Visual Portraits of Za‘atari Syrian Refugee Camp

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-252
Author(s):  
Thomas B. Stevenson

The Syrian Civil War, now in its sixth year, has displaced an estimated 11 million people (with numbers constantly escalating), nearly half the country's population. Of these, the United Nations estimates 4.8 million Syrians have fled their homeland. News reports have tended to focus on the struggles of those crossing the Mediterranean and seeking asylum in Europe, but most refugees have sought safety in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, where they have dispersed and “settled” in towns and cities. A comparative few have settled in host government and/or UNHCR sponsored camps. Jordan's Za‘atari Camp, just seven miles from the border, is the largest Syrian refugee camp. Its population peaked at more than 120,000 residents and currently has between 75,000 – 80,000 residents most of whom are from the Dara'a area. The camp is numerically equivalent to Jordan's fourth largest city.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli

Abstract Since the end of the revolution that toppled the rule of Muammar Qaddafi in October 2011, Libya has never known peace. The country descended into civil war with different factions contending for control. In this milieu, the United Nations attempted to mediate an end to the crisis but its efforts have failed to gain traction partly as a result of other mediation initiatives undertaken by several European actors. Sub-regional and continental organizations, including the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the African Union (AU) respectively, that should have taken the lead in the mediation have been absent. Meanwhile, continued fighting has hampered a mediated settlement, and terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda have taken advantage of the situation to establish a presence in the country. In the end, rather than ending the crisis, Libya has provided the ground for competing mediation processes which have prolonged the crisis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-179
Author(s):  
Andreas Schloenhardt

In response to the large number of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to southern Italy, frequently using overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels, and often facilitated by migrant smugglers, on October 9, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2240. This resolution authorizes member states to intercept, inspect, and seize vessels suspected of being used to smuggle migrants or to traffic persons. Initially limited to one year, these measures were renewed through two further UNSC resolutions on October 6, 2016, and October 5, 2017.


Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

Peacebuilding and statebuilding were integral parts of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) when the principle was first articulated in 2001. But since 2005 they have developed quite separately, creating a gap between the theories and practices of protection and peacebuilding. The effects of this gap are not just theoretical but practical too. The UN’s failure to properly follow through with rebuilding support in Libya contributed to that country’s descent into chaos and civil war, especially after 2013. Likewise a failure to incorporate atrocity-prevention concerns into ongoing peacebuilding efforts in places like Sri Lanka and the Central African Republic meant that the UN’s field presences did not do all they could to prevent atrocities or protect vulnerable populations. This chapter examines the relationship between peacebuilding and R2P in the UN context. It shows how the two were conceived as being mutually supporting activities but were separated during the UN’s wider deliberations on reform. It describes the effects of this gap between peacebuilding and protection before arguing that the two agendas are closely aligned and should be integrated. And it points to practical work to ensure that atrocity prevention is mainstreamed into peacebuilding efforts, and vice versa.


2005 ◽  
Vol 104 (679) ◽  
pp. 77-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Holiday

In the immediate aftermath of the 1992 peace accords, El Salvador was cited frequently by the United Nations and even the World Bank as a country that, with the international community's help, effectively managed its transition from civil war to peace and reconciliation. Thirteen years later, only the US government views the Salvadoran model so favorably.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-65
Author(s):  
Sara Montgomery

The United Nations is often looked to for guidance in conflict prevention and intervention, but its lack of hard power has proven to be extremely limiting. Although the United Nations has been a major improvement from the League of Nations, its ability to maintain world peace is restricted by the aspirations of its member states. The Security Council is especially significant, made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia. Each state in the Security Council has the ability to veto any initiative proposed by the United Nations. Additionally, the United Nations cannot take action without leadership from one or more of its states, and many states are hesitant to sacrifice their military resources even in the event of major human rights violations. This hesitancy to intervene is especially evident in the case study of the Rwandan genocide, but can also be seen in the Cold War and the Syrian Civil War, amongst other conflicts.


Transfers ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Ruti Stela ◽  
Maayan Amir

Exterritory Project is an ongoing art project dedicated to encouraging practical and theoretical exploration of ideas concerning extraterritoriality in an interdisciplinary context. Th is project was conceived when we decided to screen a video compilation of works by Middle Eastern artists onto the sails of boats sailing in the extraterritorial waters of the Mediterranean, as a response to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We wished to create an image of art exhibited in a neutral space, unsaturated by any one national precondition. The extraterritorial waters seemed to us a space that could temporally offer the suspension of border regimes. In 2011 the project was recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and was awarded the title of “Young Artist for Intercultural Dialogue between Arab and Western Worlds”.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-235
Author(s):  
Magnus Lundgren

Studies of conflict management by international organizations have demonstrated correlations between institutional characteristics and outcomes, but questions remain as to whether these correlations have causal properties. To examine how institutional characteristics condition the nature of international organization interventions, I examine mediation and ceasefire monitoring by the Arab League and the United Nations during the first phase of the Syrian civil war (2011–2012). Using micro-evidence sourced from unique interview material, day-to-day fatality statistics, and international organization documentation, I detail causal pathways from organizational characteristics, via intervention strategies, to intervention outcomes. I find that both international organizations relied on comparable intervention strategies. While mediating, they counseled on the costs of conflict, provided coordination points, and managed the bargaining context so as to sideline spoilers and generate leverage. While monitoring, they verified violent events, engaged in reassurance patrols, and brokered local truces. The execution of these strategies was conditioned on organizational capabilities and member state preferences in ways that help explain both variation in short-term conflict abatement and the long-term failure of both international organizations. In contrast to the Arab League, the United Nations intervention, supported by more expansive resources and expertise, temporarily shifted conflict parties away from a violent equilibrium. Both organizations ultimately failed as disunity among international organization member state principals cut interventions short and reduced the credibility of international organization mediators.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karim Makdisi

After Israel's first invasion of Lebanon in 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 (UNSCR 425) establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The early struggle over the contested meanings and interpretations of UNSCR 425, and the differences of position regarding UNIFIL itself were never fully resolved due to the shifting nature of US policies and objectives in the region and the context of the force's deployment within two distinct, albeit related conflicts: the Lebanese civil war and Arab-Israeli conflict. UNIFIL found itself trapped between the competing demands of sovereignty and resistance, not knowing which war it was there to prevent and which peace it was meant to build. This confusion resurfaced with the passage of UNSCR 1701 following the 2006 war, when UNIFIL's mandate and scope was expanded, but the force continued to be a site of contested narratives and potential future conflicts.


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