Why Does Kant Think We Must Believe in the Immortal Soul?

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-129
Author(s):  
Jessica Tizzard

AbstractMaking sense of Kant’s claim that it is morally necessary for us to believe in the immortal soul is a historically fraught issue. Commentators typically reject it, or take one of two paths: they either restrict belief in the immortal soul to our subjective psychology, draining it of any substantive rational grounding; or make it out to be a rational necessity that morally interested beings must accept on pain of contradiction. Against these interpreters, I argue that on Kant’s view, belief in our immortality is necessary because it further determines and enriches the cognitive content contained in the concept of the highest good. Through this sharpened conceptual content, we acquire the resources to withstand theoretical skepticism about our moral vocation.

2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (136) ◽  
pp. 69-86
Author(s):  
Marc Artiga

This paper addresses Prinz’s naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works (Prinz 2000, 2002, 2006). More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz’s theory faces four important difficulties, which might have significant consequences for his overall empiricist project.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Mariña ◽  
West Lafayette
Keyword(s):  

Making Media ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 193-206
Author(s):  
Arne H. Krumsvik ◽  
Stefania Milan ◽  
Niamh Ní Bhroin ◽  
Tanja Storsul
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Alan Stephens ◽  
Nicola Baker
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-183
Author(s):  
Stanley Krippner
Keyword(s):  

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 856-857
Author(s):  
Eric D. Miller ◽  
Kenneth R. Valley
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (9) ◽  
pp. 695-696
Author(s):  
Emery S. Hetrick
Keyword(s):  

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