scholarly journals The honest cheat: a timely history of cheating and fraud following Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67

Legal Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 252-268
Author(s):  
Cerian Griffiths
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
History Of ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Central Pillar ◽  
The Uk

AbstractThe UK Supreme Court took the opportunity in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 to reverse the long-standing, but unpopular, test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh. It reduced the relevance of subjectivity in the test of dishonesty, and brought the civil and the criminal law approaches to dishonesty into line by adopting the test as laid down in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. This paper employs extensive legal historical research to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was too quick to dismiss the significance of the historical roots of dishonesty. Through an innovative and comprehensive historical framework of fraud, this paper demonstrates that dishonesty has long been a central pillar of the actus reus of deceptive offences. The recognition of such significance permits us to situate the role of dishonesty in contemporary criminal property offences. This historical analysis further demonstrates that the Justices erroneously overlooked centuries of jurisprudence in their haste to unite civil and criminal law tests for dishonesty.

scholarly journals Dishonesty

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Alumni Association ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Obiter Dictum

This article provides an exposition and assessment of the UK Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd. It identifies the Supreme Court’s reconsideration, obiter dictum, of the test of dishonesty in civil and criminal law. This term is used in particular in offences such as those set out in the Theft Act 1968. Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention, the leading case was R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2. However, the Ghosh test in that case has been the subject of significant criticism in the academy and elsewhere, and some such critiques are discussed in the Supreme Court judgment. This article, which considers these developments, was first delivered as the Bristol Alumni Association Lecture on 23 February 2018.

Odpowiedzialność karna za przestępne współdziałanie w prawie angielskim po wyroku R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen

2019 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 98-121
Author(s):  
Piotr Brzostek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
English Law ◽  
Joint Enterprise ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Secondary Liability

The combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R v. Jogee; Ruddock v. The Queen caused upheaval in the English law on criminal complicity. The Supreme Court/Privy Council decided that the law on criminal complicity „took a wrong turn” 33 years ago in the Privy Council ruling in Chan Wing-Siu which concerned a controversial doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. According to the said doctrine, if A and B set out to commit a crime X (e.g. robbery) and B foresees that A might commit crime Y (e.g. murder) in the course of committing crime X, B will be liable for crime Y, even if he does not intend that crime Y be committed. The mere fact of foresight on B’s part is enough for him to be criminally liable. Decision in Jogee; Ruddock is of seminal importance as it overturned the doctrine of parasitic joint enterprise liability. It is doubtful, however, to what extent the Supreme Court has resolved the problems that have bedeviled this area of law. This article presents in outline the English law on criminal complicity and attempts to assess the changes that were introduced in Jogee; Ruddock. A number of issues still call for further refinement and resolution. It appears, however, that the emphasis the Supreme Court put on intention as a required standard of fault, draws, at least superficially, the continental (Polish and German) and English criminal law closer together in terms of mens rea requirements for secondary liability.

The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

scholarly journals Judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court

Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Hunter ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Community Leadership ◽  
The Other ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Substantial Degree

AbstractThis paper examines judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court. It does not confine itself to the formal roles of the President and Deputy President. Rather, building on existing categories of judicial leadership, including administrative, jurisprudential and community leadership, it considers the contributions of all 12 Justices. In so doing, it provides a significant compilation of quantitative data on the activities of the Justices of the Supreme Court both on and off the bench from the the Court's inception in 2009 to the end of the 2014-2015 legal year. From this, we suggest that while a number of the Justices engaged in one or two broad forms of leadership – with Lady Hale in particular demonstrating a substantial degree of leadership across all three dimensions – at the other end of the spectrum, at least on the measures used in this paper, a significant minority did not. In the light of this, and the significant number of recent and forthcoming retirements from the Court, the paper concludes by considering the implications of our findings for the future of the Court. We argue that these retirements will result in gaps in both formal and informal judicial leadership, and it is vital that these gaps are filled by appointees who are capable of, and prepared to step up to, diverse and varied forms of judicial leadership.

scholarly journals ABORTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: REFLECTIONS FROM THE UK SUPREME COURT

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-494
Author(s):  
Bríd Ní Ghráinne ◽  
Aisling McMahon
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

AbstractOn 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSCt) issued its decision on, inter alia, whether Northern Ireland's near-total abortion ban was compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This article critically assesses the UKSC's treatment of international law in this case. It argues that the UKSCt was justified in finding that Northern Ireland's ban on abortion in cases of rape, incest, and FFA was a violation of Article 8, but that the majority erred in its assessment of Article 3 ECHR and of the relevance of international law more generally.

Morrisons off the hook as employers welcome clarity on vicarious liability for data breach

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 504-506
Author(s):  
Emma Flett ◽  
Jenny Wilson ◽  
Rebecca Gover
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Causal Chain ◽  
Cautionary Tale ◽  
Vicarious Liability ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Protection Legislation ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Data Controller ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract The UK Supreme Court has granted the appeal of supermarket chain WW Morrison Supermarkets plc (Morrisons), finding that the Court of Appeal had misunderstood a number of the governing principles of vicarious liability. Considering Morrisons’ liability afresh, the Supreme Court clarified that the motive and authorized acts of the wrongdoing employee are highly material to a finding of vicarious liability, whilst a causal chain of events is not. Whilst Morrisons’ victory is a welcome clarification on the law of vicarious liability, data controllers should take note: had Morrisons not been a sophisticated data controller paying particular attention to its obligations under data protection legislation, the outcome would likely have been more of a cautionary tale.

Cross-fertilisation of Constitutional Ideas

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk

This chapter discusses the New Zealand courts' jurisprudence in regard to the interpretative provisions — sections 4, 5, and 6 — of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It not only gives an overview of the relevant New Zealand case law but also compares the courts' approaches to those of their UK counterparts, in particular the UK Supreme Court (formerly, the House of Lords) in regard to section 3 of the UK Human Rights Act 1998. It is argued that the perceived difference in the approaches can be explained by different contexts rather than different methodology. The chapter thereby questions the view held in New Zealand that the UK courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are more activist than the New Zealand courts.

SHORN-OFF COMPLICITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Dyson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Common Purpose ◽  
The Common ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Additional Form

CRIMINAL complicity has been dramatically changed by the combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and the Privy Council in Jogee; Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681. At least since the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it has been settled that a person (S) who has intentionally assisted or encouraged another (P) to commit a crime has been liable to be tried, convicted, and punished as if S was a principal. For decades, there has also been a much-debated, additional form of complicity where the accomplice was “parasitically” liable for further crimes committed by P beyond the scope of a common criminal purpose shared by S and P. For that kind of liability, the accomplice need not have assisted or encouraged the further crime but need only have foreseen that it was a possible incident of the common purpose. The effect of Jogee and Ruddock is that this further form of complicity, first recognised explicitly in the Privy Council decision of Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168 and later endorsed by the House of Lords in Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1, has been shorn off the criminal law. As a result, Chan Wing-Siu directions will no longer be given to juries.

scholarly journals Examining the Foreseeable: Assisted Suicide as a Herald of Changing Moralities

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joane Martel
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Medical Assistance ◽  
Moral Regulation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Charges

After her intense battle for the decriminalization of assisted suicide in the Supreme Court of Canada, Sue Rodriguez committed suicide with medical assistance in 1994. Following her suicide, government and law representatives remained silent and no criminal charges were ever brought against the person(s) who presumably assisted Ms Rodriguez in her death. This apparent non-intervention of criminal law is examined in view of the useful role that the Rodriguez event may have played in a possible shift in the dominant morality. It is argued that the Rodriguez assisted suicide may have been a useful 'crime' (in the Durkheimian sense) in that it brought to the fore the possibility that social conditions - which made the 'crime' possible - may no longer be in harmony with conventional morality. Similarly to Socrates' crime, the Rodriguez case can be seen as an anticipation of a new morality. It can be analysed as a prelude to alterations, as directly preparing the way for changes in the dominant morality. The role of criminal law as a preferred mode of moral regulation is also examined in relation to the moral demands and expectations that arose during as well as after the judicial saga.

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