HOW TO SOLVE HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Alexander Jackson

doi:10.1017/epi.2017.32

HOW TO SOLVE HUME'S PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2017.32 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 157-174 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Alexander Jackson

Keyword(s):

Inductive Reasoning ◽

Psychological Explanation ◽

Skeptical Argument ◽

Problem Of Induction ◽

The Past ◽

The Future

ABSTRACTThis paper explains what's wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume's argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.

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Confirmation

Philosophy ◽

10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0024 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Justin Dallmann ◽

Franz Huber

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Observational Data ◽

Scientific Theories ◽

Strong Argument ◽

Problem Of Induction ◽

The Past ◽

The Future ◽

Other Information ◽

Degree Of Confirmation

The term confirmation is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and other information that is taken for granted speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically, confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what to believe regarding the future given information that is restricted to the past and present. One relation between confirmation and induction is that the conclusion H of an inductively strong argument with premise E is confirmed by E. If inductive strength comes in degrees and the inductive strength of the argument with premise E and conclusion H is equal to r, then the degree of confirmation of H by E is likewise said to be equal to r.

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Badiou After Meillassoux: The Politics of the Problem of Induction

10.5422/fordham/9780823290000.003.0010 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 185-203

Author(s):

Nathan Brown

Keyword(s):

Political Action ◽

Theory And Practice ◽

The Political ◽

Problem Of Induction ◽

Alain Badiou ◽

Pragmatic Theory ◽

The Past ◽

Capacity To Act ◽

The Future ◽

The Subject

Chapter 8 reads Quentin Meillassoux’s revival of the problem of induction back into the work of his mentor, Alain Badiou. I argue that Badiou’s theory of the event and of truth procedures can be understood in terms of the aporetic relation of the past to the future theorized by Hume’s famous critique of the grounds of inductive judgment. While Hume overcomes his sceptical doubts through a pragmatic theory of habit (rather than a theory of rationally or empirically grounded knowledge of cause and effect), Badiou’s theory of the subject depends upon a capacity to act within the default of habit: in situations where the genesis of habits in the past is inadequate to the construction of the future in the present. Exemplifying this approach to political action through the political sequence of Occupy Oakland (2011–2012), the chapter develops an account of the political relay between theory and practice.

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