Uncertainty, Administrative Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The Courts’ Perspectives

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Fabrizio CAFAGGI ◽  
Paola IAMICELI

The role of courts has been rather significant in the COVID-19 pandemic, weakening the theory that the judiciary is not equipped to contribute to governing crisis management. Although differences exist across countries, depending on institutional varieties and political contexts, the analysis shows that, even in times of emergency, courts can provide the necessary balance to the power shift towards the executives. Both action and inaction affecting fundamental rights have been scrutinised, taking into account fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Deference to political decision-making has varied across jurisdictions and across the multiple phases of the health crisis. Differences in the balancing have emerged compared to during ordinary times. Uncertainty has played a major role, calling for new strategies in regulatory, administrative and judicial decision-making and new balances between precaution and evidence-based approaches. The role of scientific evidence has been at the core of judicial review to ensure transparency and procedural accountability. Proportionality and reasonableness with multiple conceptual variants across countries have been used to scrutinise the legality of measures. Courts are likely to continue playing a significant but different role in the years to come, when liability issues and recovery measures will likely become the core of litigation.

Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-226
Author(s):  
Mary Rogan

The case of Aranyosi and Căldăraru confirms that where prison conditions are so poor as to breach fundamental rights, the non-execution of an European Arrest Warrant is justified. Given the high stakes nature of such a decision, this article examines a critical question: What will be the possible sources of evidence which can and should be used in such an assessment? The article posits that prison inspection and monitoring bodies, which have the task of visiting prisons and reporting on them, with a view to the prevention of ill treatment, will take on an important role in this decision-making process. The article examines what this role might entail and the implications of the decision for prison inspection and monitoring bodies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea L. Miller

Although the influence of gender ideology on lay decision-making has been established, it is not known to what extent expertise may mitigate gendered biases and improve decision-making quality. In a set of controlled experiments, trial court judges and laypeople evaluated a hypothetical child custody case and a hypothetical employment discrimination case. The role of expertise was tested in two ways: by comparing judges’ and laypeople’s decision-making and by examining relative differences in expertise among judges. Judges were no less influenced by litigant gender and by their own gender ideology than the lay sample. Judges with greater subject-matter expertise were also no less influenced by gender ideology than other judges. In some cases, expertise was associated with greater, not less, bias. The results of this study suggest that expertise does not attenuate gendered biases in legal decision-making.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 1006-1024 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Bast

AbstractThe present paper concerns procedural guarantees in immigration proceedings, thus addressing the broader question of the role of the general principles of EU law in respect of administrative decision-making. The main assertion is that certain requirements of procedural due process are recognized in EU law as fundamental rights. They must therefore be observed by Member State authorities when decisions significantly affecting the legal position of a person are taken, provided that the decision is at least partly determined by EU law. The relevant immigration proceedings involve measures related to the termination of residence as well as decisions related to denial or loss of a particular legal status. In effect, the actual scope of application of the EU's administrative fundamental rights is determined by the actual scope of activity of the European legislator. The author concludes that even a relatively ‘shallow’ harmonization of laws can lead to a ‘deep’ reshaping of the domestic legal order, by becoming a Trojan Horse for fundamental rights heretofore alien to some national immigration regimes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1167-1181
Author(s):  
Laura M. Henderson

AbstractThe cases challenging the European Stability Mechanism in Eurozone creditor states show the concern courts have with protecting and promoting democratic contestation. This Article shows how John Hart Ely’s theory of process-based review provides the theoretical basis for understanding how attention to democratic contestation contributes to the legitimacy of courts reviewing legislation against constitutional norms. By focusing on promoting democratic procedures, Ely argues that courts can avoid substantive decisions that are best left to the legislature. Yet, as my discussion of the constitutional theory of constituent and constituted powers shows, no form of constituted power can avoid some exercise of constituent power. In other words, even a process-based approach cannot avoid substantive judgments. The legitimacy of these decisions depends on the availability of avenues for contestation in the judicial decision-making process itself.


2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 363-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Riggs Romaine ◽  
Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein ◽  
Elizabeth Hunt ◽  
David DeMatteo

Author(s):  
David Klein

Years of effort by many talented and creative scholars to gauge the influence of law on judicial decision-making have produced payoffs, but the payoffs do not seem commensurate with the work that has gone into producing them. After reviewing some of the most important approaches and findings, this chapter identifies key obstacles to progress and suggests a new strategy for making more headway against them. The strategy begins by recognizing that ultimately the questions driving empirical and theoretical inquiry into law’s influence are often less about law itself than about the propriety of judicial decision-making. The chapter concludes with suggestions for empirical questions to complement more familiar ones about the role of law in judges’ decisions.


Legal Theory ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan F. Gonzalez Bertomeu

The debate over judicial review of legislation is profuse. But differences are often due to the lack of a common methodology. This article discusses the proper way to evaluate judicial review and confronts central challenges raised against it. It develops the two main models that can be used for analyzing the intersection between democracy and constitutional decision-making and shows that judicial oversight may not be rejected, regardless of how we interpret that connection. The article discusses in detail the model developed by Jeremy Waldron. A nice attempt to answer methodological questions, Waldron's model wrongly tips the balance against judicial review. Its excessive level of abstraction and idealization renders it inoperable. Few systems meet its standards, and those that do pay a high price: they contradict the concept of democratic legitimacy that underlies the model. Paradoxically, a system with judicial review may end up being more legitimate than one without it.


Author(s):  
Isabella Karla Lima dos Santos

Resumo: Este trabalho busca analisar o instituto da Interpretação Constitucional no direito americano e brasileiro, de maneira comparada. Nosso objetivo é demonstrar as semelhanças e diferenças entre os dois países, no que diz respeito ao âmbito de incidência da interpretação constitucional e ao espaço de liberdade conferido ao intérprete judicial, bem como demonstrar a influência do modelo de controle de constitucionalidade norte-americano (difuso) sobre o brasileiro (misto). Para tanto, iremos fazer uma breve análise conceitual sobre aspectos fundamentais ao entendimento do tema deste trabalho e, em seguida, estudaremos os modelos de controle de constitucionalidade dos dois países de modo comparado, com ênfase no papel do intérprete constitucional e o seu âmbito de atuação dentro de cada modelo. Buscamos demonstrar que o fundamental não é o modo como se interpreta a Constituição, mas o resultado obtido, que deve ser sempre a efetivação dos direitos fundamentais. Tanto o Judiciário americano quanto o brasileiro recebem críticas quanto ao caráter contramajoritário de suas decisões, contudo, deixamos claro que um Estado Democrático de Direito se faz não só através do respeito à vontade da maioria, mas também quando há a concretização dos direitos fundamentais dos cidadãos por meio das decisões das Cortes Constitucionais. Palavras-chave: Direito Comparado; Jurisdição Constitucional; Judicial Review of Legislation; Interpretação Constitucional; Direitos Fundamentais. Abstract: This paper seeks to analyse the Constitutional Interpretation Institute in American and Brazilian Law, comparative way. Our goal is to demonstrate the similarities and differences between the two countries, with regard to the scope of constitutional interpretation and impact to the area of freedom conferred upon the court interpreter, as well as demonstrate the influence of constitutionality control model (diffuse) on the Brazilian (mixed). To this end, we will do a brief conceptual analysis on key aspects to understanding of the topic of this work and then we will study the models of judicial review of the two countries so compared with emphasis on the role of constitutional interpreter and its scope of action within each model. We seek to demonstrate that the key is not how to interpret the Constitution, but the results obtained, which should always be the practice of fundamental rights. Both the American and Brazilian Courts receive criticism about the against majority character of their decisions, however, we are clear that a democratic State of law is made not only by respecting the will of the majority, but also when there is the realization of the fundamental rights of citizens by means of decisions of Constitutional Courts. Keywords: Comparative Law; Constitutional Jurisdiction; Judicial Review of Legislation; Constitutional Interpretation; Fundamental Rights.


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