Second thoughts on the “hard problem” of consciousness (and the “easy problem,” too).

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-87
Author(s):  
John F. Kihlstrom
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Easy Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem

Consciousness

2019 ◽  
pp. 3-33
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Easy Problem ◽  
Psychological Functions ◽  
The Hard Problem

What is the significance of consciousness? This book argues that consciousness has unique epistemic significance: all epistemic justification ultimately depends on consciousness. Section 1.1 clarifies the concept of consciousness by invoking Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Section 1.2 raises a challenge to the significance of consciousness by arguing that unconscious creatures—zombies—can conceivably do everything conscious creatures can do. Section 1.3 situates this challenge in the context of David Chalmers’s distinction between the hard problem of explaining phenomenal consciousness and the easy problem of explaining its associated psychological functions. Section 1.4 explores the research program of putting phenomenal consciousness first: that is, explaining psychological functions in terms of phenomenal consciousness. Section 1.5 outlines the program developed in this book, which explains epistemic justification in terms of phenomenal consciousness. Section 1.6 concludes with chapter summaries and some guidelines for reading the book.

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

scholarly journals Animal Evolution: The Hard Problem of Cartilage Origins

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (14) ◽  
pp. R685-R688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaut Brunet ◽  
Detlev Arendt
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Animal Evolution ◽  
The Hard Problem

Going Radical

2018 ◽  
pp. 94-116
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Erik Myin
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Positive Research ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Conceptual Revolution ◽  
Hard Problem Of Content

E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter considers whether such a conceptual revolution might really be in the cards. It identities the major options proposed by E-theorists, rating each in terms of degree of radicality. It reminds readers of the hard problem of content and reviews the range of options for handling it. It argues that “going radical” is one of the most attractive ways of dealing with the hard problem of content and that it is worth exploring the positive research program that going radical opens up.

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