scholarly journals Does Investor-State Dispute Settlement Discriminate Against Nationals?

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-222
Author(s):  
Christian Riffel
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
Preliminary Injunction ◽  
Federal Constitutional

AbstractThis Article answers the question of whether investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) discriminates against nationals by providing foreign investors with an extra avenue to challenge state measures. The complaint that ISDS is discriminatory as a matter of principle has surfaced before several European constitutional courts—including the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice—in connection with the ratification of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (“CETA”). This Article rejects this complaint. The Federal Constitutional Court was able to leave the question of discrimination open in the applications for a preliminary injunction to stop ratification. It will have to take a stand, however, in the principal proceedings. If the Court were to side with the applicants, it would sound the death knell not only for the CETA in its present form, but also for the multilateral investment court system promoted by the European Union and, in particular, Germany. The point made by the applicants in the CETA complaint is not only of importance in a European constitutional law context. Whether ISDS is per se discriminatory is a fundamental issue which requires answering before any reform steps in relation to ISDS are addressed.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

scholarly journals Scope and Exercise of the Exclusive Competences of the Member States of the European Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Edyta Anna Krzysztofik
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Uniform Manner ◽  
Constitutional Identity ◽  
The Eu

The process of European integration has introduced the Member States into a new legal reality. The existing exclusivity in the area of competence implementation has been replaced by a two-stage model of their exercise. The Member States, when conferring part of their supervisory powers, did not specify the scope of their own competences. The so-called European clauses were analysed in the Constitutions of selected Member States, which showed that they define the recipient of the conferral and, in a non-uniform manner, specify the subject of the conferral.  The analysis of the indicated provisions clearly shows that the Constitutions of the Member States exclude full conferral of competences on the European Union. There is no specification of the scope of competences that may be conferred. However, this issue was addressed by Constitutional Courts of the Member States. The article refers to the judgements of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Polish Constitutional Court. It has been shown that they equate exclusive competences of the Member States with the scope of the concept of constitutional identity reduced to basic principles of the state. The Court of Justice of the European Union analysed the scope of competences of both entities. The article presents the analysis of judgements on: entries in Civil Registry regarding transcription of surnames, the issue of recognition of same-sex marriages, reform of the judiciary system in Poland, and the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the areas that do not fall under EU competence. Regardless of the division of competences, the EU is bound by the principle of respect for national identity of the Member States, including constitutional identity. It both obligates the EU to respect the exclusive competences of the Member States and is a premise restricting the achievement of EU objectives.

scholarly journals International Investment Arbitration in the European Union

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Erika Bihari
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Court System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Investment Arbitration ◽  
The Status ◽  
Major Reform ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement

The author analyses the regulation of institutional arbitration under investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms, with an emphasis on such arrangements to which the European Union is a party. The functioning of the EU’s Investment Court System is presented in detail as a major reform to the status quo, along with some questions raised when qualifying this system as a means of arbitration, especially for the purposes of recognition and enforcement of decisions rendered, both in jurisdictions party to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and third countries. The latter problem is identified as a significant aspect of international investment arbitration.

scholarly journals “European Integration Through Law”

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Voßkuhle
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
German Parliament

AbstractThis article discusses the Federal Constitutional Court’s contribution to European “integration through law” over the past decades. The Basic Law’s openness to integration and to European Law is examined, as well as the co-operation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in the execution of European Union law and the protection of fundamental rights. The author provides a number of examples to show how the instruments of identity review andultra viresreview developed by the Federal Constitutional Court secure the agenda of European integration as agreed upon in the European Treaties. He also shows how national governmental bodies are bound by the concept of responsibility with respect to the European integration process and how the Court ensures the necessary democratic legitimisation for the acts of European institutions by requiring the involvement of the German parliament in political decision-making processes related to the European Union. Finally, the author explores the idea of the legal community and the criticisms that have been levied against this concept. He concludes by positing that the European Union can only preserve itself by remaining a legal community, and that the rule of law in EU law is indispensable, particularly in times of crisis.

The Role of National Constitutional Courts in European Democracy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Grimm
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Economic Liberalization ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
European Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Court ◽  
European Democracy ◽  
And Function

This chapter examines the role of national constitutional courts in European democracy. It first provides an overview of national constitutional courts in Europe, focusing on the requirements that they impose on national institutions and the consequences of those requirements at the treaty level—i.e., transferring national powers to the European Union and regulating how these powers are exercised; at the level of the EU’s exercise of these powers; and at the level of implementing European law within national legal systems. The chapter also discusses how the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence enabled the European treaties to function as a constitution; the non-political mechanism of EU decisions and how it promotes economic liberalization; and how the design and function of European primary law undermine democracy. The chapter suggests that the democratic legitimacy imparted to the EU’s decisions by its citizens can only develop within the framework of the European Parliament’s powers.

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

2021 ◽  
Vol 192 ◽  
pp. 451-511
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-418
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Lanza
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Treaty Of Lisbon ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

A Constitutional Court for Europe?

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
European Council ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Draft Constitution

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.

scholarly journals The Responsibility of Courts in Maintaining the Rule of Law: Two Tales of Consequential Judicial Self-Restraint

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-181
Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Law

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.

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