Motivation, the brain, and psychological theory.

2004 ◽  
pp. 338-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dalbir Bindra
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Theory ◽  
The Brain

scholarly journals Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Deery
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Mental Event ◽  
The World ◽  
Predictive Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.

scholarly journals The Power of Predictions: An Emerging Paradigm for Psychological Research

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Benjamin Hutchinson ◽  
Lisa Feldman Barrett
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Predictive Processes ◽  
The Brain

In the last two decades, neuroscience studies have suggested that various psychological phenomena are produced by predictive processes in the brain. When considered together, these studies form a coherent, neurobiologically inspired program for guiding psychological research about the mind and behavior. In this article, we consider the common assumptions and hypotheses that unify an emerging framework and discuss the ramifications of such a framework, both for improving the replicability and robustness of psychological research and for renewing psychological theory by suggesting an alternative ontology of the human mind.

scholarly journals Neural mirroring mechanisms and imitation in human infants

2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1644) ◽  
pp. 20130620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Marshall ◽  
Andrew N. Meltzoff
Keyword(s):  
Action Observation ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Human Infant ◽  
Mu Rhythm ◽  
Action Execution ◽  
Human Infants ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Neuroscience Research ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Brain

Studying human infants will increase our understanding of the nature, origins and function of neural mirroring mechanisms. Human infants are prolific imitators. Infant imitation indicates observation–execution linkages in the brain prior to language and protracted learning. Investigations of neural aspects of these linkages in human infants have focused on the sensorimotor mu rhythm in the electroencephalogram, which occurs in the alpha frequency range over central electrode sites. Recent results show that the infant mu rhythm is desynchronized during action execution as well as action observation. Current work is elucidating properties of the infant mu rhythm and how it may relate to prelinguistic action processing and social understanding. Here, we consider this neuroscience research in relation to developmental psychological theory, particularly the ‘Like-Me’ framework, which holds that one of the chief cognitive tasks of the human infant is to map the similarity between self and other. We elucidate the value of integrating neuroscience findings with behavioural studies of infant imitation, and the reciprocal benefit of examining mirroring mechanisms from an ontogenetic perspective.

scholarly journals Sobre linguagem, cognição e cérebro: Uma entrevista com Peter Hagoort

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (45) ◽  
pp. 291-296
Author(s):  
Brigitte L.M Bauer ◽  
Mailce Borges Mota
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Language Production ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Max Planck ◽  
Language Faculty ◽  
Founding Director ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Human Language Faculty

Managing Director of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, founding Director of the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging (DCCN, 1999), and professor of Cognitive Neuroscience at Radboud University, all located in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, PETER HAGOORT examines how the brain controls language production and comprehension. He was one of the first to integrate psychological theory and models from neuroscience in an attempt to understand how the human language faculty is instantiated in the brain.

Effective decisions and their verbal justification

1990 ◽  
Vol 327 (1241) ◽  
pp. 493-502 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Expert System ◽  
Expert Knowledge ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Verbal Instruction ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Training Programmes ◽  
The Right ◽  
Recent Experimental Work ◽  
The Brain

Recent experimental work on human control of complex systems has drawn attention to the discrepancy that may exist between the person’s reported knowledge of the system and their ability to control it. Sometimes people act correctly but cannot answer questions about what they are doing; sometimes they can say verbally what they should do (perhaps having had verbal instruction in the right answers), but still do not do it. This discrepancy is of major practical importance, for example in designing training programmes or in eliciting expert knowledge for incorporation in a mechanical ‘expert system’. It is also puzzling for psychological theory, as it rules out certain plausible models of the functioning of the brain. This paper considers what mechanisms are still possible.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document