scholarly journals VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA: CANDIDATE STRATEGIES, MARKET LOGIC AND EFFECTIVENESS

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Aspinall ◽  
Noor Rohman ◽  
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi ◽  
Rubaidi ◽  
Zusiana Elly Triantini
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Personal Resources ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Personal Connections ◽  
Constituency Size ◽  
Logic Structures ◽  
Buying In

AbstractWhat underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exchange is so difficult to enforce? We address this question through close analysis of campaigns by several dozen candidates in two electoral districts in Java, Indonesia. Analyzing candidates’ targeting and pricing strategies, we show that candidates used personal brokerage structures that drew on social networks to identify voters and deliver payments to them. But these candidates achieved vote totals averaging about one quarter of the number of payments they distributed. Many candidates claimed to be targeting loyalists, suggestive of “turnout buying,” but judged loyalty in personal rather than partisan terms, and extended their vote-buying reach through personal connections mediated by brokers. Candidates were market sensitive, paying prices per vote determined not only by personal resources, but also by constituency size and prices offered by competitors. Accordingly, we argue that a market logic structures Indonesia's system of vote buying.

scholarly journals Social Networks and the Targeting of Vote Buying

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 382-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesi Cruz
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Family Ties ◽  
Political Cooperation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Electoral Strategies ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Buying In

The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.

Digital vote-buying will challenge weak democracies

2022 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
Online Banking ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Buying In

Significance In August, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) warned that online banking and electronic wallets -- the use of which has surged during the pandemic -- will be prime vehicles for digital vote-buying. Impacts Digital vote-buying will strengthen regional political clans, which are often the conduit for vote-buying in rural areas. Foreign influencer campaigns could become more disruptive with digital vote-buying. Fintech firms in fragile democracies could face tighter regulation on transparency and Know Your Customer rules.

Hitting Them With Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 857-881 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Frye ◽  
Ora John Reuter ◽  
David Szakonyi
Keyword(s):  
Middle Income Country ◽  
Income Country ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Election Cycle ◽  
Active Monitoring ◽  
Simple Argument ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
Survey Experiments ◽  
Buying In

Scholars have identified many ways that politicians use carrots, such as vote buying, to mobilize voters, but have paid far less attention to how they use sticks, such as voter intimidation. This article develops a simple argument which suggests that voter intimidation should be especially likely where vote buying is expensive and employers have greater leverage over employees. Using survey experiments and crowd-sourced electoral violation reports from the 2011–12 election cycle in Russia, the study finds evidence consistent with these claims. Moreover, it finds that where employers have less leverage over employees, active forms of monitoring may supplement intimidation in order to encourage compliance. These results suggest that employers can be reliable vote brokers; that voter intimidation can persist in a middle-income country; and that, under some conditions, intimidation may be employed without the need for active monitoring.

Hitting Them with Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Frye ◽  
Ora John Reuter ◽  
David Szakonyi
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Buying In

TRADING IN POWER: MERCHANTS AND THE STATE IN 19TH-CENTURY EGYPT

2013 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascale Ghazaleh
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
State Building ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Evolution ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
Business Opportunities ◽  
Personal Connections ◽  
New Business ◽  
The 19Th Century

AbstractIn this article, I argue that commercial legislation promulgated and implemented in Egypt during the first half of the 19th century was one of several factors that diminished the effect of merchants’ social networks, reduced merchants’ identity to a purely professional dimension, and made profit dependent upon association with the state. The transformation of merchants’ social roles was not part of a natural evolution toward modernization and the specialized division of labor. Rather, it resulted from interactions between state-building endeavors, pressures from established merchants who sought to parry threats to their position while profiting from new business opportunities, and an influx of merchants from outside the Ottoman sultanate, who could draw neither on personal connections nor on knowledge of local markets but instead had to depend on the protection of the European consulates and the influence of the growing Egyptian state apparatus.

Vote-Buying in Thailand's Northeast: The July 1995 General Election

Asian Survey ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 376-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Callahan ◽  
Duncan McCargo
Keyword(s):  
General Election ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Buying In
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