Remembering France's glory, securing Europe in the age of Trump

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-44
Author(s):  
Alexandra Gheciu

AbstractThese days, when we hear the slogan ‘let's make our country great again’ we almost automatically assume the state concerned is the US, and the leader uttering the slogan is President Trump. This article invites readers to explore the discourse and practices through which another national leader is seeking to restore his country's ‘greatness’ and promote national and international security. The leader concerned is France's Emmanuel Macron. Why focus on the French president? Because since his election he has become the most dynamic European leader, on a mission to enhance France's international stature, and to do so via a broader process of protecting and empowering the EU. More broadly, France stands out as a country whose political leadership has long been committed to the goal of playing a global role. As Pernille Rieker reminds us, ‘Since 1945, French foreign policy has been dominated by the explicit ambition of restoring the country's greatness [la grandeur de la France], justified in terms of French exceptionalism’.1Macron has cast his vision of national/European greatness, security, and international order in opposition to the isolationist, rigidly nationalist visions articulated by his domestic opponents and, internationally, by President Trump. In his view, France and Europe can only be secure if they defeat the illiberal ideas advocated by the increasingly vocal political forces, particularly far-right movements, seeking to undermine the core values and multilateral principles of the post-1945 international order. Under these circumstances, an analysis of Macron's policies and practices of grandeur can help us gain a better understanding of the competition between liberal and illiberal worldviews – a competition that is increasingly pronounced within the Western world.

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 217-251
Author(s):  
Valentina Covolo

Abstract Combatting criminal misuse of cryptocurrencies was at the core of the fatf agenda under the US Presidency, culminating in June 2019 with the thorough extension of international standards against money laundering over virtual assets’ markets. This echoed the first legislative measure regulating virtual currencies adopted by the EU a year before. Directive 2018/843, better known as the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, fails however to address key technological breakthroughs and new business models, which continuously make the ever-growing and fast-paced crypto economy evolve. Against this background, the present contribution investigates shortfalls and challenges that lay ahead in the light of the new fatf Recommendations. It ultimately argues that the preventive anti-money laundering measures cannot dispense with the establishment of a cross-border integrated supervisory and enforcement system.


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. i-vii
Author(s):  
Richard Duffy ◽  
Brendan D Kelly

The word ‘adherence’ refers to the provision of consistent support (eg. for a political party or religion) or the act of holding particular elements together (eg. in constructing a building). In the medical context, adherence refers to the extent to which patients take their medications as prescribed. While the terminology related to medical adherence has changed significantly over the past two millennia, the core issue has not. Most recently, the term ‘adherence’ has replaced the term ‘compliance’, although it still jostles with ‘concordance’ in a growing literature which focuses now, as always, on one key question: why do so many people seek treatment for illness but then decide not to take their prescribed medication? This is an important question, both in terms of public health and societal cost: in the US, up to 50% of patients do not take their prescribed medications, resulting in additional healthcare costs of $290 billion per year. The greatest cost of non-adherence, however, relates to prolonged illness, increased rates of relapse and reduced wellness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 68-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua A. Braun ◽  
John D. Coakley ◽  
Emily West

This study examines the international activist movement known as Sleeping Giants, a social-media “campaign to make bigotry and sexism less profitable” (Sleeping Giants, n.d.). The campaign originated in the US with an anonymous Twitter account that enlisted followers in encouraging brands to pull their online advertising from <em>Breitbart News</em>. The campaign achieved dramatic success and rapidly spread to regions outside the US, with other anonymously run and loosely allied chapters emerging in 15 different nations (as well as a regional chapter for the EU). Many of these were initially created to take on <em>Breitbart</em> advertisers in their home countries, but in a number of cases they subsequently turned their attention to disrupting financial support for other far-right news media in—or impacting—their home countries. Based on interviews with leaders of eight Sleeping Giants chapters, as well as the related UK-based Stop Funding Hate campaign, this study examines the Sleeping Giants campaign with respect to its continuity with media activism of previous eras, while also seeking to understand its potential as one of the first high-profile activist campaigns to grapple with the impacts of programmatic advertising on the news ecosystem. In particular, we consider how the campaign’s interventions speak to the larger debate around the normative relationship between advertising and the performance of the news ecosystem.


2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciwan M. Can ◽  
Anson Chan

The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the ‘pessimists’ and the ‘optimists’. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for China’s acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an ‘order-shaper’ seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the ‘Rest’, and establish new networks and institutions that will complement and augment the existing arrangements of the liberal international order, instead of challenging it.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-173
Author(s):  
Leandro Wolpert dos Santos

O objetivo deste artigo consiste em retratar um dos principais debates intelectuais que produziu cisões no pensamento diplomático brasileiro a partir dos anos 90, especialmente durante os governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) e Lula da Silva (2003-2010), a saber: o tipo de relacionamento a ser estabelecido com os Estados Unidos. Para tanto, mostraremos de que forma este debate se manifestou, as correntes de pensamento por ele engendradas no interior do Itamaraty, o conjunto de crenças e percepções que sustentaram tais correntes no período em estudo bem como as estratégias de política externa delas oriundas. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam que, neste período, duas tendências se mostraram dominantes no Itamaraty, embora em momentos distintos. A primeira, que damos o nome de acomodacionista, teria predominado durante a administração Cardoso e defendia uma posição de maior aproximação aos EUA, no marco de uma estratégia de acomodação à ordem internacional liderada pela potência hegemônica. A segunda corrente, que chamamos de revisionista, teria ganho proeminência na administração Lula, e preconizava maior autonomia frente à potência hegemônica, com quem o relacionamento brasileiro devia se sustentar na igualdade irrestrita, dentro de uma lógica de equilíbrio de poder. Essa posição de distância relativa frente os EUA se enquadrava em uma estratégia de “multipolarização” ou desconcentração do poder mundial e de revisionismo da ordem internacional vigente. O desenvolvimento da pesquisa ancorou-se fundamentalmente na investigação de discursos, entrevistas, depoimentos, livros e artigos das principais autoridades a frente do Itamaraty (chanceleres e embaixadores) no período em estudo. Palavras-chave: Pensamento Diplomático; Política Externa Brasileira; Estados Unidos.     Abstract: The objective of this article is to portray one of the main intellectual debates that produced divisions in Brazilian diplomatic thought starting in the 1990s, especially during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula da Silva (2003-2010) governments, namely: the kind of relationship to be established with the United States. To do so, we will show how this debate manifested itself, the currents of thought generated by it within the Itamaraty, the set of beliefs and perceptions that underpinned these currents in the period under study as well as the foreign policy strategies that came from them. The results of the research indicate that, during this period, two tendencies were dominant in Itamaraty, although at different moments. The first, which we call the accommodationist, would have predominated during the Cardoso administration and advocated a position of greater approximation to the United States, within the framework of a strategy of accommodation to the international order led by the hegemonic power. The second current of thought, which we call revisionist, would have gained prominence in the Lula administration, and advocated greater autonomy against the hegemonic power, with whom the Brazilian relationship should be based on unrestricted equality, within a balance of power logic. This relative distance from the US was part of a strategy of "multi-polarization" or deconcentration of world power and revisionism of the current international order. The development of the research was fundamentally based on the investigation of speeches, interviews, testimonies, books and articles of the main authorities in front of the Itamaraty (chancellors and ambassadors) during the period of study. Keywords: Diplomatic Thought; Brazilian Foreign Policy; United States.     Recebido em: agosto/2017 Aprovado em: abril/2018.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison Carnegie ◽  
Austin Carson

AbstractHow does publicizing states' illicit activities affect the stability of international order? What does this relationship tell us about how governments react to violations of international rules? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that transparent monitoring strengthens the normative legal order, we argue that these activities often undermine it. We develop two mechanisms through which this occurs: by raising the known rate of noncompliance, and by sharpening the threat that deviance poses to other states. We argue that when enforcers understand the dangers of publicizing transgressions, they do so selectively. Focusing on the nuclear nonproliferation domain, we demonstrate that these concerns shaped American decisions to reveal or obfuscate other states' efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. We formalize this argument and then empirically test the model's predictions using in-depth case study analyses. We find that the US failed to disclose infractions when this publicity would have undermined the rules through the two mechanisms we identify. However, while concealing violations can prevent proliferation in response to specific nuclear programs, it can also create potential dangers to a regime's overall health and stability. In addition to reassessing a widely shared assumption about the value of transparent monitoring, this article's broad theoretical framework can shed light on enforcement and compliance dynamics in a variety of international settings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 370-395
Author(s):  
Alexander Anievas ◽  
Richard Saull

Abstract This article intervenes in IR debates on the origins and character of the postwar liberal international order. Dominant theorizations of the US-led Western order rest on a shared assumption of its essentially post-fascist character based on the liberal-democratic properties of its constitutive members. This article challenges this prevailing view. It does so through a critical historical and theoretical exploration of the role of far-right ideopolitical forces in the development of the liberal international order during the early Cold War period. Drawing on the concepts of “uneven and combined development” and “passive revolution” as alternative theoretical frames, the article focuses particular attention on the significance of former fascists in the workings and institutional fabric of a number of West European states and the relationship between the United States and NATO in far-right coup-plotting and violence that punctuated their national histories. Demonstrating these far-right “contributions” to the making and evolution of the Cold War order, the article offers a reconceptualization of liberal order construction and US hegemony that not only problematizes existing accounts of Cold War geopolitics but also demonstrates the structural interconnections between the far-right and liberal order-building projects that goes beyond the Cold War era.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (spe) ◽  
pp. 70-87
Author(s):  
Nicole de Paula Domingos

The European Union's (EU) decision to include aviation into the Emissions Trade Scheme was heatedly contested. Countries around the world, but mainly the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa group (BRICS) and the US, denounced the EU's initiate as illegal and unilateral. Following a decade of frustrated negotiations at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), this paper interrogates why such measure, in principle climate-friendly, inspired so much global resentment. I argue that concerns with competitiveness and risks of legal inconsistency are important, but insufficient elements to explain the core of the conflict. The paper suggests that the EU was strongly criticized because third countries perceived this action as an imposed solution, which fostered an environment of distrust. Therefore, I claim that the problem has more to do with a normative divide than with a substantive divergence on what should be done regarding aviation emissions. My analysis is informed by the present literature on the links between trade and climate change, but gives particular weight to first-hand information through interviews with key stakeholders. The paper is divided in three parts. First, it presents the scope of the EU directive in historical perspective. Second, it explores the EU's measure through three different angles: legal, economical and political. The final part explores some possible solutions to overcome these divergences.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teoman Ertuğrul Tulun

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, called SWIFT, is considered a cornerstone of global transactions. At its founding, SWIFT membership amounted to 239 banks from fifteen Western countries. Past examples show that SWIFT can also be used as a weapon, even though it is nominally independent. Recent statements indicate that the US and the EU are seriously considering removing Russia from the SWIFT system in case of tension. In fact, back in 2014 after Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula, there were calls to cut Russia off from SWIFT. In response, Russia developed a its domestic financial-communications platform. It should be taken into account that in case certain Russian banks are disconnected from SWIFT, these Russian banks and multinationals looking for ways to move money may find a warm welcome in the growing Chinese Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). In recent years, there has been a significant increase in both the EU and the US use of economic sanctions to force other countries they consider as adversaries "in line" with Western interests. Being in the same alliance no longer suffices in guaranteeing exclusion from such economic sanctions. On the contrary, such sanctions have been turned into a teaching lesson even to allies, and it is undeniable that this behavior has reached a level that will shake even the strongest alliances. It should also be kept in mind that this contemptuous approach erodes the patience of the public opinions of the countries that are not included in the Western World or constantly excluded despite being in that group. It is unlikely that the results of employing sanctions, which has become a habit for the US and the EU, to the most significant countries of the world, such as Russia and China, in terms of their military power as well as their economies, will lead to beneficial results. The developments in the coming period may serve as a reminder that the Western world must act with common sense to avoid sowing divisions in the world trade system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-282
Author(s):  
Felipe Leal Albuquerque

Abstract The election of Donald Trump brought disarray to the climate change regime. The changes in what was up to then a promoter of the liberal international order (LIO) exacerbated existing tensions while creating new ones. This paper investigates how that challenge impacted the behaviours of Brazil, China and the European Union (EU) by comparatively analysing their dissimilar positions with respect to three indicators before and after Trump’s coming into power. These indicators are individual pledges and climate-related policies; approaches to climate finance; and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). The analysis first shows how the US started eroding the broader LIO and the climate change regime to then delve into the behaviours of the three respective key players concerning climate talks. I sustain that the EU, despite its inner divisions, is already counteracting Washington, whereas China is combining a pro-status quo position based on a rhetorical condemnation of the United States. Brazil, in turn, had a transition towards a climate-sceptic government, shifting from being a cooperative actor to abdicating hosting the COP25.


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