scholarly journals WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Connection Problem

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence come in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn (2015) proposes a version of process reliabilism, while Weng Hong Tang (2016) offers a version of indicator reliabilism. As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it is mysterious why we care about justification, for neither of the accounts explains how justification is connected to anything of epistemic value. We will call this the Connection Problem. I begin by describing Dunn's process reliabilism and Tang's indicator reliabilism. I argue that, understood correctly, they are, in fact, extensionally equivalent. That is, Dunn and Tang reach the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes. However, I argue that both face the Connection Problem. In response, I offer my own version of reliabilism, which is both process and indicator, and I argue that it solves that problem. Furthermore, I show that it is also extensionally equivalent to Dunn's reliabilism and Tang's. Thus, I reach the top of the same mountain as well.

Epistemic value

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Greco ◽  
Luis Pinto de Sa
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
Mere True Belief

Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This article looks at various formulations of the value problem and various accounts of the value of knowledge in ancient and modern philosophy. The article then considers some contemporary discussions of the value problem, including the charge that reliabilist accounts cannot account for the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Various virtue-theoretic accounts of epistemic value are discussed as possible improvements over process reliabilism, and the epistemic value of understanding (as compared to knowledge) is considered.

Making Things Right

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Healthy Patient ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Wrong Action

Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for why these intuitions do not show the view to be false.

Core Criteria II

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Content ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Process Reliabilism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Explicit Criteria

This chapter completes the account of the explicit criteria for epistemically proper belief. Given a belief formed through a process or processes on which the subject enjoyed a default permission to rely, the belief is epistemically proper just in case it satisfies a version of Process Reliabilism which the author calls Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR). CIR requires that (i) beliefs be formed and sustained through processes that were reliable (or conditionally reliable), and (ii) the propositional content of the belief, as well as the hypothesis asserting the reliability of the processes as used on this occasion, cohere with the subject’s background beliefs. After arguing that such a view is well motivated, the author suggests that condition (ii) amounts to the exemplification of a minimal kind of epistemic responsibility, and goes on to generalize the account to cover all beliefs (not just basic ones).

Reliabilism’s Memory Loss

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Frise
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Memory Loss ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Process Reliabilism

Abstract Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This result weakens a long-standing argument for reliabilism.

Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgi Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value

A Moderately Pessimistic Perspective on “Cooperative Naturalism”

Projections ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Davies
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Film Studies ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
Film Experience ◽  
Philosophical Questions

Murray Smith’s plea for a “cooperative naturalism” that adopts a “triangulational” approach to issues in film studies is both timely and well-defended. I raise three concerns, however: one is external, relating to this strategy’s limitations, and two are internal, relating to Smith’s application of the strategy. While triangulation seems appropriate when we ask about the nature of film experience, other philosophical questions about film have an ineliminable normative dimension that triangulation cannot address. Empirically informed philosophical reflection upon the arts must be “moderately pessimistic” in recognizing this fact. The internal concerns relate to Smith’s claims about the value and neurological basis of cinematic empathy. First, while empathy plays a central role in film experience, I argue that its neurological underpinnings fail to support the epistemic value he ascribes to it. Second, I question Smith’s reliance, in triangulating, upon the work of the Parma school on “mirror neurons.”

scholarly journals Comparative standard in institutional epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 418-430
Author(s):  
Marko-Luka Zubcic
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Agent Development

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse?s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund?s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Face ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts.Dans la littérature sur l'épistémologie du désaccord, un argument sous-développé pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'idée qu'il y a des bénéfices épistémiques à tirer du désaccord. De tels bénéfices sont impossibles à obtenir si un agent se concilie face au désaccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes liés à la recherche. Dans la théorie de l'argumentation, un désaccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un désaccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des désaccords profonds peuvent mener à des avantages épistémiques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la résolution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de désaccord profond, leur existence s'avère être bénéfique sur le plan épistémologique.

scholarly journals Conceptions of Epistemic Value

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Timothy Perrine
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value

Abstract This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity.

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