INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE AND HOW IT SHOULD BE TREATED

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kent Greenawalt

This essay summarizes crucial ways that society—in particular, the United States—has treated claims by individuals to be free of generally required duties because their convictions tell them that performing the duties is deeply wrong. Among the topics I address are how the Supreme Court decisions involving constitutional rights and organizational claims relate to this treatment, but my main focus is on what I see as the critical issues and what I believe to be the wise choices for addressing such claims. Without attempting an extensive account of all that has been written on claims of exemptions, I refer to some relatively recent books that can help one to understand what is at stake and what can be said in favor of competing positions. I also provide references to recent and forthcoming work of my own that explores claims of exemptions in greater depth.

Author(s):  
Питер Мэггс

The United States Trademark Act makes unenforceable marks that are “functional.” However, it does not define functionality. Because the Supreme Court decisions on functionality are few in number and ambiguous in meaning, the courts have differed sharply in their approaches to functionality, and their approach is constantly changing.


1975 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Weinstock ◽  
Christopher Tietze ◽  
Frederick S. Jaffe ◽  
Joy G. Dryfoos

Author(s):  
Alec Stone Sweet ◽  
Jud Mathews

This chapter considers constitutional rights doctrines of the United States in light of the global spread of proportionality. It challenges the view that proportionality is alien to the American constitutional experience, showing that American courts have developed approaches to rights that closely resemble proportionality. In particular, the Supreme Court’s test for state laws that burdened interstate commerce, developed in the nineteenth century, resembled proportionality, and so did “strict scrutiny” review as it was initially applied by the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century. The Supreme Court’s current approach to constitutional rights, relying heavily on separate tiers of review, is characterized by three pathologies: (i) judicial abdication, in the form of rational basis review; (ii) analytical incompleteness, when an explicit balancing stage is omitted; and (iii) instability, leading to reclassification and doctrinal incoherence. The chapter argues that proportionality can protect rights more consistently and coherently than the current American approach, and concludes by showing how courts courts could give proportionality greater expression in constitutional doctrine.


Author(s):  
Maryam Ahranjani

The very first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of speech. While the Supreme Court held in 1969 that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,” since then the Court has limited students' freedom of speech, stopping short of considering the boundaries of off-campus, online speech. Lower court holdings vary, meaning that a student engaging in certain online speech may not be punished at all in one state but would face harsh criminal punishments in another. The lack of a uniform standard leads to dangerously inconsistent punishments and poses the ultimate threat to constitutional knowledge and citizenship exercise: chilling of speech. Recent interest in technology-related cases and the presence of a new justice may reverse the Court's prior unwillingness to address this issue. In the meantime, this chapter argues that school districts should erect a virtual schoolhouse gate by implementing a uniform standard.


Author(s):  
Tatiana Dmitrievna Bratko

  Ensuring compliance with the generally accepted principles of law, protection of human and civil constitutional right and freedoms are attributed to a number of fundamental problems of the Russian and foreign law. Special place among them belongs to the problem of protection of constitutional rights of tax payers, particularly the contest of constitutionality of tax breaks. The essentially different approaches towards verification of constitutionality of tax breaks have established in the Russian Federation and the United States. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation refuses to verify the constitutionality of tax breaks based on compliances of the taxpayers, and thus in the author’s opinion, neglects the violation of constitutional norms. The goal of this article consists in examination of the problem of contest of constitutionality of tax breaks by the Russian taxpayers, and finding a possible way for its solution that would ensure compliance with the constitutional requirements in terms of tax incentivization. For achieving the set goal, the author resorts to comparative analysis of the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of the United States on the questions of verification of constitutionality of tax breaks. The author believes that the Supreme Court of the United States leans on the presumption of constitutionality of tax breaks, while the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation – on the fiction of constitutionality of tax breaks. The conclusion is made in the need for implementation of the U.S. experience in the Russian Federation due to positive assessment of the developed by the Supreme Court of the United States algorithm of verification of constitutionality of tax breaks and presumption of constitutionality of tax breaks.  


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document