scholarly journals A Long Time Coming

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 944-949
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Economic Community ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

The commentary, especially from abroad, on the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment concerning the bond-buying programme undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB) conveys the impression that something unimaginable has occurred. The German court has refused to follow the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby setting “a bomb under the EU legal order.”1 Yet there is nothing new about the risk of conflict between the two courts. It came about when the Court of Justice of the European Union implicitly presumed, in 1963,2 and explicitly declared, in 1964,3 that European law takes precedence over domestic law, even over domestic constitutional law. This view was by no means without alternative, given that the Treaties of Rome do not address the precedence of Community law. The Member States involved in the dispute denied having agreed to any such precedence in the Treaties. Even the CJEU’s Advocate General was unable to find any basis in the Treaties for the precedence of European law.4 The CJEU derived the precedence of European law from the purpose of the European Economic Community.5 It argued that there could be no common market if each Member State applied and interpreted European law however it saw fit.

8. European Actions

2020 ◽  
pp. 180-208
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Actions ◽  
The Eu

This chapter describes the direct enforcement of European law in the European Courts. The judicial competences of the European Courts are enumerated in the section of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) dealing with the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter discusses four classes of judicial actions. The first class is typically labelled an ‘enforcement action’ in the strict sense of the term. This action is set out in Articles 258 and 259 TFEU and concerns the failure of a Member State to act in accordance with European law. The three remaining actions ‘enforce’ the European Treaties against the EU itself. These actions can be brought for a failure to act, for judicial review, and for damages.

scholarly journals Objective justification, less discriminatory alternatives, and the ‘Great Repeal Bill’

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Indirect Discrimination ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Apparent Reason ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
The Eu

On the 13 July of this year, the UK Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 1 more commonly called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Aside from the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 (and with it the proposed ousting of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), the Bill’s purpose is to ‘convert the acquis’ of EU law and preserve any UK law implementing EU law.2 This will include ‘workers’ rights’ and with it their employment discrimination rights.3 The efficacy of such a move will be limited if the British judges fail to adopt the same interpretations of these rights as their counterparts in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Over the years of Britain’s membership, there have been many references to Luxembourg to clarify the meaning of particular aspects of the discrimination provisions, with the Court generally giving a more liberal interpretation than the domestic courts had suggested would be their preference. One element of the law largely untouched by this process is the objective justification defence to claims of indirect discrimination. This is because the domestic courts have maintained a fiction that their interpretation is consistent with the EU formula. For no apparent reason, the domestic courts have reworded the EU formula while labelling it as being no different. This presents a major challenge for the Bill. It would be all too easy for Parliament to assume all is well with this aspect of workers’ rights, especially when the judges tell them so. Using a handful of cases, this article exposes the shortfalls within the domestic law and suggests some solutions. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the Bill (which no doubt is due for many amendments), but to focus on one important aspect of discrimination law, both pre- and post-Brexit.

scholarly journals Will the European Union accede to the European Convention on Human Rights? ‘Before’ and ‘after’ the Opinion 2/13 of the ECJ

2020 ◽  
pp. 370-381
Author(s):  
Olena Polivanova ◽  
Olga Poberezhna
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Eu

The article examines the European Union’s accession to the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. To this end, two stages of accession are being examined: the stage before the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 on the compatibility of the Draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention with the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the stage after this Opinon. In the frames of the first stage the prerequisites for the Court of Justice of the European Union’s making the Opinion 2/13, the content of the Draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention and the main provisions of the legal position of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the incompatibility of the Draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention are analysed. The second stage of the accession examines the intentions and real steps of the institutional mechanism of the European Union and the Council of Europe’s bodies for the implementation of accession, as well as possible ways of eliminating the inconsistencies of the Draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention identified by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Opinion 2/13. Considering that the preparation of the first draft of the EU accession agreement to the Convention took about three years, noting the lack of an updated draft accession agreement (which could have taken into account the position of the European Union Court of Justice expressed in its Opinion 2/13), taking into account the necessity of the compatibility assessment of the new draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention with the EU by the European Union Court of Justice, there is a reason to believe that the issue of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights will have been open for a long time. At the same time, following the adoption of the Opinion 2/13, both the Commission of the European Union and the European Parliament have repeatedly confirmed the continuity of the European Union’s course for accession, and the fact that in early 2020 it was decided to extend the deadlines for the development of legal instruments establishing models of the European Union’s accession to the Convention in the ad hoc group cannot but confirm the perspective of accession at least in the long run.

The Basic Law as a Barrier against a Transformation of the EU into a State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Court ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines how Germany’s Basic Law can prevent the transformation of the European Union into a state. It begins with a discussion of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 2009 decision on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Basic Law. In particular, it highlights the message of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s judgment: that European integration will not be hindered by Germany but finds it limits in the Basic Law. It then explains why, on the side of the EU, the German Court puts so much weight on the treaty character of the EU’s legal basis and why, on the side of the Member States, much emphasis is placed on sovereignty. It also considers the question of whether Germany would be allowed to join a federal European state if its democratic legitimacy were at the level required by Article 79(3) Basic Law.

scholarly journals Member state's lawlessness and European law – the case of Poland

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mezyk
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Domestic Court ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms ◽  
The Eu

Since 2015 the Polish authorities have undertaken numerous actions subordinating the country's judiciary to political influence. These steps met resistance from the European Union (EU), including proceedings by the European Commission and at the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The judgement of the ECJ in the case A.K. and Others v Sąd Najwyższy (2019) brought the situation to another level by empowering national courts to verify the independence of other domestic judicial bodies. While the ECJ empowered Polish judges to reject the domestic court-packing, the Polish state countered this with internal disciplinary sanctions. I discuss this tension and consider the upcoming conflict between the ECJ and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (‘CT’). I conclude by highlighting the fact that whereas Poland breaches European law, the breach will be hard to rectify due to the lack of independent enforcement mechanisms on the side of the EU.

Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

A Union of Peoples

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rival Theory ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
The Eu

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

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