SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie Alana Ashton ◽  
Robin McKenna

ABSTRACTFeminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions raise serious problems for feminist epistemologies? We argue that some versions of two of the main strands in feminist epistemology – feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricism – are committed to a form of social constructivism, which requires certain departures from traditional epistemological thinking. But we argue that these departures are less problematic than one might think. Thus, (some) feminist epistemologies provide a plausible way of understanding how (some) knowledge might be socially constructed.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-318
Author(s):  
María Silvestre Cabrera ◽  
María López Belloso ◽  
Raquel Royo Prieto

This article assumes a priori that feminist epistemology must necessarily imply the definition and application of a methodology that is capable of analysing knowledge from a situated perspective, making visible the restrictions of gender, class, ethnicity, and in summary, of the social location.  Feminist Standpoint Theory (FST) set out by authors such as Sandra Harding, calls on those who have not had access to power and areas of decision-making to participate in the construction of knowledge and in the social construction of reality. In this article, we will claim for a need of a sociological investigation based on FST and provide some examples and evidence of the knowledge generated by women's voices building on the analysis of 10 doctoral theses. The methodology used is based on the analysis of the topics chosen by the thesis, the formulation of its objectives and the bibliography used. Likewise, we have developed a so-called “Harding test” grounded on her postulates, which has allowed us to assess the doctoral theses analysed and to reflect about the empirical contributions of the research, the feminist commitment and what the subject / object relationship should be in feminist epistemology.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jenni Rytilä

AbstractThe core idea of social constructivism in mathematics is that mathematical entities are social constructs that exist in virtue of social practices, similar to more familiar social entities like institutions and money. Julian C. Cole has presented an institutional version of social constructivism about mathematics based on John Searle’s theory of the construction of the social reality. In this paper, I consider what merits social constructivism has and examine how well Cole’s institutional account meets the challenge of accounting for the characteristic features of mathematics, especially objectivity and applicability. I propose that in general social constructivism shows promise as an ontology of mathematics, because the view can agree with mathematical practice and it offers a way of understanding how mathematical entities can be real without conflicting with a scientific picture of reality. However, I argue that Cole’s specific theory does not provide an adequate social constructivist account of mathematics. His institutional account fails to sufficiently explain the objectivity and applicability of mathematics, because the explanations are weakened and limited by the three-level theoretical model underlying Cole’s account of the construction of mathematical reality and by the use of the Searlean institutional framework. The shortcomings of Cole’s theory give reason to suspect that the Searlean framework is not an optimal way to defend the view that mathematical reality is socially constructed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 106-115
Author(s):  
Lina Gurung

Feminist Standpoint theory challenges the notion of conventional scientific practices that had excluded women from the inquiry and marginalize them in every aspect of knowledge benefits and construction. Amidst the prevalent controversies, standpoint theorists have proposed alternative knowledge construction with the theses of ‘strong objectivity’, ‘situated knowledge’, ‘epistemic advantage’, and ‘power relations’. Feminist standpoint theory is claimed to be a successful methodology and the author support this argument based on the four reasons; the logic of discovery, insider-outsider position, study up, and methodological innovation. The author also put forwards the various challenges confronted by feminist standpoint theory and the justification given by the theorists. The cognitive, methodological, and epistemological interrogations toward this theory have widened its scope and adoption in social science research. The paper aims to suggest this analysis as the most suitable analytical and theoretical approach to do feminist inquiry which brings the understanding of feminist epistemologies as the most appropriate alternative approach of recent inquires against the dominant practices.


Hypatia ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Weasel

Despite the development of a vast body of literature pertaining to feminism and science, examples of how feminist phifosophies might be applied to scientific theories and practice have been limited. Moreover, most scientists remain unfamiliar with how feminism pertains to their work. Using the example of the immune system, this paper applies three feminist epistemologies feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernismtoassess competingchims of immune function within a feminist context.


Author(s):  
Shari Stone-Mediatore

This article traces debates within feminist theory since the 1980s over the critical and democratic potential of experience-based storytelling. Focusing on accounts of storytelling that have developed within feminist standpoint theory, transnational feminism, feminist democratic theory, and feminist epistemology, the article examines arguments that experience-based narratives are necessary for more rigorous and inclusive civic and scholarly discussions. The article also examines the challenges that have been posed to storytelling from within feminist theory, including analyses that highlight the power relations, exclusions, and cultural conventions that characterize storytelling itself. The article explores what we might learn about the politics of knowledge from such varied but persistent feminist engagements with storytelling.


Author(s):  
Kristen Intemann

Despite a long history of scholarship on feminist standpoint theory, the central claims of the view are often interpreted in different ways, some of which render them implausible. Moreover, as more sophisticated versions of the view have evolved, it has become less clear how standpoint theory offers a distinct alternative to other feminist epistemologies or philosophies of science, such as feminist empiricism. This chapter elucidates and defends an interpretation of feminist standpoint theory known as feminist standpoint empiricism, understood as a branch of feminist empiricism that is committed to producing empirically adequate knowledge that challenges, rather than reinforces, systems of oppression. In doing so, it identifies not only the claims that feminist standpoint theorists share with feminist empiricists, but also the unique epistemological and political benefits that feminist standpoint theory offers.


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