CONSTRUCTIVE REFLECTIVITY PRINCIPLES FOR REGULAR THEORIES

2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 1348-1367
Author(s):  
HENRIK FORSSELL ◽  
PETER LEFANU LUMSDAINE
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Small Object ◽  
Basic Construction ◽  
Weak Reflection ◽  
Small Object Argument ◽  
Regular Theory ◽  
Image Position

AbstractClassically, any structure for a signature ${\rm{\Sigma }}$ may be completed to a model of a desired regular theory ${T}}$ by means of the chase construction or small object argument. Moreover, this exhibits ${\rm{Mod}}\left(T)$ as weakly reflective in ${\rm{Str}}\left( {\rm{\Sigma }} \right)$.We investigate this in the constructive setting. The basic construction is unproblematic; however, it is no longer a weak reflection. Indeed, we show that various reflectivity principles for models of regular theories are equivalent to choice principles in the ambient set theory. However, the embedding of a structure into its chase-completion still satisfies a conservativity property, which suffices for applications such as the completeness of regular logic with respect to Tarski (i.e., set) models.Unlike most constructive developments of predicate logic, we do not assume that equality between symbols in the signature is decidable. While in this setting, we also give a version of one classical lemma which is trivial over discrete signatures but more interesting here: the abstraction of constants in a proof to variables.

scholarly journals Predicate functors revisited

1981 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. V. Quine
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Combinatory Logic ◽  
Homogeneous Case ◽  
Quantification Theory ◽  
Present Scheme ◽  
First Order ◽  
Image Position ◽  
First Order Predicate Logic

Quantification theory, or first-order predicate logic, can be formulated in terms purely of predicate letters and a few predicate functors which attach to predicates to form further predicates. Apart from the predicate letters, which are schematic, there are no variables. On this score the plan is reminiscent of the combinatory logic of Schönfinkel and Curry. Theirs, however, had the whole of higher set theory as its domain; the present scheme stays within the bounds of predicate logic.In 1960 I published an apparatus to this effect, and an improved version in 1971. In both versions I assumed two inversion functors, major and minor; also a cropping functor and the obvious complement functor. The effects of these functors, when applied to an n-place predicate, are as follows:The variables here are explanatory only and no part of the final notation. Ultimately the predicate letters need exponents showing the number of places, but I omit them in these pages.A further functor-to continue now with the 1971 version-was padding:Finally there was a zero-place predicate functor, which is to say simply a constant predicate, namely the predicate ‘I’ of identity, and there was a two-place predicate functor ‘∩’ of intersection. The intersection ‘F ∩ G’ received a generalized interpretation, allowing ‘F’ and ‘G’ to be predicates with unlike numbers of places. However, Steven T. Kuhn has lately shown me that the generalization is unnecessary and reducible to the homogeneous case.

An extension of Ackermann's set theory

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-704
Author(s):  
Donald Perlis
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Image Position

Ackermann's set theory [1], called here A, involves a schemawhere φ is an ∈-formula with free variables among y1, …, yn and w does not appear in φ. Variables are thought of as ranging over classes and V is intended as the class of all sets.S is a kind of comprehension principle, perhaps most simply motivated by the following idea: The familiar paradoxes seem to arise when the class CP of all P-sets is claimed to be a set, while there exists some P-object x not in CP such that x would have to be a set if CP were. Clearly this cannot happen if all P-objects are sets.Now, Levy [2] and Reinhardt [3] showed that A* (A with regularity) is in some sense equivalent to ZF. But the strong replacement axiom of Gödel-Bernays set theory intuitively ought to be a theorem of A* although in fact it is not (Levy's work shows this). Strong replacement can be formulated asThis lack of A* can be remedied by replacing S above bywhere ψ and φ are ∈-formulas and x is not in ψ and w is not in φ. ψv is ψ with quantifiers relativized to V, and y and z stand for y1, …, yn and z1, …, zm.

scholarly journals THE CONSISTENCY STRENGTH OF LONG PROJECTIVE DETERMINACY

2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 338-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN P. AGUILERA ◽  
SANDRA MÜLLER
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Consistency Strength ◽  
Axiom Of Determinacy ◽  
Woodin Cardinals ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Woodin Cardinal

AbstractWe determine the consistency strength of determinacy for projective games of length ω2. Our main theorem is that $\Pi _{n + 1}^1 $-determinacy for games of length ω2 implies the existence of a model of set theory with ω + n Woodin cardinals. In a first step, we show that this hypothesis implies that there is a countable set of reals A such that Mn (A), the canonical inner model for n Woodin cardinals constructed over A, satisfies $$A = R$$ and the Axiom of Determinacy. Then we argue how to obtain a model with ω + n Woodin cardinal from this.We also show how the proof can be adapted to investigate the consistency strength of determinacy for games of length ω2 with payoff in $^R R\Pi _1^1 $ or with σ-projective payoff.

scholarly journals SQUARES, ASCENT PATHS, AND CHAIN CONDITIONS

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 (04) ◽  
pp. 1512-1538 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRIS LAMBIE-HANSON ◽  
PHILIPP LÜCKE
Keyword(s):  
Partial Order ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Consistency Strength ◽  
Chain Conditions ◽  
Regular Cardinals ◽  
Aronszajn Tree ◽  
Square Principles ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Aronszajn Trees ◽  
Consistency Strengths

AbstractWith the help of various square principles, we obtain results concerning the consistency strength of several statements about trees containing ascent paths, special trees, and strong chain conditions. Building on a result that shows that Todorčević’s principle $\square \left( {\kappa ,\lambda } \right)$ implies an indexed version of $\square \left( {\kappa ,\lambda } \right)$, we show that for all infinite, regular cardinals $\lambda < \kappa$, the principle $\square \left( \kappa \right)$ implies the existence of a κ-Aronszajn tree containing a λ-ascent path. We then provide a complete picture of the consistency strengths of statements relating the interactions of trees with ascent paths and special trees. As a part of this analysis, we construct a model of set theory in which ${\aleph _2}$-Aronszajn trees exist and all such trees contain ${\aleph _0}$-ascent paths. Finally, we use our techniques to show that the assumption that the κ-Knaster property is countably productive and the assumption that every κ-Knaster partial order is κ-stationarily layered both imply the failure of $\square \left( \kappa \right)$.

Existence of classes and value specification of variables

1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Logic ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Image Position

In mathematics, when we want to introduce classes which fulfill certain conditions, we usually prove beforehand that classes fulfilling such conditions do exist, and that such classes are uniquely determined by the conditions. The statements which state such unicity and existence of classes are in mathematical logic consequences of the principles of extensionality and class existence. In order to illustrate how these principles enable us to introduce classes into systems of mathematical logic, let us consider the manner in which Gödel introduces classes in his book on set theory.For instance, before introducing the definition of the non-ordered pair of two classesGödel puts down as its justification the following two axioms:By A4, for every two classesyandzthere exists at least one non-ordered pairwof them; and by A3,wis uniquely determined in A4.

Craig interpolation theorem for intuitionistic logic and extensions Part III

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Interpolation Property ◽  
Interpolation Theorem ◽  
Kripke Structure ◽  
Unary Predicate ◽  
The World ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Constant Domains ◽  
Positive Integers

This is a continuation of two previous papers by the same title [2] and examines mainly the interpolation property for the logic CD with constant domains, i.e., the extension of the intuitionistic predicate logic with the schemaIt is known [3], [4] that this logic is complete for the class of all Kripke structures with constant domains.Theorem 47. The strong Robinson consistency theorem is not true for CD.Proof. Consider the following Kripke structure with constant domains. The set S of possible worlds is ω0, the set of positive integers. R is the natural ordering ≤. Let ω0 0 = , Bn, is a sequence of pairwise disjoint infinite sets. Let L0 be a language with the unary predicates P, P1 and consider the following extensions for P,P1 at the world m.(a) P is true on ⋃i≤2nBi, and P1 is true on ⋃i≤2n+1Bi for m = 2n.(b) P is true on ⋃i≤2nBi, and P1 for ⋃i≤2n+1Bi for m = 2n.Let (Δ,Θ) be the complete theory of this structure. Consider another unary predicate Q. Let L be the language with P, Q and let M be the language with P1, Q.

scholarly journals On the uniqueness of cellular injectives

2018 ◽  
Vol 167 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. ROSICKÝ
Keyword(s):  
Banach Spaces ◽  
Category Theory ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
Small Object ◽  
Unified Approach ◽  
Basic Tool ◽  
Saturated Models ◽  
Small Object Argument

AbstractA. Avilés and C. Brech proved an intriguing result about the existence and uniqueness of certain injective Boolean algebras or Banach spaces. Their result refines the standard existence and uniqueness of saturated models. They express a wish to obtain a unified approach in the context of category theory. We provide this in the framework of weak factorisation systems. Our basic tool is the fat small object argument.

scholarly journals AN EXTENSION OF A THEOREM OF ZERMELO

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOUKO VÄÄNÄNEN
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
Membership Relation ◽  
Image Position

AbstractWe show that if $(M,{ \in _1},{ \in _2})$ satisfies the first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms of set theory when the membership relation is ${ \in _1}$ and also when the membership relation is ${ \in _2}$, and in both cases the formulas are allowed to contain both ${ \in _1}$ and ${ \in _2}$, then $\left( {M, \in _1 } \right) \cong \left( {M, \in _2 } \right)$, and the isomorphism is definable in $(M,{ \in _1},{ \in _2})$. This extends Zermelo’s 1930 theorem in [6].

scholarly journals IDEAL PROJECTIONS AND FORCING PROJECTIONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1247-1285 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEAN COX ◽  
MARTIN ZEMAN
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Negative Answer ◽  
Large Cardinals ◽  
Normal Ideal ◽  
List Type ◽  
Type Number ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Woodin Cardinal

AbstractIt is well known that saturation of ideals is closely related to the “antichain-catching” phenomenon from Foreman–Magidor–Shelah [10]. We consider several antichain-catching properties that are weaker than saturation, and prove:(1)If${\cal I}$is a normal ideal on$\omega _2 $which satisfiesstationary antichain catching, then there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal;(2)For any$n \in \omega $, it is consistent relative to large cardinals that there is a normal ideal${\cal I}$on$\omega _n $which satisfiesprojective antichain catching, yet${\cal I}$is not saturated (or even strong). This provides a negative answer to Open Question number 13 from Foreman’s chapter in the Handbook of Set Theory ([7]).

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