Sex differences in folk biology and folk physics.

Author(s):  
David C. Geary
1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-580
Author(s):  
Justin Leiber

Pace Atran, (1) folk physics, (2) folk biology, and (3) folk psychology rest on informationally encapsulated modules that emerge before language: a gifted austic person who can see objects and animals perfectly well can nonetheless be incommunicatively mind blind.


2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
David Papineau

According to an influential view in contemporary cognitive science, many human cognitive capacities are innate. The primary support for this view comes from ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments. In general outline, such arguments contrast the meagre informational input to cognitive development with its rich informational output. Consider the ease with which humans acquire languages, become facile at attributing psychological states (‘folk psychology’), gain knowledge of biological kinds (‘folk biology’), or come to under–stand basic physical processes (‘folk physics’). In all these cases, the evidence available to a growing child is far too thin and noisy for it to be plausible that the underlying principles involved are derived from general learning mechanisms. This only alternative hypothesis seems to be that the child’s grasp of these principles is innate. (Cf. Laurence and Margolis, 2001.)


2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 291-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Papineau

According to an influential view in contemporary cognitive science, many human cognitive capacities are innate. The primary support for this view comes from ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments. In general outline, such arguments contrast the meagre informational input to cognitive development with its rich informational output. Consider the ease with which humans acquire languages, become facile at attributing psychological states (‘folk psychology’), gain knowledge of biological kinds (‘folk biology’), or come to understand basic physical processes (‘folk physics’). In all these cases, the evidence available to a growing child is far too thin and noisy for it to be plausible that the underlying principles involved are derived from general learning mechanisms. This only alternative hypothesis seems to be that the child's grasp of these principles is innate. (Cf. Laurence and Margolis, 2001.)


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin E. Hecht ◽  
Olivia T. Reilly ◽  
Marcela Benítez ◽  
Kimberley A. Phillips ◽  
Sarah Brosnan

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