal firm and its network partner are operationally and strategically similar, as are ties created by executive directors. Board ties to low-tax firms are also more influential when the focal firm and its network partner engage the same local auditor. Overall, our results suggest that the influence of firms' network ties on their tax-avoidance behavior depends on the character of those ties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (6/7) ◽  
pp. 582-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hairul Azlan Annuar ◽  
Hafiz Majdi Abdul Rashid

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to ascertain the control role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), as prescribed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG).The MCCG (2000) requires substantive involvement of INEDs on the audit, nomination and remuneration board sub-committees. The study also examines the effectiveness of INEDs in discharging their monitoring roles in these sub-committees. Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative research design consisting of a series of interviews with board members of Malaysian-owned PLCs on the board of Bursa Malaysia was used. Findings – Interviews with 27 company directors reveal that, due to their independence, INEDs are crucial in safeguarding the interests of smaller investors if situations arise in which shareholders’ interests may be threatened. The interviews also disclose that the audit committee possesses the most authority among the sub-committees, as it derives its power not only from the Listing Requirements but also from statute, as well as being involved in areas of the company not traditionally associated with the committee. The study also reveals the differences in opinion between executive directors and INEDs with regard to the extent of INEDs’ effectiveness. Research limitations/implications – This research utilises interviews. Generalisation may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. In addition, the sample is not random, as access to many directors is dependent on recommendations. In addition, the respondents have been consciously selected to cover various board positions, including independent and non-independent directors. Practical implications – The findings from this research suggest that INEDs are able to discharge their responsibilities in overseeing the conduct of executives and protecting the interests of investors. In addition, the interviews disclose that the effectiveness of INEDs depends on how non-executive directors view INEDs being on the board. Rather than focusing solely on their control role, INEDS are expected to have a more proactive and progressive role in ensuring sustainable growth and the expansion of the business entity. Originality/value – There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating the effectiveness of INEDs in the control role of the board in developing countries. Prior studies were predominantly based upon the experience of Western economies.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Nana Yaw Simpson

Purpose – This study aims to examine the structure, attributes, and performance of boards of directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the broader context of public sector governance. This is informed by the less attention given to the concept among public sector organizations despite efforts to make state enterprises more effective and efficient, especially in developing and middle income countries. Design/methodology/approach – Data was collected through questionnaires self-administered in 2010 to all 25 SOEs in Accra, Ghana, out of the 29 nationwide. Some key officials were interviewed and documentary evidence analyzed to achieve triangulation of data and results. Findings – Results show that state-owned enterprises have boards and comply with the minimal governance issues outlined the legal frameworks establishing them. However, they exhibit significant weaknesses in the areas of board performance evaluation, criteria for board appointment, the balance of executive directors and non-executive directors, and other board characteristics, indicating a departure from general practices. Practical implications – Findings suggest the need for a tailored corporate governance framework or code for state-owned enterprises in developing countries. Originality/value – Compared to the literature, this study provides insight on boards from the perspective of state enterprises in ensuring good corporate governance, particularly in the context of a middle income country (Ghana).


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