Conspiracy Theories and Religion: Reframing Conspiracy Theories as Bliks

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn Y. Bezalel

Abstract Conspiracy theories have largely been framed by the academy as a stigmatised form of knowledge. Yet recent scholarship has included calls to take conspiracy theories more seriously as an area of study with a desire to judge them on their own merits rather than an a priori dismissal of them as a class of explanation. This paper argues that the debates within the philosophy of religion, long overlooked by scholars of conspiracy theories, can help sow the seeds for re-examining our understanding of conspiracy theories in a more balanced and nuanced way. The nature of religious belief is elemental to understanding the epistemological foundations of the conspiracy theorising worldview amidst what we may call ‘conspiratorial ambiguity’. Specifically, R.M. Hare's concept of bliks, which are unfalsifiable but meaningful worldviews, offers a way forward to reframe our approach towards the theory of conspiracy theories.

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-97
Author(s):  
VINCENT BRÜMMER

In this response to Stenmark's critique of my views on rational theology, I concentrate on his distinction between the epistemic and the practical goals of religion and between descriptive and normative rational theology. With regard to the first distinction, I grant that truth claims play an essential role in religious belief and that it is indeed the task of philosophy of religion to decide on the meaning and rationality of such claims. I argue, however, that since such claims are internally related to the practical context of religious belief, their meaning and rationality cannot be determined apart from this context as is done in the kind of rational theology which Stenmark calls ‘scientific’. With regard to the second distinction, I reject Stenmark's view that philosophy of religion has a descriptive task with reference to religion, and hence also his claim that I have put forward a false description of ‘the religious language game’.


1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-399
Author(s):  
Michael P. Levine

Through various applications of the ‘deep structure’ of moral and religious reasoning, I have sought to illustrate the value of a morally informed approach in helping us to understand the complexity of religious thought and practice…religions are primarily moved by rational moral concerns and…ethical theory provides the single most powerful methodology for understanding religious belief. Ronald Green, Religion and Moral Reason


Author(s):  
William P. Alston

The philosophy of religion comprises any philosophical discussion of questions arising from religion. This has primarily consisted in the clarification and critical evaluation of fundamental beliefs and concepts from one or another religious tradition. Major issues of concern in the philosophy of religion include arguments for and against the existence of God, problems about the attributes of God, the problem of evil, and the epistemology of religious belief. Of arguments for the existence of God, the most prominent ones can be assigned to four types. First, cosmological arguments, which go back to Plato and Aristotle, explain the existence of the universe by reference to a being on whom all else depends for its existence. Second, teleological arguments seek to explain adaptation in the world, for example, the way organisms have structures adapted to their needs, by positing an intelligent designer of the world. Third, ontological arguments, first introduced by Anselm, focus on the concept of a perfect being and argue that it is incoherent to deny that such a being exists. Finally, moral arguments maintain that objective moral statuses, distinctions or principles presuppose a divine being as the locus of their objectivity. Discussions of the attributes of God have focused on omniscience and omnipotence. These raise various problems, for example, whether complete divine foreknowledge of human actions is compatible with human free will. Moreover, these attributes, together with God’s perfect goodness give rise to the problem of evil. If God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good, how can there be wickedness, suffering and other undesirable states of affairs in the world? This problem has been repeatedly discussed from ancient times to the present. The epistemology of religious belief has to do with the questions of what is the proper approach to the assessment of religious belief (for rationality, justification, or whatever) and with the carrying out of such assessments. Much of the discussion has turned on the contrast between the roles of human reason and God’s revelation to us. A variety of views have been held on this. Many, such as Aquinas, have tried to forge a synthesis of the two; Kant and his followers have sought to ground religion solely on reason; others, most notably Kierkegaard, have held that the subjecting of religious belief to rational scrutiny is subversive of true religious faith. Recently, a group of ‘Reformed epistemologists’ (so-called because of the heavy influence of the Reformed theology of Calvin and his followers on their thinking) has attacked ‘evidentialism’ and has argued that religious beliefs can be rationally justified even if one has no reasons or evidence for them.


The Monist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-414
Author(s):  
Sofia Miguens

Abstract Hilary Putnam and Cora Diamond both wrote on Wittgenstein’s Three Lectures on Religious Belief. They did it quite differently; my ultimate aim in this article is to explore this difference. Putnam’s view of religion is largely a view of ethical life; I look thus into his writings on ethics and his proposals to face the relativist menace therein. Still, in his incursions into philosophy of religion, describing religious experience through authors such as Rosenzweig, Buber, or Levinas, Putnam deals with what Diamond calls, after Wittgenstein, “the gulfs between us.” Such gulfs, and the threat of relativism they bring, need to be accounted for. With that purpose in mind I complement Putnam’s reading of the Three Lectures with Diamond’s own reading.


Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Flage ◽  
Kenneth Pearce

George Berkeley (b. 1685–d. 1753) was an Irish philosopher best known for his defense of immaterialism, the thesis that perceived objects are only ideas and do not exist outside the minds that perceive them (in Berkeley’s famous phrase, their esse is percipi, i.e., their being is to be perceived). This thesis was defended in Berkeley’s two most famous works, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (PHK) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (DHP). While Berkeley scholars have traditionally focused on the arguments in metaphysics and epistemology contained in these two books written in Berkeley’s youth, more recent scholarship has given more attention to other texts and topics, including Berkeley’s later works and his contributions to philosophy of language; philosophy of religion; philosophy of science; and social, political, and economic philosophy.


Noûs ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 383
Author(s):  
William H. Austin ◽  
Robert Audi ◽  
William J. Wainwright

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazimierz Wolsza

The philosophy of religion constituted one of the main fields of research by Prof. Józef Herbut. He created an original version of the analytical philosophy of religion. With the use of logical means, he analysed various dimensions of religion, primarily religious language. During the last period of his work, Herbut included ecumenical issues in his philosophical research. His research on these issues consisted of two stages. During the first stage, Herbut tried to create a specific logic of ecumenism. He hypothesised that the reason for the crisis of ecumenical dialogue consists in the lack of a clearly defined goal. Using the logical set theory, Herbut constructed possible models of doctrinal unity of different denominations. These models were constructed a priori, without reference to actual dialogues. During the second stage of his project, Herbut focused on the content of Catholic and Evangelical doctrines presented in catechisms. Here, he also put forward a research hypothesis that the languages of Catholic and Evangelical theology are different because they include different philosophical assumptions. These assumptions reach back to the medieval problem of universals. The language of Catholic theology is heavily influenced by moderate realism, and the language of Evangelical theology is influenced by moderate nominalism (these are two of the four standpoints in the problem of universals). Herbut's research project is original and innovative in terms of Polish philosophical and theological literature. However, in foreign language literature it is possible to find ones analogous to Herbut's project (József Fuisz, Charles Morerod).


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