scholarly journals The Conceptualization of Constitutional Supremacy: Global Discourse and Legal Tradition

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 904-923
Author(s):  
Graziella Romeo

AbstractThis Article argues that a) constitutional supremacy is affected by the legal tradition, which implies that it is a concept largely shaped by the legal context in which it is elaborated, and b) the common law version of constitutional supremacy determines a sort of cultural resistance to constitutional imperialism. In making its argument, this Article begins with the doctrine of sources of law with a view to unpack its operational logic within the common law and, therefore, to understand how the supremacy of constitutions is conceptualized. It then examines the embryonic conceptualization of constitutional supremacy in the British legal culture by addressing the “constitutional statutes.” It goes on to analyse how constitutional supremacy is safeguarded in jurisdictions that are affected by the British tradition and equipped with written constitutions, to show how constitutions concretely established themselves as supreme laws without neglecting the relevance of traditions pre-dating the constitutional texts. It then shows how the common law finds its way to be applied alongside or even instead of the constitution. Eventually, this Article offers some conclusions as to the implications of such a conceptualization of constitutional supremacy for comparative and global constitutional studies.

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Claire Hamilton

Abstract The changes to the Irish exclusionary rule introduced by the judgment in People (DPP) v JC mark an important watershed in the Irish law of evidence and Irish legal culture more generally. The case relaxed the exclusionary rule established in People (DPP) v Kenny, one of the strictest in the common law world, by creating an exception based on ‘inadvertence’. This paper examines the decision through the lens of legal culture, drawing in particular on Lawrence Friedman's distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal culture to help understand the factors contributing to the decision. The paper argues that Friedman's concept and, in particular, the dialectic between internal and external legal culture, holds much utility at a micro as well as macro level, in interrogating the cultural logics at work in judicial decision-making.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (12) ◽  
pp. 1255-1275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Leible

National legislators approach European law very differently. The reason for these differences lies partly in the historical development of their individual legal cultures. If one pursues a broad interpretation of the term ‘legal culture’ one takes especially into account the style of law and the attitude toward it. Thus legal culture can be defined as the Continental civil law countries’ ideal of a “concise, but comprehensive codification by which the judge can derive solutions for all possible cases through teleological interpretation;” whereas the common law rather limits this concept to “special laws which are interpreted very narrowly by the courts and accordingly are designed by the legislator to the last detail”. Furthermore, one could include the status of a judge, the nature of legal discourse, or the training of legal professionals, as well as the respect accorded to the law by the population when defining the concept of ‘legal culture'.


2006 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
KWAME AKUFFO

In English law, equity is assigned relatively benign and comfortable roles, functioning as a canon of interpretation of the common law; as its versatile and flexible help-mate and mitigator of its formal strictness. More than this, equity claims a moral justice or conscience function that is deeply embedded in legal culture. As a consequence, equity has been extremely successful in lubricating the machinery of English law, providing it with a ready means of change to meet the needs of the dominant actors within society. This justice function is, however, contradicted by equity's history and its practical functioning, particularly, within the British colonial experience. This article examines the effect of the imposition of English equity on the prevailing customary law systems in colonial West Africa. The analysis challenges the fundamental claim of equity to a moral justice function within the colonial regime and argues that equity served the imperial objective as an instrument for fragmenting and dislocating indigenous property systems in order to facilitate the installation of capitalist property forms.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 295-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARGOT C. FINN

The common law tradition: lawyers, books and the law. By J. H. Baker. London: Hambledon, 2000. Pp. xxxiv+404. ISBN 1-85285-181-3. £40.00.Lawyers, litigation and English society since 1450. By Christopher W. Brooks. London: Hambledon, 1998. Pp. x+274. ISBN 1-85285-156-2. £40.00.Professors of the law: barristers and English legal culture in the eighteenth century. By David Lemmings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiv+399. ISBN 0-19-820721-2. £50.00.Industrializing English law: entrepreneurship and business organization, 1720–1844. By Ron Harris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi+331. ISBN 0-521-66275-3. £37.50.Between law and custom: ‘high’ and ‘low’ legal cultures in the lands of the British Diaspora – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600–1900. By Peter Karsten. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi+560. ISBN 0-521-79283-5. £70.00.The past few decades have witnessed a welcome expansion in historians' understanding of English legal cultures, a development that has extended the reach of legal history far beyond the boundaries circumscribed by the Inns of Court, the central tribunals of Westminster, and the periodic provincial circuits of their judges, barristers, and attorneys. The publication of J. G. A. Pocock's classic study, The ancient constitution and the feudal law, in 1957 laid essential foundations for this expansion by underlining the centrality of legal culture to wider political and intellectual developments in the early modern period. Recent years have seen social historians elaborate further upon the purchase exercised by legal norms outside the courtroom. Criminal law was initially at the vanguard of this historiographical trend, and developments in this field continue to revise and enrich our understanding of the law's pervasive reach in British culture. But civil litigation – most notably disputes over contracts and debts – now occupies an increasingly prominent position within the social history of the law. Law's empire, denoting the area of dominion marked out by the myriad legal cultures that emanated both from parliamentary statutes and English courts, is now a far more capacious field of study than an earlier generation of legal scholars could imagine. Without superseding the need for continued attention to established lines of legal history, the mapping of this imperial terrain has underscored the imperative for new approaches to legal culture that emphasize plurality and dislocation rather than the presumed coherence of the common law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Ionel DIDEA ◽  
Diana Maria ILIE

We are heading towards a phenomenon of internationalization and globalization of the substantiation of law, due to the fact that Romania is, inevitably, part of the process of integration and reflection of its own identity in a European and global context. Ultimately, law derives from observing the society and analysing its needs, passing through the filter of equity the final legal form in order to ensure the completeness of law, and also the structural coherence of society. Although the continental European legal culture is attached to the “general will”, globalization managed to erase many of the symbolical boundaries between the legal culture promoted by the Common-law, the one promoted by our system deeply markedby the Romano-Germanic System, and also the legal system outlined by American Realist trends, thus allowing the law to become the result of the self-adaptation of the society, not just the creation of the State.


Author(s):  
Nepyivoda Vasyl ◽  
Nepyivoda Ivanna

The Anglo-American law have a considerable amount of accomplishments, which have become a worldwide asset. In terms of globalization and interaction, to use these achievements would be beneficial for further development of Ukrainian legal system. However, the very philosophy and reasoning behind the precedent-based common law is different from that in the civil law tradition of which the Ukrainian law is a part. This paper is intended to contribute to the examination how the mechanism of Anglo-American law operates in view of the expediency to introduce some of its elements into the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The initial part devoted to the emergence of, and formation of, the common law. It is noted that in the case of common law the influence of Roman law should not be denied. Relying mostly on praetorium ius experience, it has manifested itself in other directions and forms compare to civil law system. Therefore, the both, common law and civil law, despite their differences have been formed on the common ground – the Roman legal tradition. Taking into consideration that throughout their history they exchanged fruitful ideas, there is no irreconcilable, "genetic" incompatibility between them. Thus, it would allow to successfully implant certain common law elements, first of all precedent as a source of law, in the body of Ukrainian law, a part of civil law system. The paper notes that issues of common law mechanism have never been a priority for scholarly research in Ukraine as in a country of civil law tradition. The inertial influence of the Soviet law has also contributed to this situation. According to the communist ideology and the positivist visions on which the Soviet law was based, the precedent has not been considered as an acceptable legal instrument. In order to clarify how the mechanism works, the paper provides an overview of precedent and stare decisis doctrine as key components of common law. While a principle of stare decisis binding courts to follow legal precedents in cases with similar circumstances is in the core of Anglo-American law, in civil law systems precedent is not considered as binding. This discussion is followed by an analysis of judicial lawmaking. The paper specifies that in the common law systems, courts are not absolutely bound by precedents. In terms of radical changes in political, social or legal areas, they are entitled to re-examine and apply the law differently without legislative intervention, to adapt it to new circumstances. Thus, the Anglo-American legal tradition provides much broader scope for judicial lawmaking than Romano-German law. However, there is no consensus on the range to which it should be extended and to which extent it should rely on precedent. Within the framework of this controversial issue judicial activism and judicial restraint, two opposite philosophies of making a ruling in common law, are addressed. In order to examine the multifaceted nature of correlation between stare decisis principle and judicial lawmaking, the latest experience of the Supreme Court of the United States' on overruling precedents is considered. The paper summarizes that, most likely, mixed legal system associated with Nordic countries should be set as the reference point for the movement of Ukraine in this area. Such approach would provide rather broad scope for the operation of the common law elements, while safeguarding its omissions such as unjustified judicial activism.


Author(s):  
Gary F Bell

Indonesia is one of the most legally diverse and complex countries in the world. It practises legal pluralism with three types of contract law in force: adat (customary) contract laws, Islamic contract laws (mostly concerning banking), and the European civil law of contract, transplanted from the Netherlands in 1847, found mainly in the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata). This chapter focuses on European civil law as it is the law used for the majority of commercial transactions. The civil law of contract is not well developed and there is a paucity of indigenous doctrine and jurisprudence, since most significant commercial disputes are settled by arbitration. The contours of the law are consistent with the French/Dutch legal tradition. In the formation of contracts, the subjective intention of the parties plays a greater role than in the common law. As with most jurisdictions with a Napoleonic tradition, the offer must include all the essential element of the contract, there is no concept of ‘invitations to treat’ or of ‘consideration’, the common law posting rule is rejected, and the contract is formed only when the acceptance is received. There are generally few requirements of form but some contracts must be in writing and some in a notarial deed.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter explains briefly the origins and development of the common law tradition in order to better understand the rise of judicial review in the seven common law countries discussed in this volume. The common law legal tradition is characterized historically, in public law, by limited, constitutional government and by forms of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. In private law, the common law tradition is characterized by judge-made case law, which is the primary source of the law, instead of a massive code being the primary source of the law. The common law tradition is also characterized by reliance on the institution of trial by jury. Judges, rather than scholars, are the key figures who are revered in the common law legal tradition, and this is one of the key things that distinguishes the common law legal tradition from the civil law legal tradition. The common law legal tradition emphasizes judicial power, which explains why it has led to judicial review in the countries studied in this volume. It is the prevailing legal tradition in the four countries with the oldest systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation: the United States, Canada, Australia, and India. Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in these four countries is very much shaped by common law attitudes about the roles of judges.


Author(s):  
Juan-Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo

This chapter examines the relationship between judicial legal culture and victim procedural practices at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Starting with judicial composition, judges are categorized by their professional and educational backgrounds and legal cultures before assuming their STL/ECCC judicial positions: whether they originate from the common law/adversarial system, the civil law/inquisitorial system, or the ‘international’ system. The chapter then investigates connections between STL/ECCC practices concerning victim procedural status and the typical features of these legal cultures. Overall, it is argued that there is a direct relationship between the legal culture of judges and their judicial practices. The chapter explains how STL and ECCC judges have adapted several civil law/inquisitorial and common law/adversarial features to make victim procedural status fit the mandate and characteristics of the STL and ECCC, namely, the presence of sui generis international features.


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