Supplemental Material for Rational Thinking and Cognitive Sophistication: Development, Cognitive Abilities, and Thinking Dispositions

Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West ◽  
Maggie E. Toplak

Chapter 7 discussed four subtests that are direct measures of the avoidance of miserly processing on the CART. Chapter 8 discusses how the CART also contains six other subtests that assess the ability to avoid suboptimal thought patterns that arise indirectly from miserly thinking tendencies. Three of those subtests assess an important component of axiomatic utility theory: the ability to avoid being affected by irrelevant context when decision-making. The three subtests that measure the ability to avoid this tendency are: the Framing subtest, the Anchoring subtest, and the Preference Anomalies subtest. Three other subtests are described in this chapter. The avoidance of myside bias is a fundamental component of performance in most discussions of rational thinking. We used our original version of an Argument Evaluation subtest to measure this component of rational thinking. The ability to avoid overconfidence is measured on the CART by the Knowledge Calibration subtest. Finally, the Rational Temporal Discounting subtest assesses the ability to pass up an immediate reward for a delayed larger one. The history of each subtest is described, as well as a large study of each subtest in which correlations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions are examined.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Erceg ◽  
Zvonimir Galić ◽  
Andreja Bubić

The aim of the study was to investigate the role that cognitive abilities, rational thinking abilities, cognitive styles and self-control play in explaining the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs among university students. A total of 159 students participated in the study. We found that different aspects of rational thought (i.e. rational thinking abilities and cognitive styles) and self-control, but not intelligence, significantly predicted the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs. Based on these findings, it may be suggested that intelligence and rational thinking, although related, represent two fundamentally different constructs. Thus, deviations from rational thinking could be well described by the term “dysrationalia”, meaning the inability to think rationally despite having adequate intelligence. We discuss the implications of the results, as well as some drawbacks of the study.


Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West ◽  
Maggie E. Toplak

Based on the taxonomy of errors discussed in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 outlines a positive framework for assessing rational thinking using the CART. Ten subtests of the CART are classified as having heavy processing requirements compared to knowledge requirements. Four subtests of the CART are classified as having heavy knowledge requirements compared to processing requirements. Two domains of the CART thinking—probabilistic and statistical reasoning and scientific reasoning—have process and knowledge stressed to an equal extent. Four of the subtests of the CART measure the ability to avoid contaminated mindware. Four thinking dispositions that are supplemental and not part of the total score are also assessed on the CART. The twenty subtests of the CART collectively assess aspects of epistemic rationality (such as the tendency to show incoherent probability assessments; the tendency toward overconfidence in knowledge judgments; and others) as well as aspects of instrumental rationality (such as the tendency to show inconsistent preferences because of framing effects; the tendency for decisions to be affected by irrelevant context; and others).


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Erceg ◽  
Zvonimir Galic ◽  
Andreja Bubić

When solving reasoning tasks such as the Cognitive reflection test (CRT) or the Belief bias syllogisms (BBS), people can do it in four different ways depending on whether they detected the conflict or not and whether they were accurate or not. Specifically, one can detect the conflict and be accurate, detect the conflict but be inaccurate, fail to detect the conflict but still be accurate or fail to detect the conflict and be inaccurate. In this study, we investigated whether the individual differences in intelligence, numerical ability, math knowledge and analytic thinking dispositions underpin these different approaches to solving reasoning tasks. Generally, we found that very accurate conflict non-detectors were the most intelligent, numerate and knowledgable of all the groups. On the contrary, inaccurate conflict non-detectors were the least intelligent, numerate and knowledgable, with the other two groups somewhere in between these two. However, the conclusions depended on what reasoning tasks were used and how the conflict detection was operationalized. We argue that these individual differences indicate that different people solve reasoning tasks in qualitatively different ways and that this calls in question the validity of reasoning tasks. Namely, we hypothesize that reasoning tasks could be measuring different constructs for different people. Specifically, we hypothesize and offer preliminary evidence that the CRT at least somewhat assesses reflection for those lower on cognitive abilities, but not at all for those very intelligent and numerate participants. We discuss how these findings relate to contemporary dual-process theories and validity of reasoning tasks and offer some speculations and suggestions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Canice E. Crerand ◽  
Ari N. Rabkin

Purpose This article reviews the psychosocial risks associated with 22q11.2 deletion syndrome, a relatively common genetic condition associated with a range of physical and psychiatric problems. Risks associated with developmental stages from infancy through adolescence and early adulthood are described, including developmental, learning, and intellectual disabilities as well as psychiatric disorders including anxiety, mood, and psychotic disorders. Other risks related to coping with health problems and related treatments are also detailed for both affected individuals and their families. Conclusion The article ends with strategies for addressing psychosocial risks including provision of condition-specific education, enhancement of social support, routine assessment of cognitive abilities, regular mental health screening, and referrals for empirically supported psychiatric and psychological treatments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 314-325
Author(s):  
Kimberly F. Frazier ◽  
Jessica Collier ◽  
Rachel Glade

Background The aim of this study was to determine the clinical efficacy of combining self-management strategies and a social thinking approach to address the social performance and executive function of an adolescent female with autism spectrum disorder. Method This research examined the effects of a social knowledge training program, “Think Social,” as well as strategies to improve higher order cognitive abilities. Results and Conclusion Although quantitative improvement was not found, several qualitative gains in behavior were noted for the participants of this study, suggesting a benefit from using structured environmental cues of self-management strategies, as well as improved social understanding through social cognitive training.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Hinckley

Abstract A patient with aphasia that is uncomplicated by other cognitive abilities will usually show a primary impairment of language. The frequency of additional cognitive impairments associated with cerebrovascular disease, multiple (silent or diagnosed) infarcts, or dementia increases with age and can complicate a single focal lesion that produces aphasia. The typical cognitive profiles of vascular dementia or dementia due to cerebrovascular disease may differ from the cognitive profile of patients with Alzheimer's dementia. In order to complete effective treatment selection, clinicians must know the cognitive profile of the patient and choose treatments accordingly. When attention, memory, and executive function are relatively preserved, strategy-based and conversation-based interventions provide the best choices to target personally relevant communication abilities. Examples of treatments in this category include PACE and Response Elaboration Training. When patients with aphasia have co-occurring episodic memory or executive function impairments, treatments that rely less on these abilities should be selected. Examples of treatments that fit these selection criteria include spaced retrieval and errorless learning. Finally, training caregivers in the use of supportive communication strategies is helpful to patients with aphasia, with or without additional cognitive complications.


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