scholarly journals Excuses and Alternatives

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
Keyword(s):  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

AbstractA version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to reasonably opt for—is a good excuse. Yet, this principle is subject to straightforward counterexamples, unless it is given an epistemicised reading. And in this latter case, it does not support PAP. So, PAP is unsupported, at least for now.

scholarly journals Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Max Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for Frankfurt’s critique, moral dilemmas, and the challenge of causal determinism.

Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-410
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
The Many ◽  
Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives. If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. The second premise is a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP): persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. This principle, in conjunction with the assumptions that responsibility requires control, and that this control consists in the freedom to do otherwise, provides the vital bridge from the initial premise to the skeptical conclusion. Some incompatibilists, joining ranks with various compatibilists, have sought to reject this principle by invoking so-called ‘Frankfurt examples.’

Fischer on the Fragilist Account of Alternative Possibilities

Dialogue ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-800
Author(s):  
HUIYUHL YI
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

One response to the Frankfurtian attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is to advert to the observation that the agent’s actual action (or the particular event resulting from that action) is numerically distinct from the corresponding action (or the resultant event) he would have generated in the relevant counterfactual scenario. Since this response is based on taking actions and events to be fragile, I shall call it the fragilist account of alternative possibilities. This paper addresses an anti-fragilist argument delivered by John Martin Fischer. I contend that, on close examination, Fischer’s counterargument does not undermine the fragilist account.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document