Platonic Laws of Nature

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Hildebrand

AbstractDavid Armstrong accepted the following three theses: universals are immanent, laws are relations between universals, and laws govern. Taken together, they form an attractive position, for they promise to explain regularities in nature—one of the most important desiderata for a theory of laws and properties—while remaining compatible with naturalism. However, I argue that the three theses are incompatible. The basic idea is that each thesis makes an explanatory claim, but the three claims can be shown to run in a problematic circle. I then consider which thesis we ought to reject (hint: see the title) and suggest some general lessons for the metaphysics of laws.

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Maclean

In What is a Law of Nature? (1983) David Armstrong promotes a theory of laws according to which laws of nature are contingent relations of necessitation between universals. The metaphysics Armstrong develops uses deterministic causal laws as paradigmatic cases of laws, but he thinks his metaphysics explicates other sorts of laws too, including probabilistic laws, like that of the half-life of radium being 1602 years. Bas van Fraassen (1987) gives seven arguments for why Armstrong's theory of laws is incapable of explicating probabilistic laws. The main thrust of the arguments is that Armstrong's metaphysical apparatus serves to drive up the initial probability values stated by probabilistic laws. Armstrong replies to van Fraassen in his (1988) and (1997) by appealing to limiting relative frequencies. Remarkably little has since been written about Armstrong's theory of probabilistic laws and I wish to revive interest in the debate here by assessing Armstrong's response. I will argue that his response fails because the principle of instantiation puts the limiting relative frequencies that he requires out of reach.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-459
Author(s):  
Nélida Gentile

It will be analyzed some views about laws and highlight certain aspects in each of them that, in our opinion, are to the detriment of their plausibility. The views that we will analyze are the standard regularist conception and the most sophisticated variant known as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL) approach, on the one hand, and the necessitarianist versions of David Armstrong and Stephen Mumford, on the other. Finally, we present an alternative proposal that is intermediate between the regularist conception and Mumford’s nomological anti-realism. We believe that our proposal successfully avoids the reviewed difficulties and opens a new theoretical space within the dispute over the laws of nature.


Author(s):  
Heather Demarest

A familiar choice-point in the laws of nature debate is whether the laws do any important metaphysical work. Some philosophers, such as Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, David Armstrong, and Tim Maudlin, argue that the laws have very important metaphysical work to do because the way the world is depends on the laws. Others, such as David Lewis, Barry Loewer, Jonathan Cohen and Craig Callender, and Alexander Bird argue that the laws do not have important metaphysical work to do because the laws depend on the way the world is. According to the traditional formulation of the Best System Account (BSA), the most basic laws of nature (those that are the aim of ideal, final physics) are those propositions which, taken together, constitute the simplest and most informative description of the world. There are two central, but independent, features of this view. One is that the laws are mere systematizations of the fundamental ontology; they are not metaphysically ‘weighty’ and do not govern. The other is that the laws depend upon only categorical properties and relations. In this chapter I explore the consequences of accepting the first feature while rejecting the second. That is, I explore a best sys-tem account of laws that depends upon potencies. (For the purposes of this chapter, I suppose the fundamental properties are potencies: properties that are essentially dispositional.) I argue that a BSA grounded in potencies is preferable to a BSA grounded in categorical properties. Laws of nature, on this view, are those propositions that constitute the simplest and most informative description of potencies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiwei Yu

Natural laws are at the heart of contemporary academic studies. Yet, the basic question on what is accounted as a law is still open to debate among philosophers of science. This paper provides a survey on three representativephilosophical accounts of laws of nature —— the regularity (Humean) account, the necessitarian account by David Armstrong and the best system account of laws by David Lewis. By pointing out the disputes among these views whichstem from the dilemma pointed out by van Frassen – the tension between the problem of inference and the problem of identification, this paper provides a clear way to compare these accounts and a guidance for further research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-137
Author(s):  
RUSTAM KHAKIMOVICH RAKHIMOV

The article presents the main basic laws of nature and modern theories of the nature of electromagnetic radiation, its generation, characteristics, and laws of reflection, absorption and scattering of light. The principle of transformation of the radiation spectrum of the primary source using the developed ceramic materials are shown, as well as experimental results of the interaction of IR radiation with matter and various mechanisms of influence on various objects and processes are described.


Author(s):  
Nikolay S. Savkin

Introduction. Radical pessimism and militant anti-natalism of Arthur Schopenhauer and David Benathar create an optimistic philosophy of life, according to which life is not meaningless. It is given by nature in a natural way, and a person lives, studies, works, makes a career, achieves results, grows, develops. Being an active subject of his own social relations, a person does not refuse to continue the race, no matter what difficulties, misfortunes and sufferings would be experienced. Benathar convinces that all life is continuous suffering, and existence is constant dying. Therefore, it is better not to be born. Materials and Methods. As the main theoretical and methodological direction of research, the dialectical materialist and integrative approaches are used, the realization of which, in conjunction with the synergetic technique, provides a certain result: is convinced that the idea of anti-natalism is inadequate, the idea of giving up life. A systematic approach and a comprehensive assessment of the studied processes provide for the disclosure of the contradictory nature of anti-natalism. Results of the study are presented in the form of conclusions that human life is naturally given by nature itself. Instincts, needs, interests embodied in a person, stimulate to active actions, and he lives. But even if we finish off with all of humanity by agreement, then over time, according to the laws of nature and according to evolutionary theory, man will inevitably, objectively, and naturally reappear. Discussion and Conclusion. The expected effect of the idea of inevitability of rebirth can be the formation of an optimistic orientation of a significant part of the youth, the idea of continuing life and building happiness, development. As a social being, man is universal, and the awareness of this universality allows one to understand one’s purpose – continuous versatile development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-74
Author(s):  
Galileu Galilei Medeiros de Souza

Resumo: O artigo é um ensaio sobre como a atividade científica poderia ser influenciada por uma proposta ética voltada para a superação das desigualdades. A questão subjacente a este estudo tematiza a possível contraposição entre a ética, que parece ser inteiramente vinculada à liberdade humana e seus processos de escolha, e a lógica da pesquisa científica, que ainda, pelo menos em visão popular, parece se basear na posse de informações objetivas e na descoberta de leis de regulação da natureza. Será feita uma breve contextualização das aquisições teóricas sobre o sentido da ciência positiva dos últimos séculos, procurando extrair daí as indicações de uma estreita dependência dessa em relação às escolhas humanas, em virtude de sua metodologia dialética.   Palavras-Chave: Ciência positiva. Filosofia da ciência. Dialética. Ética.      Abstract: The article is an essay on how scientific activity could be influenced by an ethics proposal aimed at overcoming inequalities. The question underlying this study discusses the possible contrast between ethics, which seems to be entirely linked to human freedom and choice processes, and the logic of scientific research, which still, at least in a popular view, seems to be based on possession of objective information and discovery of regulatory laws of nature. Will be presented a brief background of theoretical acquisitions on the meaning of positive science of the last centuries, looking to extract the indications of a close dependence of this in relation to human choices, because your dialectic methodology.  Keywords: Positive Science. Philosophy of Science. Dialectic. Ethics. REFERÊNCIASARISTÓTELES, Tópicos. In: _______. Órganon. 2.ed. São Paulo: EDIPRO, 2010, p. 347-543.BLONDEL, M. L’Action (1893): essai d’une critique de la vie et d’une science de la pratique, Paris: Quadrige, 1993.CARNAP, R. A superação da metafísica por meio da análise lógica da linguagem. In: Cognitio, São Paulo, v. 10, n. 2, jul./dez. 2009, p. 293-309.DESCARTES, R. Discurso do Método. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001.DILTHEY, W. Introdução às ciências humanas. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2010.FANNING, P. A. Isaac Newton e a transmutação da alquimia: uma visão alternativa da revolução científica. Balneário Camboriú (SC): Livraria Danúbio, 2016.GALILEI, G. Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Galileo Galilei. Antonio Favaro (ed.) Florença: Barbéra, 1928-38, 19 Vols.HESSE, Mary. Revolutions and Reconstruction in Philosophy of Science. Brighton, 1980.HUME, D. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano. In: BERKELEY, G.; HUME, D. Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano; Três diálogos entre Hilas e Filonous em oposição aos Céticos e Ateus; Investigação sobre o entendimento humano; Ensaios morais, políticos e literários. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.KUHN, T. La strututtura delle rivoluzioni scientifiche. Torino: [s.n], 1978.LEVINAS, E. Totalité et Infini. [sl]: The Hague, 1971.MACINTYRE, A. Dopo la virtù: Saggio di teoria morale. Milano: Feltrino, 1988.NEIMAN, S. O mal no pensamento moderno: uma história alternativa da filosofia. Rio de Janeiro: DIFEL, 2003.NIETZSCHE, F. Assim falou Zaratustra. 2.ed., Petrópolis: Vozes, 2008.ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. O que é Filosofia? Campinas: Vide Editorial, 2016.PAGANI, S.M.; Luciani, A. (org.) Os Documentos do Processo de Galileu Galilei. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994.PLATÃO. Teeteto. Tradução de Edson Bini, Bauru/SP: EDIPRO, 2007.POPPER. K. A lógica da descoberta científica. São Paulo: Cultrix, 2001.WHITE, M. O grande livro das coisas horríveis: a crônica definitiva da história das 100 piores atrocidades. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2013. 


Author(s):  
Aliyev Z.H.

The article considers the issues of solving the problems of the development of the erosive danger of soil in Azerbaijan, which is why it should be understood that the human mind is unable to change the force of nature, but can only learn and correctly use the laws of nature, use the acting natural force and improve the ways of controlling them. At the same time, in the process of development, methods are struggling with soil erosion in the first stage, which is necessary for studying the causes of occurrence and patterns in its development


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federica Eftimiadi ◽  
Enrico Pugni Trimigliozzi

Reversible computing is a paradigm where computing models are defined so that they reflect physical reversibility, one of the fundamental microscopic physical property of Nature. Also, it is one of the basic microscopic physical laws of nature. Reversible computing refers tothe computation that could always be reversed to recover its earlier state. It is based on reversible physics, which implies that we can never truly erase information in a computer. Reversible computing is very difficult and its engineering hurdles are enormous. This paper provides a brief introduction to reversible computing. With these constraints, one can still satisfactorily deal with both functional and structural aspects of computing processes; at the same time, one attains a closer correspondence between the behavior of abstract computing systems and the microscopic physical laws (which are presumed to be strictly reversible) that underlay any implementation of such systems Available online at https://int-scientific-journals.com


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