DOING (BETTER) WHAT COMES NATURALLY: ZAGZEBSKI ON RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC SELF-TRUST
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ABSTRACTI offer an account of what trust is, and of what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify five distinct arguments extracted from Chapter 2 of Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority for the rationality and epistemic legitimacy of epistemic self-trust. I take issue with the general account of human rational self-regulation on which one of her arguments rests. Zagzebski maintains that this consists in restoring harmony in the psyche by eliminating conflict and so ending ‘dissonance’. I argue that epistemic rationality is distinct from psychic mechanisms aimed at eliminating dissonance, and these two sometimes pull in opposed directions.
2009 ◽
Vol 16
(1)
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pp. 28-36
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2019 ◽
Vol 33
(1)
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pp. 1-12
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2017 ◽
Vol 31
(2)
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pp. 78-89
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2020 ◽
pp. 1-14
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2008 ◽
Vol 100
(3)
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pp. 629-642
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