scholarly journals Bring Back the Politics: The PSPP Ruling in Its Institutional Context

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1045-1057
Author(s):  
Teresa Violante
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Eu Integration ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that the conflict between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union is the story of a clash foretold, if one takes seriously constitutional courts as institutions designed to be “dogs that bite.” The German Court consistently developed a doctrinal tool to guide its role as guardian of the national constitutional order and the democratic principle, and enforced it when the constitutional control of monetary policy measures so required. I analyze the PSPP ruling, focusing on where the Court concluded that the lack of a satisfactory statement of reasons by the European Central Bank prevented it from reviewing the proportionality of the program. I argue that the Court, after conducting a substantive assessment, applied a weak remedy, thereby deferring the last word on the constitutionality of the PSPP to the political branches. In doing so, the Court opens space for the political assessment of a controversial monetary policy, enhancing the politicization of the Economic and Monetary Union, and provides a doctrinal toolbox for national constitutional courts that face competence creep of EU law in their jurisdictions. I conclude that, ultimately, the main merit of constitutional courts’ interventions in the EU integration is that they are in a privileged position to allow for the politicization of technocratic processes.

scholarly journals Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Arrest Warrant ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
European Arrest Warrant ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which allows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the statehood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the implementing Act

Emergence and Diffusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 59-95
Author(s):  
Alec Stone Sweet ◽  
Jud Mathews
Keyword(s):  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
Global Principle ◽  
And Diffusion ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court

This chapter charts how proportionality has developed into a global principle of constitutional law. The German Federal Constitutional Court constitutionalized the proportionality principle, which has roots in eighteenth-century political theory and nineteenth-century administrative law. From Germany, proportionality radiated outward, spreading through Europe with the aid of the courts from the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights, and beyond Europe owing to its adoption by influential constitutional courts, including in Canada, Israel, and South Africa. PA has accompanied most successful transitions to rights-based constitutional democracy in the past three decades, including in Asia and Latin America. The empirical focus in this chapter is on (i) how courts have justified their turn to proportionality, (ii) how they subsequently deploy PA, and (iii) how these choices impact law and politics. Proportionality’s diffusion exhibits the basic features of what institutional sociologists call isomorphism, which is driven by mimetic, coercive, and normative mechanisms. Notwithstanding points of convergence, there are profound cross-national variation in how courts adopt and use proportionality. The chapter explains why this diversity is likely to persist.

A Sense of Déjà Vu? The FCC's Preliminary European Stability Mechanism Verdict

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Role Model ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
German Politics ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The One ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
The Eu

Over the summer of 2012, the pending verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) was a topic of much speculation not only in Germany and in the European Union (EU), but also on the international level. Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was quoted as threatening to leave a meeting, were she to hear again “Bundesverfassungsgericht.” That decisions of a German non-majoritarian institution have such transnational repercussions while being guided by German laws and national considerations is nothing new. The Bundesbank's D-Mark rule was comparable and effectively pushed the introduction of the euro along. But also previous landmark rulings of the FCC on European integration raised cross-border attention, given that the Constitutional Court has the final say on German politics, and the biggest member state and economy of the EU can hardly be ignored. Moreover, being one of the most powerful constitutional courts in Europe, and certainly the one whose judgments receive most attention, rulings of the FCC are not only often cited but may also serve as a role model for other constitutional courts. Protest coming from this angle may therefore multiply.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Goldmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Measure ◽  
European Central ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional

In Karlsruhe's recent request for a preliminary ruling, an unconventional monetary policy measure of the European Central Bank (ECB) finds an unconventional judicial response. Based on its mandate to enforce the fundamental right to vote, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) leaves no doubt about its view that the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT Programme) violates the law of the European Union and hence the German Basic Law, unless one reads them in a rather restrictive way. But as unconventional monetary policy steps up the need for the ECB to justify the legality of its measures, so does the FCC's unconventional expansion of the scope of judicial review raise questions which the recent decision in its—generally laudable—brevity leaves underexplored. In particular, the decision does not dwell much on the issue whether it is appropriate for a court to review issues of monetary policy, and which standard of review should apply. Only Judge Gerhardt calls the majority's standard of review into question when he doubts whether the requirement for transgressions of the European Union's competences to be “manifest” is a workable criterion for defining the scope of the FCC's ultra vires control.

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court – New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Core Competencies ◽  
National Level ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
State Functions

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has found that there are no constitutional objections against the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the FCC imposed limitations to future integration by identifying a number of state functions that are non-amenable to integration and which have to be retained at the national level. This article examines the scope and content of these core competencies. It also discusses to what extent the criteria used by the FCC for the determination of core competencies might reflect a European-wide standard for the determination of limits to the transfer of competencies to the European Union. The article concludes that the judgment clarifies the limitations of the transfer of competencies, even though the criteria used by the FCC cannot claim to produce the set of inalienable sovereign powers that were recognized as such throughout the Union.

Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 869-894 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Hartwig
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court

On October 14, 2004 the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) delivered a judgment which gave rise to vivid reactions in the mass media and to a dispute between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the German Federal Constitutional Court. In interviews, members of the Strasbourg court spoke about their disappointment in the German Court's unwillingness to implement decisions of the ECtHR while members of the German court referred to the necessity to respect national particularities. Whereas, normally, the ECtHR and the constitutional courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe are fighting side by side for human rights and, therefore, consider themselves as natural allies, this time their decisions, which seem to be incompatible, led to a dispute which attracted as much public interest as a film or theatre premiere.

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