scholarly journals MODEL THEORETIC PROPERTIES OF METRIC VALUED FIELDS

2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-675
Author(s):  
ITAÏ BEN YAACOV

We study model theoretic properties of valued fields (equipped with a real-valued multiplicative valuation), viewed as metric structures in continuous first order logic.For technical reasons we prefer to consider not the valued field (K, |·|) directly, but rather the associated projective spaces KPn, as bounded metric structures.We show that the class of (projective spaces over) metric valued fields is elementary, with theory MVF, and that the projective spaces Pn and are Pm biinterpretable for every n, m ≥ 1. The theory MVF admits a model completion ACMVF, the theory of algebraically closed metric valued fields (with a nontrivial valuation). This theory is strictly stable (even up to perturbation).Similarly, we show that the theory of real closed metric valued fields, RCMVF, is the model companion of the theory of formally real metric valued fields, and that it is dependent.

2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itaï Ben Yaacov ◽  
Arthur Paul Pedersen

AbstractContinuous first-order logic has found interest among model theorists who wish to extend the classical analysis of “algebraic” structures (such as fields, group, and graphs) to various natural classes of complete metric structures (such as probability algebras, Hilbert spaces, and Banach spaces). With research in continuous first-order logic preoccupied with studying the model theory of this framework, we find a natural question calls for attention. Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness result?The primary purpose of this article is to show that a certain, interesting set of axioms does indeed yield a completeness result for continuous first-order logic. In particular, we show that in continuous first-order logic a set of formulae is (completely) satisfiable if (and only if) it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-order logic also satisfies anapproximatedform of strong completeness, whereby Σ⊧φ(if and) only if Σ⊢φ∸2−nfor alln < ω. This approximated form of strong completeness asserts that if Σ⊧φ, then proofs from Σ, being finite, can provide arbitrarily better approximations of the truth ofφ.Additionally, we consider a different kind of question traditionally arising in model theory—that of decidability. When is the set of all consequences of a theory (in a countable, recursive language) recursive? Say that a complete theoryTisdecidableif for every sentenceφ, the valueφTis a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly computable fromφ. IfTis incomplete, we say it is decidable if for every sentenceφthe real numberφTois uniformly recursive fromφ, whereφTois the maximal value ofφconsistent withT. As in classical first-order logic, it follows from the completeness theorem of continuous first-order logic that if a complete theory admits a recursive (or even recursively enumerable) axiomatization then it is decidable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-100
Author(s):  
MARTINO LUPINI

AbstractWe present an introductory survey to first order logic for metric structures and its applications to C*-algebras.


2008 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 197-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
ITAÏ BEN YAACOV

We present an adaptation of continuous first order logic to unbounded metric structures. This has the advantage of being closer in spirit to C. Ward Henson's logic for Banach space structures than the unit ball approach (which has been the common approach so far to Banach space structures in continuous logic), as well as of applying in situations where the unit ball approach does not apply (i.e. when the unit ball is not a definable set). We also introduce the process of single point emboundment (closely related to the topological single point compactification), allowing to bring unbounded structures back into the setting of bounded continuous first order logic. Together with results from [4] regarding perturbations of bounded metric structures, we prove a Ryll–Nardzewski style characterization of theories of Banach spaces which are separably categorical up to small perturbation of the norm. This last result is motivated by an unpublished result of Henson.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG

Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.


1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.


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