scholarly journals CHARACTERIZING DOWNWARDS CLOSED, STRONGLY FIRST-ORDER, RELATIVIZABLE DEPENDENCIES

2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 1136-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
PIETRO GALLIANI

AbstractIn Team Semantics, a dependency notion is strongly first order if every sentence of the logic obtained by adding the corresponding atoms to First-Order Logic is equivalent to some first-order sentence. In this work it is shown that all nontrivial dependency atoms that are strongly first order, downwards closed, and relativizable (in the sense that the relativizations of the corresponding atoms with respect to some unary predicate are expressible in terms of them) are definable in terms of constancy atoms.Additionally, it is shown that any strongly first-order dependency is safe for any family of downwards closed dependencies, in the sense that every sentence of the logic obtained by adding to First-Order Logic both the strongly first-order dependency and the downwards closed dependencies is equivalent to some sentence of the logic obtained by adding only the downwards closed dependencies.

2021 ◽  
Vol Volume 17, Issue 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hoelzel ◽  
Richard Wilke

We present syntactic characterisations for the union closed fragments of existential second-order logic and of logics with team semantics. Since union closure is a semantical and undecidable property, the normal form we introduce enables the handling and provides a better understanding of this fragment. We also introduce inclusion-exclusion games that turn out to be precisely the corresponding model-checking games. These games are not only interesting in their own right, but they also are a key factor towards building a bridge between the semantic and syntactic fragments. On the level of logics with team semantics we additionally present restrictions of inclusion-exclusion logic to capture the union closed fragment. Moreover, we define a team based atom that when adding it to first-order logic also precisely captures the union closed fragment of existential second-order logic which answers an open question by Galliani and Hella.


1995 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 673-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrique Casanovas

In analogy to ω-logic, one defines M-logic for an arbitrary structure M (see [5],[6]). In M-logic only those structures are considered in which a special part, determined by a fixed unary predicate, is isomorphic to M. Let L be the similarity type of M and T its complete theory. We say that M-logic is κ-compact if it satisfies the compactness theorem for sets of < κ sentences. In this paper we introduce the related notion of compactness for expandability: a model M is κ-compactly expandable if for every extension T′ ⊇ T of cardinality < κ, if every finite subset of T′ can be satisfied in an expansion of M, then T′ can also be satisfied in an expansion of M. Moreover, M is compactly expandable if it is ∥M∥+-compactly expandable. It turns out that M-logic is κ-compact iff M is κ-compactly expandable.Whereas for first-order logic consistency and finite satisfiability are the same, consistency with T and finite satisfiability in M are, in general, no longer the same thing. We call the model Mκ-expandable if every consistent extension T′ ⊇ T of cardinality < κ can be satisfied in an expansion of M. We say that M is expandable if it is ∥M∥+-expandable. Here we study the relationship between saturation, expandability and compactness for expandability. There is a close parallelism between our results about compactly expandable models and some theorems of S. Shelah about expandable models, which are in fact expressed in terms of categoricity of PC-classes (see [7, Th. VI.5.3, VI.5.4 and VI.5.5]). Our results could be obtained directly from these theorems of Shelah if expandability and compactness for expandability were the same notion.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG

Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.


1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document