scholarly journals When Informality Advantages Women: Quota Networks, Electoral Rules and Candidate Selection in Mexico

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Piscopo
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Gender Quotas ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
The Status ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Informal Practices

As gender quotas change the formal rules governing candidate selection, party leaders use informal practices in order to preserve the choicest candidacies for men. This article uses a critical case to highlight how the opposite also occurs. In Mexico, female elites built informal, cross-partisan networks that, in collaboration with state regulators, successfully eliminated political parties’ practices of allocating women the least-viable candidacies. Traditional party elites rely on informal tactics to secure the status quo, but female party members devise their own strategies to force changes to candidate selection, signalling that informality cannot be theorized as wholly negative for women.

Ideology, Identity, and the 2014 National Elections

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pradeep K. Chhibber ◽  
Rahul Verma
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Regional Parties ◽  
The Status ◽  
Party Members

The 2014 national elections were an ideological showdown between the main political parties with distinctly different visions offered to Indian voters. The BJP advocated a de-emphasis on statism and recognition whereas the Congress and many regional parties favored the status quo. Voter surveys of the 2014 election provide clear evidence of this ideological divide both among party members and voters of particular parties. The divide was furthered by Narendra Modi, the chief campaigner for the BJP, whose personal appeal was important to the electoral success of the BJP. Consistent with theoretical expectations ideologically motivated voters were more likely to participate in political activity around election time. They are also able to distinguish between the ideological vision offered by the various parties and coalitions.

Dinasti Politik dalam Pilkada di Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martien Herna Susanti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
National Level ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Political ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The Status ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Dynastic Politics

The presence of political dynasties in power struggles from regional to national level is inseparable from the role of political parties and the regulation of the regional head elections. Oligarchy on the body of a political party can be seen from the tendency of candidates nominating by political parties based more on the wishes of party elites, not through democratic mechanisms by considering the ability and integrity of the candidates. Simultaneously, political dynasties continue to establish solid networks of power so they can dominate and kill democracy within political parties. In the context of society, there is also an effort to maintain the status quo in the region by encouraging families or people close to the head of the region to replace the incumbent. Weak regulation to trim political dynasties has contributed to the widespread political dynasty in the regional head elections. The practice of dynastic politics is also suspected to make the weakness of checks and balances function to the effect of corruption acts committed by the head of the region and their relatives. In the year 2017 is the second half of a new round of regional head elections, after the first half in 2015. The regional head elections system is new, but the old faces that are nothing but the continuity of the political dynasty characterize this Pilkada event which is feared could threaten the phase of democratic transition towards consolidation of democracy.Keyword: Political Dynasties, Democracy, The Regional Head Elections

Democratic Procedures in the CCP's Cadre Selection Process: Implementation and Consequences

2015 ◽  
Vol 225 ◽  
pp. 73-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingjie Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Democratic Reform ◽  
Process Implementation ◽  
Depth Study ◽  
Research Interviews ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Informal Practices ◽  
Formal Procedures

AbstractSince the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has put in place a series of measures to allow more Party members to participate in the cadre selection process. “Intra-party democracy” was promoted as a remedy to solve the corruption and social tension that resulted from overly concentrated personnel power. How effective are these formal procedures in constraining the appointment power of core Party leaders and institutionalizing the influence of a larger group of cadres? Drawing on archival research, interviews and quantitative data, this paper examines two components of intra-party democratic reform: “democratic recommendation,” which serves as a gateway to cadre promotion, and the semi-competitive elections at Party congresses. This in-depth study finds that the efforts to expand bottom-up participation are hindered by loopholes in formal regulations, informal practices and the frequent rotation of Party officials. Meanwhile, the reform measures have brought changes to the personnel system by complicating the Party secretaries' exercise of appointment power and altering the incentives of ambitious cadres. The implementation of intra-party democracy could improve the vitality of one-party rule, and its ebbs and flows imply a divide within China's top leadership over the direction of political change.

Which Party Elites Choose to Lead the Nomination Process?

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher L. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Presidential Nominations

Even though political parties maintain control of presidential nominations, little is known about what leads individual party members to participate in the process. Party elites have a collective incentive to nominate an electorally viable and ideologically unifying candidate, and they also have personal, strategic incentives that may foster or prevent their participation in the nominating process. Using endorsement data on a subset of party elites—members of the U.S. House of Representatives—this article finds that individual members of the extended party are strategic with their decision to participate in or abstain from the nomination process.

scholarly journals Introduction

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 746-748 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meryl Kenny ◽  
Tània Verge
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Gender Quotas ◽  
Gender And Politics ◽  
Social Bias ◽  
Race And Class ◽  
Selection Processes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Political Recruitment ◽  
The Secret Garden

Twenty years ago, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski published the classic workPolitical Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament(1995), one of the most comprehensive accounts of legislative recruitment thus far. Seeking to explain the social bias evident in legislatures worldwide, Norris and Lovenduski focused on the central role of political parties, arguing that the outcome of parties’ selection processes could be understood in terms of the interaction between thesupplyof candidates wishing to stand for office and thedemandsof party gatekeepers who select the candidates. Indeed, in most countries, political parties control not only which candidates are recruited and selected, but also are the central actors involved in adopting and implementing candidate selection reforms such as gender quotas. Yet, two decades later, systematic studies of the “secret garden” of candidate selection and recruitment have been few and far between in the gender and politics literature. It therefore seems a particularly appropriate time to revisit the core preoccupations, puzzles, and challenges that remain in the field of gender and political recruitment.

scholarly journals Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Terhadap Pembubaran Partai Politik Di Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Hasir Budiman Ritonga
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Republic

Judicial power in Indonesia under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia shall be exercised by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. One of the authority of the Constitutional Court according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is to decide the dissolution of political parties. The facts in the current Indonesian system of ketatanegaran no cases of political parties that were dissolved through the decision of the Constitutional Court, it's just that the problem is when the Constitutional Court uses its authority to break the dissolution of political parties there are things that are formal juridically there is no clear rules, such as the legal status of party members who are not directly involved in the violation committed by the party and the status of party members who hold the position of members of the legislature both at the center and in the regions. So for that must be resolved by emphasizing the certainty, justice and benefit in the decision of the constitutional court

Mobilization in Multi-Level Systems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sona N. Golder ◽  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Elisabeth Gidengil ◽  
Thomas Gschwend
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Multi Level

Existing accounts of multi-level elections focus on voters rather than on political parties, but the multi-level arrangement also affects party strategies. Party elites base their voter mobilization strategies in part on the features of each electoral arena, and make decisions about how to allocate their resources across these arenas accordingly. Small parties, in particular, focus their mobilization efforts on electoral arenas in which the electoral rules are more permissive, so that the parties have a better chance of winning seats. This chapter shows that larger or more nationalized parties tend to make different choices with respect to what kind of potential voters they attempt to mobilize, and for which kind of election, compared with smaller, under-resourced, or regionally based parties.

Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahomi Ichino ◽  
Noah L. Nathan
Keyword(s):  
Party Politics ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Primary Elections ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Political Interference ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Local Party

In new democracies, why do political party leaders relinquish power over nominations and allow legislative candidates to be selected by primary elections? Where the legislature is weak and politics is clientelistic, democratization of candidate selection is driven by local party members seeking benefits from primary contestants. Analysis of an original dataset on legislative nominations and political interference by party leaders for the 2004 and 2008 elections in Ghana shows that primaries are more common where nominations attract more aspirants and where the party is more likely to win, counter to predictions in the existing literature. Moreover, the analysis shows that party leaders interfere in primaries in a pattern consistent with anticipation of party members’ reactions.

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