Lecture XXV. The presentative faculty--I. Perception--Objections to the doctrine of natural realism.

The article is aim to consciously bring natural elements and natural processes into landscape design, which have such sound effect of continuously changing features from a traditional garden. There are two main methods of design with natural thinking: one is expansion of the natural elements, including direct and indirect demonstration of the natural elements and abstract refinement of the natural forms; the other is expression of natural dynamic forces, such as site conditions, the forces of nature and ecological significance. The landscape reacting with natural affinity and dynamic helps people to re-perception, experience and care of natural realism and vitality.

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Real realism

10.1093/oso/9780199684830.003.0007 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Dan Zahavi

Keyword(s):

Transcendental Idealism ◽

Speculative Realism ◽

The World ◽

Natural Realism ◽

Empirical Realism ◽

Two Alternatives

How much of an anti-realist is Husserl? Or to put it differently, how many of our realist intuitions can his transcendental idealism accommodate? In Chapter 6, I contrast Husserl’s position with two allegedly realist views, namely speculative realism and neuro-representationalism, and argue that Husserl’s theory might be in a better position to defend our natural realism than either of these two alternatives. I next discuss to what extent Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism is motivated by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience and ward off a form of global scepticism. As will become clear, not unlike Kant, Husserl did not merely think that transcendental idealism and empirical realism are compatible, he also thought that the latter requires the former.

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Property theory

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ◽

10.4324/9780415249126-y031-1 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Nino B. Cocchiarella

Keyword(s):

Noun Phrase ◽

Laws Of Nature ◽

Formal Theory ◽

Property Theory ◽

Abstract Noun ◽

Singular Terms ◽

Abstract Entities ◽

Natural Realism ◽

Causal Structures ◽

Logical Realism

Traditionally, a property theory is a theory of abstract entities that can be predicated of things. A theory of properties in this sense is a theory of predication – just as a theory of classes or sets is a theory of membership. In a formal theory of predication, properties are taken to correspond to some (or all) one-place predicate expressions. In addition to properties, it is usually assumed that there are n-ary relations that correspond to some (or all) n-place predicate expressions (for n≥ 2). A theory of properties is then also a theory of relations. In this entry we shall use the traditional labels ‘realism’ and ‘conceptualism’ as a convenient way to classify theories. In natural realism, where properties and relations are the physical, or natural, causal structures involved in the laws of nature, properties and relations correspond to only some predicate expressions, whereas in logical realism properties and relations are generally assumed to correspond to all predicate expressions. Not all theories of predication take properties and relations to be the universals that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. The universals of conceptualism, for example, are unsaturated concepts in the sense of cognitive capacities that are exercised (saturated) in thought and speech. Properties and relations in the sense of intensional Platonic objects may still correspond to predicate expressions, as they do in conceptual intensional realism, but only indirectly as the intensional contents of the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates. In that case, instead of properties and relations being what predicates stand for directly, they are what nominalized predicates denote as abstract singular terms. It is in this way that concepts – such as those that the predicate phrases ‘is wise’, ‘is triangular’ and ‘is identical with’ stand for – are distinguished from the properties and relations that are their intensional contents – such as those that are denoted by the abstract singular terms ‘wisdom’, ‘triangularity’ and ‘identity’, respectively. Once properties are represented by abstract singular terms, concepts can be predicated of them, and, in particular, a concept can be predicated of the property that is its intensional content. For example, the concept represented by ‘is a property’ can be predicated of the property denoted by the abstract noun phrase ‘being a property’, so that ‘Being a property is a property’ (or, ‘The property of being a property is a property’) becomes well-formed. In this way, however, we are confronted with Russell’s paradox of (the property of) being a non-self-predicable property, which is the intensional content of the concept represented by ‘is a non-self-predicable property’. That is, the property of being a non-self-predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property (and therefore both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable).

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