Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya et al. (S.C.C.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 747-810
Author(s):  
Russell Hopkins

In a judgment delivered on February 28, 2020, the Supreme Court of Canada held (by majority, 7–2) that Canadian common law does not contain an all-encompassing doctrine of non-justiciability based on foreign acts of state; and (by a narrower majority, 5–4) that alleged breaches of customary international law (CIL) arguably provide a novel cause of action in tort. The court held that claims against a Canadian mining corporation related to alleged violations at a mine in Eritrea could proceed to trial.

2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-114
Author(s):  
Beatrice A. Walton

In Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, the Supreme Court of Canada declined to dismiss a series of customary international law claims brought by Eritrean refugees against a Canadian mining corporation for grave human rights abuses committed in Eritrea. In doing so, the Supreme Court opened the possibility of a novel front for transnational human rights litigation: common law tort claims based on customary international law. Under the doctrine of adoption, customary international law is directly incorporated into the Canadian common law. However, Canadian courts have not yet upheld a private right of action for violations of customary international law. Writing for a divided court (5–4), Justice Abella allowed the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed, finding that it is not “plain and obvious” that the plaintiffs’ customary international law claims are bound to fail under either Canada's burgeoning “transnational” or “foreign relations” law, or international law itself. In reaching this conclusion, she offered a unique and overdue reflection on the role of national courts in identifying, adopting, and developing custom. A larger majority of the court (7–2) also rejected outright the application of the act of state doctrine in Canada, tracking several common law systems in limiting the doctrine in favor of human rights litigants.


Author(s):  
Robert Wai

SummaryThis article discusses four judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada that transformed private international law in Canada and represent a striking episode in the internationalization of law — a form of judicial activism in the name of the international. It is argued that these cases evidence a mode of internationalization by internationalist policy consciousness that is distinct from, although often complementary to, internationalization via the mechanism of international treaties or changes in customary international law. The key features of this approach suggest some resemblances to the vision found in the traditions of liberal internationalism, Canadian internationalism, and public international law. The article cautions against several general dangers in the use of this approach in law reform and adjudication and uses two specific doctrinal issues in private international law to demonstrate what a richer policy discourse concerning internationalism would be.


Author(s):  
Gib van Ert

This chapter describes how public international legal norms are received into Canadian domestic law. The rules governing international law’s reception in Canada originate in British constitutionalism and English common law. But the Supreme Court of Canada has developed this tradition by insisting that international law is part of the context in which Canada’s domestic laws are enacted. This has led to a notable openness to internationally informed legal arguments and a strong commitment to the interpretive presumption that domestic law conforms with the state’s international obligations. While treaties still require legislative implementation to take direct effect in domestic law, they can have indirect interpretive effects even without legislation. Customary international law does not require legislation; it is automatically incorporated by the common law. Even Canada’s leading constitutional instrument, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seems now to be interpreted according to a presumption that it at least meets the minimum requirements of international human rights law. Traditional judicial avoidance techniques such as the act of state and political question doctrines are notably absent in Canadian reception jurisprudence. Courts still find ways to disregard international law in particular cases, but the trajectory is toward using it.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


Author(s):  
Gibran van Ert

SummaryIn Spraytech v. Hudson, the Supreme Court of Canada made a bold declaration on the status of the precautionary principle in international law. While the methodology of the majority is open to criticism, the judgment is a welcome clarification of the court’s groundbreaking decision in Baker v. Canada and, building on that case, offers the prospect of a truly internationalized Canadian jurisprudence. In a postscript to this comment, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v. Canada is briefly considered.


Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.


Author(s):  
Wendy A. Adams

SummaryThe distinction between formal and essential validity in Anglo-Canadian choice of law regarding marriage is an illogical bifurcation that unnecessarily invalidates same-sex relationships contracted in foreign jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reformulated certain rules of private international law, taking into account both the constitutional and sub-constitutional imperatives inherent in a federal setting and the need for order and fairness when co-ordinating diversity in the face of increasing globalization. Reform of the choice of law rules regarding the validity of foreign marriages should proceed accordingly with the result being that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. No principled reason exists to deny recognition to same-sex relationships validly contracted in other jurisdictions, nor to differentiate between the rights and obligations arising from the legal status of same-sex and different-sex relationships.


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