scholarly journals In Defense of Bad Infinity: A Fichtean Response to Hegel's Differenzschrift

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 168-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne M. Martin
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Subsequent Stage ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Critical Questions ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
History Of ◽  
Missed Opportunity ◽  
As If ◽  
Minor Works

Hegel's very first acknowledged publication was, among other things, an attack on Fichte. In 1801, Hegel was still laboring in almost complete obscurity, while Fichte was an international sensation, though already somewhat past the peak of his meteoric career. In the 1801 Differenzschrift, Hegel cut his teeth by criticizing Fichte's already widelycriticised Wissenschaftslehre, and by demonstrating that Schelling's philosophical system was not simply to be equated with it. Fichte himself never bothered to respond to Hegel's criticisms; indeed he never publicly acknowledged their existence. This was not because he was unconcerned with criticisms of his views; quite the contrary. But at the time he had bigger fish to fry. He responded to Jacobi's criticisms, and to Schelling's; he replied in great detail to critical questions raised by Reinhold, and with vituperative intensity to objections raised by skeptics and purportedly loyal Kantians. But Hegel's Differenzschrift was left without a Fichtean rebuttal. This is a pity, both because of the missed opportunity to illuminate by controversy central issues at stake in the post-Kantian period, but also because it made it easier for Hegel simply to reiterate his youthful criticism as if it were the last word. And reiterate it he did: in one form or another Hegel's early criticisms of Fichte reappear at every subsequent stage of his career: in the Phenomenology, in the Science of Logic, in the Encyclopaedia, as the final chapter in Hegel's History of Philosophy, and in countless other minor works and documents from the Nachlass and correspondence.

Kant and the Science of Logic

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huaping Lu-Adler
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Logical Pluralism ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Transcendental Logic ◽  
If Logic ◽  
General Logic ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philosophical Debates

This book is both a history of philosophy of logic told from the Kantian viewpoint and a reconstruction of Kant’s theory of logic from a historical perspective. Kant’s theory represents a turning point in a history of philosophical debates over the following questions: (1) Is logic a science, instrument, standard of assessment, or mixture of these? (2) If logic is a science, what is the subject matter that differentiates it from other sciences, particularly metaphysics? (3) If logic is a necessary instrument to all philosophical inquiries, how is it so entitled? (4) If logic is both a science and an instrument, how are these two roles related? Kant’s answer to these questions centers on three distinctions: general versus particular logic, pure versus applied logic, pure general logic versus transcendental logic. The true meaning and significance of each distinction becomes clear, this book argues, only if we consider two factors. First, Kant was mindful of various historical views on how logic relates to other branches of philosophy (viz. metaphysics and physics) and to the workings of common human understanding. Second, he first coined “transcendental logic” while struggling to secure metaphysics as a proper “science,” and this conceptual innovation would in turn have profound implications for his mature theory of logic. Against this backdrop, the book reassesses the place of Kant’s theory in the history of philosophy of logic and highlights certain issues that are still debated today, such as normativity of logic and the challenges posed by logical pluralism.

The Oxford Handbook of Hegel

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
The Past ◽  
Philosophical Movement ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Many ◽  
Systematic Importance

The Oxford Handbook of Hegel is a comprehensive guide to the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, the last major thinker in the philosophical movement known as German Idealism. Beginning with chapters on his first published writings, the authors draw out Hegel’s debts to his predecessors and highlight the themes and arguments that have proven the most influential over the past two centuries. There are six chapters each on the Phenomenology of Spirit and The Science of Logic, and in-depth analyses of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Five chapters cover Hegel’s philosophy of law, action, and the ethical and political philosophy presented in his Philosophy of Right. Several chapters cover the many recently edited lecture series from the 1820s, bringing new clarity to Hegel’s conception of aesthetics, the philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy. The concluding part focuses on Hegel’s legacy, from his role in the formation of Marx’s philosophy to his importance for contemporary liberal political philosophy. The Handbook includes many essays from younger scholars who have brought new perspectives and rigor to the study of Hegel’s thought. The essays are marked by close engagement with Hegel’s difficult texts and by a concern with highlighting the ongoing systematic importance of Hegel’s philosophy.

Epicurus in Nineteenth-Century Germany

2020 ◽  
pp. 760-790
Author(s):  
James I. Porter
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Fourth Century ◽  
Fifth Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
History Of Ideas ◽  
Unique Point ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
History Of

Epicurus marks a unique point of convergence for three unlikely bedfellows in the nineteenth century: Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche. Each sees a different “Epicurus” in this fourth-century successor to Democritus, the fifth-century co-founder of atomism. Each renders Epicurus and his materialism into a symptom of modernity’s engagement with antiquity, a role that atomism increasingly played from the Enlightenment onwards. Fresh readings of each of these philosophers contribute to a better understanding of their ways of construing the history of ideas, and in particular their bold reinterpretations of Epicurus himself, in addition to correcting a number of misconceptions surrounding their individual readings of Epicurus, be this in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy and his Science of Logic, Marx’s dissertation, or Nietzsche’s sprawling corpus of published and unpublished writings.

Philosophy as Action

Philosophy ◽  
1939 ◽  
Vol 14 (54) ◽  
pp. 192-204
Author(s):  
J. W. Scott
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
As If

In studying the problems of philosophy, it is commonly considered an advantage to approach them through the history of philosophy, But to be compelled to spread one's sails, and take one's solitary course, “as if no Plato or Kant had ever existed,” has perhaps its advantages too.

Philosophy, Religion, and the End of Hegel

2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
John Walker
Keyword(s):  
World History ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Objective World ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
As If

I want to begin with two of Hegel's endings, one well known, the other less so. First, some words from the closing paragraphs of Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy:A new epoch has arisen in the world. It seems as if the world spirit has succeeded in casting off everything in objective reality which is alien to itself, in order to comprehend itself as absolute spirit: to produce its own objective world from itself and to keep that world serenely in its own power. The struggle of the finite self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness, which once appeared as an alien reality, is now coming to an end. The finite self-consciousness has ceased to be finite; and, by the same token, the absolute self-consciousness has achieved the reality which it formerly lacked. The whole of world history and especially the history of philosophy is the representation of this conflict. History now seems to have achieved its goal, when the absolute self-consciousness is no longer something alien; when the spirit is real as spirit. For spirit is this only when it knows itself to be absolute spirit; and this it knows in speculative science (Wissemchaft).

Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism

1998 ◽  
pp. 22-34
Author(s):  
Janos Boros
Keyword(s):  
Richard Rorty ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Circular Reasoning ◽  
Internal Realism ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
As If

The notions of representationalism and antirepresentationalism are introduced and used in contemporary philosophical discussions by Richard Rorty to describe his and the neopragmatists' attitude toward traditional problems of epistemology. Rorty means that the history of philosophy shows that there are no final answers to the traditional questions about knowledge, truth, and representation; consequently, they should be rejected. Rorty thinks such questions should be eliminated from philosophy since there is no possibility to get outside of our mind and language. We cannot say anything about a mind-transcendent or language-transcendent, nonlocal or eternal reality. Hilary Putnam agrees with Rorty on this, but not with the conclusion that we should reject traditional philosophical questions. For Putnam, the epistemological questions are worthwhile asking and, although we cannot find the final correct answers, we should continue our investigations as if there were final answers. Our struggles with those problems can lead to refinements of the formulations and to cognitive developments. Putnam proposes a quasirealism which is often called "internal realism." Rorty rejects every refinement of realism as still realism and believes that the questions of knowledge, truth, and representation lead to regresses ad infinitum or to circular reasoning.

Alain Badiou and Education

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torill Strand
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Academic Discipline ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
The State ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Alain Badiou ◽  
French Philosophy ◽  
Radical Innovations ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
History Of

The French philosopher Alain Badiou (1937–) is one of the most significant philosophers of our time, well known for his meticulous work on rethinking, renewing, and thereby strengthening philosophy as an academic discipline. In short, his philosophy seeks to reveal and make sense of the potential of radical innovations in, or transformations of, any given situation. Although he has not written extensively on education, the pedagogical theme is vital, constitutive, and ongoing throughout his work. Badiou is an outspoken critic of the analytic and postmodern schools of thought, as he strongly promotes the virtue of curiosity, and prospects of “an education by truths.” “Truths” are not to be confused with matters of knowledge or opinion. Truths are existential, ongoing, and open-ended ontological operations that do not belong to any epistemic category. An education by such truths operates through a subtraction from the state of the situation and proposes a different direction regarding the true life. According to Badiou, the task of philosophy is to think these truths as processes that emerge from and pursue gradually transformations of particular situations. Overall, the structure of Badiou’s philosophical system demonstrates an extraordinary ontological style as it concurrently stands in relation to, and breaks off from, the history of contemporary French philosophy, German Idealism, and Greek antiquity. His system, which is of vast complexity, is based on mathematical set theory, consisting of a series of determinate negations of the history of philosophy, and also created by the histories of what Badiou terms philosophy’s conditions: science, art, politics, and love.

scholarly journals «Ein Spielen der Liebe mit sich selbst». Hegel e la teoria spinoziana dell’amor Dei intellectualis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvatore Carannante
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Different Levels

Resumen: Nella parte quinta dell’Etica, Spinoza descrive l’«amore intellettuale verso Dio» - che nasce nella mente che ha raggiunto la scientia intuitiva - come una «parte dell’amore infinito con il quale Dio ama se stesso». Scopo del saggio è gettare luce sui rilevanti, ma scarsamente considerati, riferimenti di Hegel alla teoria dell’amor dei intellectualis, tentando di ricostruirne il significato a due livelli differenti: anzitutto, esaminando le Lezioni sulla storia della filosofia, dove la descrizione dell’amore intellettuale è inserito in una disamina storico-filosofica del pensiero spinoziano; in secondo luogo, analizzando alcuni passaggi della Fenomenologia dello spirito e della Scienza della logica, opere in cui Hegel richiama l’amor dei intellectualis per esprimere metaforicamente la convinzione che l’Assoluto va concepito in termini dialettici, come soggetto e spirito.  Palabras clave: Hegel - Spinoza - Amor dei intellectualisAbstract: In the fifth part of the Ethica Spinoza describes the «intellectual love toward God» – arising in the mind that has achieved the scientia intuitiva – as a «part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself». The aim of the essay is to cast light, at two different levels, on the interesting but rarely studied Hegel’s references to the theory of amor dei intellectualis: firstly, focusing on the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, where the description of intellectual love is included in an historico-philosophical account of Spinoza’s thought; secondly, dealing with the Phenomenology of Spirit and in the Science of Logic, works in which Hegel mentions the amor dei intellectualis in order to express the idea that the Absolute has to be conceived in dialectical terms, as subject and spirit.Key words: Hegel - Spinoza - Amor dei intellectualis

‘A Perfect Contradiction is Mysterious for the Clever and for Fools Alike’: Did Hegel Contradict Aristotle?

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Michael Inwood
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Logical Contradiction ◽  
History Of ◽  
Logical Sense

AbstractAristotle argued that there are no true statements of the form <Fx and not-Fx>. In his lectures on history of philosophy Hegel does not challenge this view and in his Science of Logic expresses admiration for Aristotle's rebuttal of Zeno of Elea's attempt to find such contradictions in his paradoxes of motion. Yet more than once in his logics Hegel insists that everything is contradictory. I approach this problem from two directions. First, Widerspruch often means, and is understood by Hegel to mean, ‘opposition’ rather than ‘contradiction’ in the strict logical sense. Thus Catullus's simultaneous love and hatred of Clodia is a contradiction, but not an Aristotelian, or formal logical, contradiction. I defuse Hegel's occasional suggestions of Aristotelian contradictions in motion and time. Second, I exploit Hegel's tacit rejection of Aristotle's official bivalence account of truth and falsity, in favour of the view that truth is approached by successive improvements in our inevitably imperfect attempts to attain it. In this respect Hegel's procedure is similar to that of Aristotle himself, who characteristically constructs his own view of metaphysics, physics, ethics, etc., from the imperfect, but not flatly false, opinions of his predecessors. ‘The truth is the whole’, that is, the whole sequence of our attempts to reach it.

scholarly journals Idea of freedom in Hegel and Schopenhauer

2011 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-77
Author(s):  
Andrija Soc
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
Identical Manner ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Way

The fact that Schopenhauer is known in history of philosophy as one of the fiercest Hegel's opponents naturally suggests that the systems of the two philosophers are sharply distinct or even opposed to one another. In this paper, we will try to show that this is not the case, and that the systems have significant structural similarities. As we will show, the similiraties between Hegel's and Schopenhauer's philosophical system, often more than just analogies, at least partly stem from the virtually identical manner they criticize Kant's philosophy. However, there are also some important differences between philosophical ideas of these thinkers. One of the questions regarding which their opinions differ is the question of freedom. The way Schopenhauer understood freedom is diametrally opposed to the way Hegel understood it. Without pretences to answer the question which of these two conceptions of freedom is tout court more plausible, we will consider which of these is more in accordance with the philosophical system it is a part of.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document