scholarly journals What Drives Institutional Reforms in Regional Organisations? Diffusion, Contextual Conditions, and the Modular Design of ASEAN

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Jetschke
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Modular Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regional Organisations ◽  
Available Information ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractWhat drives institutional reforms in regional organisations? And what explains the institutional design of ASEAN? Despite many differences, conventional approaches to the institutional design of regional organisations more generally and ASEAN in particular are united in regarding them as either determined by factors endogenous to the region − such as varying state interests or collective norms − or as exogenously driven, most importantly by hegemonic states like the US or China. This article offers a diffusion account of ASEAN's institutional design. Building on a more recent strand in the diffusion literature emphasising that diffusion rarely leads to convergence, the article makes two genuine contributions. First, it argues that members of regional organisations engage in modular adoption: they select institutional templates from a variety of regional as well as international organisations thereby taking advantage of available information on the costs and benefits of alternative institutions. Second, it argues that contextual conditions and cognitive priors influence what templates are chosen. The argument will be illustrated with a case study on ASEAN's adoption of a single market and a dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, and contrary to arguments that institutional borrowing might increase the expectations-deliverance gap within regional organisations, it argues that if conducted consistently, modular adoption can lead to substantial innovation and success.

Diffusion and Decentralized Bargaining in International Organizations: Evidence from Mercosur's Dispute Settlement Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lenz
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Diffusion Processes ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Institutional Convergence ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Decentralized Bargaining ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Abstract How and with what effects do institutions diffuse between international organizations (IOs)? An emerging literature extends a key insight of the study of diffusion processes among states to the international level, establishing that the adoption of institutions in IOs is regularly conditioned by the choices of other IOs. Yet, this literature neglects a key contextual difference between the two settings: unlike in the hierarchically structured organizations that have dominated the literature on diffusion, institutional creation, and change in IOs are the result of decentralized bargaining among sovereign governments. This paper develops a heuristic model that shows how diffusion between IOs shapes decision-making within them through its impact on the institutional preferences of individual governments. The model establishes that, unlike in diffusion processes among states, convergence is an unlikely outcome of diffusion between IOs. By implication, studies that take institutional convergence as their starting point are likely to underestimate the pervasiveness of diffusion effects. I demonstrate these arguments with a case study of the establishment of a regional dispute settlement system in Mercosur, a regional organization in Latin America.

Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators in International Arbitration: Issue Conflicts as Grounds for Disqualification with Special Regard to ICSID Arbitrations

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 535-601
Author(s):  
Pablo Agustín Alonso
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Case Study Research ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The grounds for disqualification of arbitrators provided by most arbitration rules refer to the relationships of arbitrators with the parties or the subject matter of the dispute – i.e., issue conflicts. However, some of those rules used to be vague or unclear, which resulted in incomplete arbitrators’ disclosures, unfunded challenge requests and awards that lacked homogeneity. Following a case-study research method, the paper focuses on the ICSID investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. It analyses and compares the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in light of challenge awards. The paper stresses the relevance of arbitrators’ disclosure duty and the importance of clearly defining the scope and content of ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’ as a guidance for parties and deciding authorities when raising or deciding upon a challenge request. In particular, the study aims to show how international investment arbitrations deal with issue conflicts as grounds for disqualification, by analyzing their main causes: multiple appointments of arbitrators, similar legal issues to be decided and permission to serve both as counsel and arbitrator.

Cotton-4 and the Cotton Subsidies Issue: A Litmus Test for the WTO’s Benefits to Least-Developed Countries

2013 ◽  
pp. 852-888
Author(s):  
Amanda Pamela Dakouré
Keyword(s):  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Least Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Litmus Test ◽  
Central Pillar ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The World Trade Organization’s primary purpose is to promote trade liberalization for the benefit of all its members. Being a self-enforcing trading system, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is its central pillar. Despite critics praising the DSM for its efficiency, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that litigation is not always an option for the WTO’s least-developed members. Through a case study of the cotton issue this article will analyze the efficiency of the WTO for its least-developed members. Part I of the article will set out why the issue of cotton is the perfect paradigm to examine how the WTO’s agriculture trade liberalization can benefit its least-developed members. Part II will examine the Brazil-US Upland Cotton Dispute and shed light on its repercussions on a group called Cotton-4. Part III will discuss how Cotton-4 has tried to resolve the cotton issue through negotiations. Finally, part IV will provide least-developed members, such as Cotton-4, with ways around the power inequalities that limit them from fully benefiting from the WTO’s agriculture trade liberalization.

The Legitimate Regulatory Distinction Test: Incomplete and Inadequate for the Particular Purposes of the TBT Agreement

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON HOUSTON-MCMILLAN
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Technical Barriers To Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Circumstances ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

AbstractPrior to 2011, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade had been somewhat neglected as a dispute-settlement mechanism, due in part to the lack of previous interpretation of the Agreement by WTO DSB Panels. In 2012, the Appellate Body adjudicated on three TBT disputes:US–Clove Cigarettes, US–Tuna II, andUS–COOL, aiming to officially interpret and clarify Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement by creating a distinct test for a measure's consistency with these Articles. This paper explores the relevant decisions of both the Panel and Appellate Body in the three disputes which led to the creation of the ‘legitimate regulatory distinction’ test. The substance behind this phrase, placed in context, is dissected along with the associated idea of ‘even-handedness’. The test attempts to simplify future interpretations regarding what will constitute unjustifiable discrimination, but at the cost of the necessary distinction between the GATT and the TBT Agreement being blurred. The result is a test which is incomplete and which fails to take account of the special circumstances surrounding the TBT Agreement.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

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