Motivated Reasoning and Implicit Carbon Prices: Overcoming Public Opposition to Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading Schemes

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Goran DOMINIONI

Analysts agree that public opposition is one of the main factors that hinder ambition in many countries’ carbon pricing policy agenda. This article argues that motivated reasoning contributes to this opposition by inducing the public to underestimate the effectiveness of carbon pricing to mitigate climate change and yield co-benefits. This article also argues that measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes due to motivated reasoning. These measures are becoming increasingly available thanks to recent work by the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and private-sector actors, and therefore they offer a potential instrument for reducing public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes in various countries. A strength of the approach proposed in this article – compared to some of the mainstream approaches to risk regulation – is that it tries is to keep the regulation of climate risks in line with public attitudes towards these risks.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Martin ◽  
Jayden Rae ◽  
Brooke Struck ◽  
Sekoul Krastev

This study looked at the effects of framing and payment structure on the public reception of acarbon pricing policy. The study closely mirrored the design of the Federal backstop of the Pan-Canadian Framework, under which consumers receive a direct payment to offset the carbon taxes collected in their province. There were four key findings. First, framing the payment as an “incentive” increased the likelihood of consumers spending their return on green renovations as opposed to everyday purchases. Alternatively, calling the payment a “rebate” pushed people towards spending the money on everyday expenses.Second, if the policy was designed so that payments were disbursed monthly in smaller amounts, they were more likely to be spent on everyday purchases. Conversely, annual lump sum payments were more likely to be allocated towards savings. Third, there was an interaction effect between framing the payment as a “dividend” and the lump sum annual payment structure; in this case, consumers were much more likely to put the money towards savings. Finally, in terms of public perception of the policy, framing it as an “incentive” led to the most positive response, notably in terms of how well the policy reflects on Canada’s image and its alignment with Canadian values. These findings offer insight into how the use of different language to describe a carbon pricing policy, and the use of different payment schedules, can affect what consumers would spend their rebates on and their perception of the policy. How to frame public policy issues advantageously is an important part of political communication. These preliminary findings offer insight into how a carbon pricing policy can be framed and structured so as to promote the changes in consumer behaviour that the policy seeks to bring about.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-456
Author(s):  
Claudio Franzius

Der motorisierte Individualverkehr ist in den Blick der Klimapolitik geraten. Von allen klimarelevanten Sektoren sind im Verkehrssektor die wenigsten CO2-Einsparungen festzustellen. Mit dem neuen Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetz ist eine CO2-Bepreisung des Verkehrs auf den Weg gebracht worden, aber es wird bezweifelt, ob der nationale Emissionshandel hinreichende Lenkungswirkungen entfaltet und finanzverfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist. Es ist verfehlt, den Emissionshandel als Alternative zu ordnungsrechtlichen Instrumenten zu begreifen. Außerdem mahnt der Beitrag im Hinblick auf die verfassungsrechtliche Bewertung zur Vorsicht. Sinn macht der CO2-Preis für den Verkehr, wenn nachgeschärft wird. Dazu gehört eine beherzte Reform der Energiesteuern, aber auch die Einführung einer streckenbezogenen Pkw-Maut sowie eine übergreifende Verkehrsplanung. Im Ergebnis ist zu begrüßen, dass die CO2-Emissionen des Verkehrs einen Preis erhalten, aber naiv anzunehmen, allein darüber würde die Verkehrswende gelingen. Individual motorized transport has become the focus of climate policy. Of all the climate-relevant sectors, the transport sector has seen the fewest reductions in CO2 emissions. The new Fuel Emissions Trading Act (“Brennstoffemissionshandelsgesetz”) initiates carbon pricing for the transport sector. Nonetheless, it remains doubtful whether national emissions trading has sufficient steering effects and if it complies with the constitutional finance law. It would be erroneous to understand emissions trading as an alternative to regulatory instruments. In addition, the article urges caution with regard to the constitutional assessment. Moreover, carbon pricing for the traffic sector only makes sense if it is increased. This includes a courageous reform of energy taxes, but also the introduction of a route-based car toll and comprehensive traffic planning. As a result, carbon pricing of the transport sector is appreciated, however it would be naïve to assume that it alone would lead to a sustainable transport policy (“Verkehrswende”).


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojun Li ◽  
Yingqiu Kuang ◽  
Linting Zhang

AbstractForeign direct investment (FDI) from China has recently met with increasing public opposition in many host nations. Why does the public respond less favourably to Chinese FDI than to FDI from other countries? We explore this question by conducting a series of survey experiments in Canada, where the majority of the public holds a negative opinion of Chinese investment. We find that the bias can be attributed to innumeracy about the relative size of China's FDI and misinformation about investment rules that govern FDI projects in Canada. Correcting both misperceptions substantially reduces the bias of respondents against FDI projects from China. These results suggest that corrective information can lead to positive change in public attitudes, a finding that has important policy implications for Canadian leaders hoping to expand the country's business ties with China.


Author(s):  
Erick Lachapelle

In debates surrounding policy options for mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, economists of various political stripes are near unanimous in their advocacy of putting a price on carbon, whether through a tax or emissions trading program. Due to the visible costs imposed on industry and consumers, however, these policies have been resisted by carbon-intensive industries and by an ideologically divided public, producing incentives for vote-seeking politicians to avoid implementing comprehensive and stringent carbon prices within their own borders. In this highly politicized environment, and considering the more recent diffusion of market-based instruments across political jurisdictions around the world, researchers have sought to identify the conditions most favorable to implementing carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs, the correlates of public support for these policies, and the extent to which different communication strategies may help build public support. How do experts, political leaders, and members of the public understand these policy instruments, and what specific approaches have been most successful in persuading policy makers and the public to support a price on carbon? In places that have yet to implement a carbon price, what can communication strategists learn from existing research and the experience of other jurisdictions where such policies have been successfully implemented? In places where carbon taxes or carbon cap-and-trade programs exist, how are the benefits of these policies best communicated to ensure the durability of carbon pricing policies over time?


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