scholarly journals Rethinking the “Crisis” of Indigenous Mass Imprisonment

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-456
Author(s):  
Efrat Arbel
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Indigenous People ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Cumulative Impact ◽  
Mass Imprisonment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Legal Understanding

AbstractIn R v Gladue, the Supreme Court of Canada famously remarked that the incarceration of Indigenous people represents a “crisis.” Since Gladue’s release, the language of “crisis” has been used with frequency in Canadian legal discourse. In this article, I analyze how this language has shaped the broader legal understanding of Indigenous mass imprisonment. My focus is not on specific iterations or uses, but on the cumulative impact of the language of “crisis” over the last twenty years. I suggest that however well-meaning these representations may be, their cumulative impact is harmful. In the face of the relentless intensification of Indigenous mass imprisonment, the language of “crisis” has operated to subtly entrench the colonial structures it purports to disrupt. Urging a shift away from its use, I argue that the language of “crisis” is not only ill suited to address the problem, but is part of the problem.

Same-Sex Relationships and Anglo-Canadian Choice of Law: An Argument for Universal Validity

1997 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 103-136
Author(s):  
Wendy A. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Choice Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face

SummaryThe distinction between formal and essential validity in Anglo-Canadian choice of law regarding marriage is an illogical bifurcation that unnecessarily invalidates same-sex relationships contracted in foreign jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reformulated certain rules of private international law, taking into account both the constitutional and sub-constitutional imperatives inherent in a federal setting and the need for order and fairness when co-ordinating diversity in the face of increasing globalization. Reform of the choice of law rules regarding the validity of foreign marriages should proceed accordingly with the result being that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. No principled reason exists to deny recognition to same-sex relationships validly contracted in other jurisdictions, nor to differentiate between the rights and obligations arising from the legal status of same-sex and different-sex relationships.

Sexual Orientation and Legal Discourse: Legal Constructions of the “Normal” Family

1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Orientation ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Michel Foucault ◽  
Normal Family ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Analytic Framework ◽  
Old Age Security ◽  
Legal Method ◽  
The Supreme Court

AbstractLegal method, or the way in which legal claims are processed, is an integral component of the law's authority to include, exclude and deny claims and experiences. This paper explores the issue of sexual orientation and the legal construction of family as it emerges in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Egan v. Canada. The analysis includes a detailed consideration of the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada incorporates assumptions about the nature of family life as a relevant factor in its assessment of the meaning of the word “spouse” under the Old Age Security Act. The process by which notions of the normal family become legitimized through legal discourse is deconstructed using the work of Mary Jane Mossman and Michel Foucault. Mossman develops an analytic framework which illuminates the ways in which legal method works to preserve the power of law and the illusion that law produces “truth.” Michel Foucault considers both the ways in which knowledge is produced as truth, and its integral links to power.

scholarly journals Les erreurs de droit dans l'exercice d'une compétence

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-516
Author(s):  
Denis Lemieux
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Legal Foundations ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In this paper, the author deals with the legal foundations of judicial control over errors of law allegedly committed by administrative authorities. The paper also considers the scope of error of law on the face of the record as a ground of review. More specifically, the author has examined all the decisions rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980 and 1981 where there was an allegation of error of law. From this statistical analysis, the author describes and explains the different, and seemingly contradictory, results achieved by these different jurisdictions. The author adds some comments on the constitutionality of privative clauses excluding judicial review of non-jurisdictional errors of law.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

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