Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (U.S. Sup. Ct.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Whytock

Domestic courts frequently apply foreign law. For example, the forum's choice-of-law rules may require a court to apply foreign law, or a party may expressly base a claim or defense on foreign law. Private international law (or “conflict of laws”) provides principles governing many aspects of the way courts should identify and interpret foreign law.

Author(s):  
Torremans Paul

This chapter examines the issue of incidental question from a choice of law perspective. A case involving private international law may place a subsidiary issue, as well as a main question, before the court. The main issue should, under the English rules of private international law, be governed by a foreign law. This chapter first explains what an incidental question is before discussing its essential elements. It then considers two cases that illustrate the way in which an incidental question arises: Lawrence v Lawrence in England and Schwebel v Ungar in Canada. It also proposes a coherent and predictable approach for dealing with the incidental question and concludes with an overview of a problem related to that of the incidental question — dépeçage or ‘picking and choosing’.


2017 ◽  
pp. 80-87
Author(s):  
Indrani Kundu

Marriage, a civil union between two persons, involves some legal procedures which determine the rights and liabilities of parties in such civil union. Conflict of marriage laws is the conflict of laws governing status and capacity to marry defined by personal laws of parties to the marriage. Rules of Conflict of Laws are set of procedural rules which determine A) which legal system will be applicable to a given dispute, & B) which Court will have jurisdiction to try the suit.In the words of Dicey and Morris, rules of Private International Law do not directly determine the rights and liabilities of persons, rather it determines the jurisdiction of Court and the choice of body of law i.e. whether by the domestic law or by any foreign law, the case will be decided. This paper, by adopting doctrinal approach, seeks to find the criteria for Indian court to exercise jurisdiction in cross border matrimonial suit. Further, it endeavors to find out the difference between term ‘domicile’ and ‘residence’.


2019 ◽  
pp. 172-194
Author(s):  
Adrian Briggs

This chapter examines of the role of the lex fori in English private international law before proceeding to examine the rules of the conflict of laws applicable in an English court. Issues for which the rules of the conflict of laws select the lex fori as the law to be applied include grounds for the dissolution (as distinct from nullity) of marriage, even if the marriage has little or nothing to do with the United Kingdom; or settlement of the distribution of assets in an insolvency even though there may be significant overseas elements. Where the rules of the conflict of laws select a foreign law, its application, even though it is proved to the satisfaction of the court, may be disrupted or derailed by a provision of the lex fori instead. The remainder of the chapter covers procedural issues; penal, revenue, and public laws; and public policy.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Hill

This introductory chapter begins by explaining the nature of the subject known as conflict of laws or private international law, which deals with cases before the English court which have connections with foreign countries. The foreign elements in the case may be events which have taken place in a foreign country or countries, or they may be the foreign domicile, residence, or place of business of the parties. In short, any case involving a foreign element raises potential conflict of laws issues. The conflict of laws is concerned with the following three questions: jurisdiction; choice of law; and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The remainder of the chapter discusses the various stages of proceedings which raise conflict of laws issues.


Author(s):  
Joost Blom

For anyone who is interested in the methodology of choice of law, no field is more rewarding than that of contracts. As domestic laws of contracts develop a progressively more intricate relationship between the principles of social regulation and private autonomy, private international law is led to develop choice of law techniques that will keep an appropriate balance between these principles in interjurisdictional cases. Choice of law rules that underemphasize the interests of the parties, and rely instead on the regulatory concerns of states that are affected by the transaction, may place too many obstacles in the way of persons who should be left to arrange their transaction in the way they think best. At the same time, choice of law rules that give too much weight to the parties’ wishes may interfere unduly with a state’s ability to regulate a transtaction with which it has a legitimate concern. In this respect, balance is more difficult to achieve in contracts than it is elsewhere.


Author(s):  
Kobeh Marie-Claude Najm

This chapter evaluates Lebanese perspectives on the Hague Principles. In Lebanon, private international law rules in respect of international commercial contracts are not codified. There are statutory rules governing certain areas of private international law, some of which might be relevant in cases where international commercial contracts are litigated. This is the case for rules on international jurisdiction (Articles 74–80 Code of Civil Procedure, hereafter CCP), recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions (Articles 1009–1024 CCP), international arbitration (Articles 809–821 CCP) and the application of foreign law (Articles 139–142 CCP). Given the rarity of private international law statutory rules, and specifically the absence of statutory choice of law rules for international commercial contracts, it was up to the courts to shape conflict of law rules for these contracts.. In this respect, Lebanese courts do not have the authority to refer to the Hague Principles as persuasive applicable rules, ie to use them to interpret and supplement the applicable rules and principles of private international law. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Article 4 CCP invites the courts, in the absence of statutory law, to rely on ‘general principles, custom and equity’.


This collection of essays is written in honour of Adrian Briggs, Professor of Private International Law at the University of Oxford. It recognises his outstanding contributions to the study and practice of the conflict of laws in England and internationally. The essays, written by experts from several legal systems, address topics ranging across the subject’s conventional lines of demarcation (jurisdiction, choice of law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments) and extending to its frontiers. Each of them engages with a particular aspect of the subject’s work. Separately, Professor Briggs’ close colleagues outline his many contributions to teaching and the wider academic community in Oxford and elsewhere.


2013 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth B Crawford ◽  
Janeen M Carruthers

AbstractThis article considers points of connection and coherence between and among the Rome I Regulation, the Rome II Regulation, and Regulation 1215, and relevant predecessor instruments. The degree of consistency in aim, design and detail of conflict of laws rules is examined, vertically (between/among consecutive instruments) and horizontally (across cognate instruments). Symbiosis between instruments is explored, as is the interrelationship between choice of court and choice of law. Disadvantaged parties, and the cohesiveness of their treatment under the Regulations, receive particular attention.


1936 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-21
Author(s):  
H. C. Gutteridge

Our English system of Private International Law has for some time past lent itself to accusationsof insularity of conception and stagnation of thought. Dicey's famous work on the Conflict of Laws has threatened to develop into a comfortable niche in which our rules of jurisdiction and the choice of law would be able to dwell in cloistered seclusion undisturbed by criticism from within or by the infiltration of new ideas from without. English legal thought has, undeniably, been dominated for over a hundred years by two text-books. Story's Conflict of Laws reigned supreme until the beginning of this century when it was ousted by Dicey's treatise. Westlake's Private International Law, which in some respects is the most notable contribution which English writers have made to the development of Private International Law, never established itself in a like degree. The somewhat abstruse treatment of the subject by Westlake and his insistence on its comparative aspects involved a departure from current legal tradition which was not wellreceived by the English legal public. Foote's Private International Law which at one time was held in great favour by practitioners was avowedly confined to an analysis of the English casesand as such contained within itself the germs of the obsolescence which has overtaken it. In any event, Dicey's Conflict of Laws was elevated by the Bench and the Bar to a pinnacle of authority which has seldom been attained by a text-book, and the rules in which Dicey stated his propositions have acquired a character which is almost sacrosanct.


1977 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
K. Lipstein

When I was first called upon to lecture during the darkest days of the war in 1941, because Hersch Lauterpacht was on some mission, I was still surrounded by my own teachers—Buckland, Duff, Gutteridge and McNair (Hazeltine had left). Of these Gutteridge and McNair influenced me most—the former by convincing me that foreign law was well worth studying, if not for its own sake, then in order to test the validity of one's own cherished notions and established techniques and to acquire the inspiration for new solutions, but not in order to discover an all pervading droit commun legislatif. McNair impressed upon me the reality of the rules of international law in the practice of states and in the administration of law by domestic courts. Not monism of a doctrinaire kind, but the age old tradition of the common lawyer to interpret English law so as not to conflict with international law was his inspiration, which has guided me ever since. I must not omit two other formative influences from times long passed. My teachers in Berlin included the last “Pandectist” (Th. Kipp), the broadly based Romanist, Greek scholar and modern comparatist as well as innovator of private international law (Rabel), and the superb exponent of private and private international law (M. Wolff) whose nephew, I am happy to think, will continue the propagation of the work which has been carried out in Cambridge since 1930 by Gutteridge, Hamson and myself. Gutteridge, Rabel and Wolff, whose works in the English language have enriched the fund of the common law, probably gave me the foundations on which most of my own work is based.


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