Does the Iron Curtain Still Exist? The Convergence in Electoral Volatility between Eastern and Western Europe

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 308-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Emanuele ◽  
Alessandro Chiaramonte ◽  
Sorina Soare
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Electoral Volatility ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Eastern And Western Europe ◽  
Do So

AbstractThe literature on party system change and electoral volatility in post-communist Europe tends to make a clear-cut distinction between Central and Eastern European (CEE) party systems and Western European (WE) ones. The former are unstable and unpredictable and electoral volatility is driven by the continuous emergence of new political parties. Conversely, electoral stability is the rule in the latter, and volatility is associated with electoral shifts among established parties. This conventional wisdom suffers from three potential sources of bias: case selection, time coverage and method. By correcting these biases, this article investigates whether the traditional division between CEE and WE party systems has been levelled as regards volatility. To do so, it presents evidence based on an original data set of electoral volatility and its internal components covering 31 WE and CEE party systems since 1990. It finds that a process of asymmetric convergence in the levels of electoral volatility is taking place between the two regions, with Western Europe approaching Central and Eastern Europe with increasing electoral instability.

scholarly journals Electoral coordination and party system institutionalization

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 570-580
Author(s):  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
Mariano Torcal
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Government Performance ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Lower House ◽  
Electoral Cycles ◽  
Party System Institutionalization

A new theoretical development for examining the institutionalization of party systems is proposed in this article. We build on electoral coordination theories to disaggregate volatility into the vote transfers that occur between or towards parties that are in equilibrium (which we call endogenous volatility) and those that are not (exogenous volatility). The former captures accountability, and the latter reflects the number of voters who are not acting in accordance with the existing equilibrium in the party system. Exogenous volatility measures the institutionalization of party systems. We also show that endogenous volatility depends on government performance, while exogenous volatility is a function of institutional openness. The empirical evidence comes from an original data set that includes 448 electoral cycles in lower-house elections in 66 countries between 1977 and 2011.

Institutionalization and De-institutionalization in Post-communist Party Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 422-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zsolt Enyedi ◽  
Fernando Casal Bértoa
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
The West ◽  
Electoral Volatility ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
East West

This article is part of the special cluster titled Parties and Democratic Linkage in Post-Communist Europe, guest edited by Lori Thorlakson, and will be published in the August 2018 issue of EEPS In an article written in 1995 titled “What Is Different about Postcommunist Party Systems?” Peter Mair applied the method that he called “ ex adverso extrapolation.” He matched his knowledge of the process of consolidation of party systems in the West with what was known at that time about Eastern European history, society, and the emerging post-communist party politics. Considering factors such as the existence of fluid social structures, the weakness of civil society, or the destabilizing impact of the so-called triple transition, his article predicted long-term instability for the region. In the present article, we evaluate the validity of Mair’s predictions, thereby also contributing to a lively debate in the current literature about the scale and nature of East–West differences and about the trajectories of the two regions. Going beyond the identification of cross-regional similarities and differences, we also differentiate between individual party systems, establish subgroups, and describe changes across time. Using four major dimensions (i.e., party system closure, party-level stability, electoral volatility, and fragmentation), the article finds that Mair’s predictions were largely, though not in every detail, right. Ironically, however, we also find that changes in the West tend to match over time the trajectory of the East.

scholarly journals The Role of International Factors in Electoral Volatility in Latin America: An Examination of Structural Adjustment

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 215824402110178
Author(s):  
Michelle Kuenzi ◽  
Hafthor Erlingsson ◽  
John P. Tuman
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Structural Adjustment ◽  
Party System ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Electoral Volatility

Does structural adjustment increase party system instability in Latin America? We employ the Latin American Presidential and Legislative Elections (LAPALE) database ( http://www.lapaledata.com ) and our own original data set for structural adjustment to assess the effects of structural adjustment and other economic, social, and political variables on legislative volatility in 18 Latin American countries during the period of 1982 to 2016. The results of our study indicate that structural adjustment results in higher levels of within-system electoral volatility and support a broad version of economic voting theory. Extra-system electoral volatility is driven primarily by institutional and demographic factors. Our findings also highlight the importance of disaggregating electoral volatility as within-system volatility and extra-system volatility appear to be largely driven by different factors, or in different ways by the same factors.

scholarly journals Party System Institutionalization and Government Formation in new Democracies

2016 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Savage
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Party System ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Data Set ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Dominant Parties ◽  
Party System Institutionalization

Party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment. Stability in party systems ensures the presence of regularities that can be observed in government formation, but most empirical research focuses on established democracies. In new democracies, party systems are less institutionalized, which means that interactions between parties can be unpredictable and has significant implications for coalition formation. This article presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design comparable to that of the leading research on Western Europe. The author uses a new data set of potential coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized. The results show first that incumbency is a disadvantage for governments in new democracies when formation occurs postelection. This disadvantage is due to high levels of electoral volatility caused by policy failure and clientelistic practices. Incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place midterm, as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties, which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative. Second, the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition. Instead, programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities. And third, established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation—a possible indicator that a party system is becoming more institutionalized. The article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions.

Hurricane Season

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Haughton ◽  
Kevin Deegan-Krause
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Age Distribution ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
New Parties ◽  
Hurricane Season ◽  
Insight Into

The seemingly random triumph and demise of new political parties in Central and Eastern Europe actually represent a durable subsystem with relevance for party systems around the world. This article supplements existing research on volatility with new measures of party age distribution that reveal clear patterns of disruption, turnover and restabilization. These patterns emerge from stable and coherent party subsystems that follow a simple model based on three dynamics: losses by established parties, rapid gains by uncorrupted newcomers, and equally rapid newcomer losses to even newer parties. Confirmed both by electoral evidence and computer simulations, this model offers insight into the endurance of these subsystems, particularly since the very mechanisms that generate new parties’ success can preclude their ability to survive in subsequent elections. Central and Eastern European party systems offer a laboratory for understanding trends in party system volatility that are emerging in Western Europe and across the globe.

scholarly journals The Centre Does Not Hold: Coalition Politics and Party System Change in the Netherlands, 2002–12

2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huib Pellikaan ◽  
Sarah L. de Lange ◽  
Tom W.G. van der Meer
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Party System ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Coalition Formation Process ◽  
The Impact

Like many party systems across Western Europe, the Dutch party system has been in flux since 2002 as a result of a series of related developments, including the decline of mainstream parties which coincided with the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties and the concurrent dimensional transformation of the political space. This article analyses how these challenges to mainstream parties fundamentally affected the structure of party competition. On the basis of content analysis of party programmes, we examine the changing configuration of the Dutch party space since 2002 and investigate the impact of these changes on coalition-formation patterns. We conclude that the Dutch party system has become increasingly unstable. It has gradually lost its core through electoral fragmentation and mainstream parties’ positional shifts. The disappearance of a core party that dominates the coalition-formation process initially transformed the direction of party competition from centripetal to centrifugal. However, since 2012 a theoretically novel configuration has emerged in which no party or coherent group of parties dominates competition.

Party system erosion: Evidence from Peru

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 581-593
Author(s):  
Christopher L Carter
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Improve Performance ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Weak Party ◽  
Party Brands

Weakly institutionalized party systems are a defining feature of third-wave democracies. Yet, in some countries like Peru, party weakness is not a static equilibrium but rather part of a dynamic process of “party system erosion” in which weak parties become weaker over time as independents come to dominate subnational posts. As I argue, party system erosion is driven by a particular configuration of institutional factors—weak party brands, ease of ballot access, and limited partisan control over resource distribution. These institutional features increase the likelihood that experienced candidates will run as independents. When these candidates are elected, they obtain more intergovernmental discretionary transfers, which are used to improve performance and maintain clientelistic networks. This resource advantage of independent officials further weakens party brands and reduces experienced candidates’ incentives to run with parties in future elections. I test this theory using a data set of 80,000 subnational officials and a regression discontinuity design.

scholarly journals Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence From Over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies

2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172092325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arndt Leininger ◽  
Maurits J Meijers
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Party System ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Quality Of Democracy ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
The Relationship

While some consider populist parties to be a threat to liberal democracy, others have argued that populist parties may positively affect the quality of democracy by increasing political participation of citizens. This supposition, however, has hitherto not been subjected to rigorous empirical tests. The voter turnout literature, moreover, has primarily focused on stable institutional and party system characteristics – ignoring more dynamic determinants of voter turnout related to party competition. To fill this double gap in the literature, we examine the effect of populist parties, both left and right, on aggregate-level turnout in Western and Eastern European parliamentary elections. Based on a dataset on 315 elections in 31 European democracies since 1970s, we find that turnout is higher when populist parties are represented in parliament prior to an election in Eastern Europe, but not in Western Europe. These findings further our understanding of the relationship between populism, political participation and democracy.

scholarly journals The role of political opposition: A pre-requisite for democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-71
Author(s):  
Arif Khan ◽  
Saiful Islam ◽  
Muhammad Alam
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
The Government ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
The Times ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Do So

No doubt for a democracy to be triumphant, multi-party system or, at least two party systems is obligatory. A country where there is one party system and lack observant and efficient opposition there are every chances for the incumbent party to become autocratic and domineering. One party system is most of the times susceptible to transform into dictatorship. Most of the times where there is one party system, the opposition is stifled and trampled and the dictatorship of the single party is established. Germany during Hitler’s rule and Italy during Mussoloni rule are the cases in point. One cannot imagine of a democratic set up without a healthy and watchful opposition. For the success of any parliamentary democracy, an effective opposition is must to carry out its functions courageously and effectively. The paper analyses the rights, responsibilities and obligations of opposition in a democratic system. For this purpose, the techniques adopted by the researcher for data collection include a detailed survey of the available literature covering different aspects of the topic. The internationally reputed authors and experts have been quoted. It is for the government to allow the opposition to fulfil their functions, which indicates a sign of democratic maturity on the part of government. The opposition has to focus on its democratic functions and if it fails to do so, it will be a sign of dysfunctional democracy.

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