The Routine Business of Lower Courts

1990 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 713-713
Author(s):  
Gilbert Geis
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fawzia Cassim ◽  
Nomulelo Queen Mabeka

Civil procedure enforces the rules and provisions of civil law.  The law of civil procedure involves the issuing, service and filing of documents to initiate court proceedings in the superior courts and lower courts. Indeed, notice of legal proceedings is given to every person to ensure compliance with the audi alteram partem maxim (“hear the other side”). There are various rules and legislation that regulate these court proceedings such as inter alia, the Superior Courts Act, 2013, Uniform Rules of Court, Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1944. The rules of court are binding on a court by virtue of their nature.  The purpose of these rules is to facilitate inexpensive and efficient legislation. However, civil procedure does not only depend on statutory provisions and the rules of court.  Common law also plays a role. Superior Courts are said to exercise inherent jurisdiction in that its jurisdiction is derived from common law.  It is noteworthy that whilst our rules of court and statutes are largely based on the English law, Roman-Dutch law also has an impact on our procedural law. The question thus arises, how can our law of civil procedure transform to accommodate elements of Africanisation as we are part and parcel of the African continent/diaspora? In this regard, the article examines the origins of Western-based civil procedure, our formal court systems, the impact of the Constitution on traditional civil procedure, the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in Western legal systems and African culture, an overview of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2012 and the advent of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2017. The article also examines how the contentious Traditional Courts Bills of 2012 and 2017 will transform or complement the law of civil procedure and apply in practice once it is passed into law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


Author(s):  
William E. Nelson

This chapter shows that, in the absence of bureaucratic institutions, courts were the primary institutions by which central political authorities could enforce law and policy in localities. The courts, in turn, were local institutions under local control in every colony except, perhaps, Pennsylvania. In many colonies juries that determined both law and fact used their power to nullify legislation and other commands of central government. In other colonies, county courts were self-perpetuating bodies whose judges felt free to ignore the commands of appellate courts and other central authorities. Other colonies were so small that power was necessarily local in nature. Pennsylvania was the only large colony in which the Supreme Court controlled the work of lower courts, but its authority was also under challenge.


2021 ◽  
pp. 192536212110325
Author(s):  
Victor W. Weedn

Background: The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause gives defendants a right to confront their accusers. Method: U.S. Supreme Court cases that interpreted this right as applied to forensic scientists were reviewed. Results: Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams examined constitutional rights to confront forensic scientists. Lower courts have specifically examined their application to forensic pathology. Whether autopsy reports are considered “testimonial” varies among jurisdictions and has not been definitively settled. Defendants are generally able to compel testimony of forensic pathologists. Where the forensic pathologist is truly unavailable, the surrogate expert should be in a position to render an independent opinion.


Author(s):  
Mekonnen Firew Ayano

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the World Bank and other Western development agencies have prescribed restructuring land rights in post-communist economies to promote land markets, with the goal of alleviating poverty and social conflicts. But restructuring land rights in such settings is more difficult than it may seem. Ethiopia’s efforts in this area have produced disparate laws that have exacerbated both the intensity and the frequency of land conflicts. This article analyzes all land cases decided by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) and the House of Federation (HoF), Ethiopia’s constitutional review bodies, from 1998 to 2018. It shows that from 1998 to 2014, the trial and appellate courts were favorably disposed toward the policies of international financial agencies, and that the CCI and the HoF acquiesced. However, starting in 2014, following a countrywide protest connected to land dispossession, the CCI and the HoF have reversed the lower courts’ judgements by invoking constitutional clauses declaring that land belongs to the Ethiopian nations and that it cannot be alienated. The country’s experience reveals the perils of restructuring land rights without paying close attention to distributive concerns and the needs of those who end up being excluded from property access.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul S. Davies

Both interpretation and rectification continue to pose problems. Difficulties are compounded by blurring the boundary between the two. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2016] HCA 47, the High Court of Australia overturned the decisions of the lower courts which had held that performance bonds could be interpreted in a “loose” manner in order to correct a mistake. However, the documents could be rectified in order to reflect the actual intentions of the parties. This decision should be welcomed: the mistake was more appropriately corrected through the equitable jurisdiction than at common law. Significantly, the concurring judgments of French C.J. and Kiefel J. highlight that the law of rectification now seems to be different in Australia from the law in England. It is to be hoped that the English approach will soon be revisited (see further P. Davies, “Rectification versus Interpretation” [2016] C.L.J. 62).


2016 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 264-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kelman

The tension between an individual’s right to a fair trial and a state’s prerogative to withhold information where it is in the national interest to do so is an issue which is especially relevant in preventative detention cases. In a string of cases since 2009, lower courts have interpreted the ‘gisting’ requirement imposed by the Grand Chamber in A v United Kingdom in response to this problem. This paper will consider the jurisprudence of the lower courts and will argue that the House of Lords’ judgment in AF No. 3 imposed requirements not only in relation to the amount of information that must be disclosed, but also in relation to what that information must consist of. It will note that two irreconcilable interpretations of A have developed, and argue that one of those approaches is incompatible with AF. Finally, it will discuss the interaction between these decisions and the statutory framework of the JSA, especially ss 6(5) and 7(2), and will consider the consequences of the judicial uncertainty in this area in relation to the return of TPIMs following the CTSA.


Author(s):  
Heikki Pihlajamäki ◽  
Marju Luts-Sootak

Legal transfers (or transplants, receptions) of legal phenomena sometimes take place even within one single realm. This especially applies to the conglomerate states of the early modern period where different regions of one realm often had different laws and legal cultures. Livland – covering roughly the northern part of present-day Latvia and the southern part of Estonia – became part of Sweden through the Treaty of Altmark in 1629. From the social and political viewpoint, Livland was vastly distinct from Sweden proper. Livland was a feudal society par excellence, a land with mighty land-owning magnates and a peasantry tied to the land. Sweden, in turn, came late in developing feudal structures. The legal culture in Livland also differed vastly from that of Sweden proper. Since the Middle Ages, a German-speaking nobility and citizenry had settled in Livland. This brought the same legal order and judicial proceedings to Livland that were in effect in other northern German regions. This, among other things, meant that Livland participated in the reception of Roman law, which never influenced Sweden to the same extent. The model of the Swedish high court, such as it was created in Stockholm in 1614, was duplicated in other parts of the realm, including the Livonian court in Dorpat in 1630. The statutes regulating the Dorpat High Court were similar to those governing the Svea High Court, albeit with some differences. The most important of those differences was that the Livonian courts, including the Dorpat High Court, were to follow different legal sources than the courts in Sweden proper. In Livland, local law, the German gemeines Recht and the European ius commune were all accepted as binding legal sources. The differences in practice were more significant than those in the statutes. The Livonian court turned out to be less of an appeals court than the Svea High Court. In Livland, the access of peasants to the appeals court was effectively barred because their cases were rarely heard even in the lower courts – they were heard in the manorial courts instead, which survived under Swedish rule. In comparison to Sweden proper, judicial culture in Livland was in the hands of learned lawyers to a far greater extent, who dominated both civil procedure and accusatorial criminal procedure. In both categories, the procedure was written and dominated by lawyers. Although learned discussions took place at the Svea Court as well, in Dorpat, learned judicial culture was taken a step further. In criminal procedure, clearly the biggest difference was that judicial torture was living law in Livland until the 1680s, with the High Court giving formal permission for the lower courts to apply torture. In Sweden, torture emerged in the early seventeenth century, but was never legalised. The high court of appeals was a phenomenon, which came in many shapes and sizes. The same idea was transferred from one realm to another, and the same basic structure was multiplied within the realms. The products of legal transfer, the courts in action, could turn out differently, however. This often happened deliberately, as the idea of a high court sometimes needed tailoring to suit particular local circumstances. Sometimes the product took a different shape unexpectedly, because the local circumstances simply made it different. This could even happen within one and the same realm.


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