scholarly journals Coercive paternalism and the intelligence continuum

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-107
Author(s):  
NATHAN COFNAS

AbstractThaler and Sunstein advocate ‘libertarian paternalism’. A libertarian paternalist changes the conditions under which people act so that their cognitive biases lead them to choose what is best for themselves. Although libertarian paternalism manipulates people, Thaler and Sunstein say that it respects their autonomy by preserving the possibility of choice. Conly argues that libertarian paternalism does not go far enough, since there is no compelling reason why we should allow people the opportunity to choose to bring disaster upon themselves if sometimes they will make the wrong decision. She defends ‘coercive paternalism’. The present paper argues that errors in reasoning are not due only to cognitive biases. People also make errors because they have an insufficient level of general intelligence. Intelligence is distributed on a continuum. Those who fall on higher levels of the continuum have greater abilities, in certain contexts, to reason about both their own and others’ interests. Coercive paternalism may sometimes be appropriate to prevent less intelligent people from engaging in self-destructive behavior due to errors of reasoning.

2019 ◽  
Vol 130 (629) ◽  
pp. 1384-1415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Hertwig ◽  
Michael D Ryall

ABSTRACT Thaler and Sunstein (2008) advance the concept of ‘nudge’ policies—non-regulatory and non-fiscal mechanisms designed to enlist people's cognitive biases or motivational deficits so as to guide their behaviour in a desired direction. A core assumption of this approach is that policymakers make artful use of people's cognitive biases and motivational deficits in ways that serve the ultimate interests of the nudged individual. We analyse a model of dynamic policymaking in which the policymaker's preferences are not always aligned with those of the individual. One novelty of our set-up is that the policymaker has the option to implement a ‘boost’ policy, equipping the individual with the competence to overcome the nudge-enabling bias once and for all. Our main result identifies conditions under which the policymaker chooses not to boost in order to preserve the option of using the nudge (and its associated bias) in the future—even though boosting is in the immediate best interests of both the policymaker and the individual. We extend our analysis to situations in which the policymaker can be removed (e.g., through an election) and in which the policymaker is similarly prone to bias. We conclude with a discussion of some policy implications of these findings.


1990 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 207-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Firestone ◽  
Richard H. Seiden

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giada Tripoli ◽  
Diego Quattrone ◽  
Laura Ferraro ◽  
Charlotte Gayer-Anderson ◽  
Victoria Rodriguez ◽  
...  

Abstract Background The ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias is associated with both psychosis and general cognition but their relationship is unclear. In this study, we set out to clarify the relationship between the JTC bias, IQ, psychosis and polygenic liability to schizophrenia and IQ. Methods A total of 817 first episode psychosis patients and 1294 population-based controls completed assessments of general intelligence (IQ), and JTC, and provided blood or saliva samples from which we extracted DNA and computed polygenic risk scores for IQ and schizophrenia. Results The estimated proportion of the total effect of case/control differences on JTC mediated by IQ was 79%. Schizophrenia polygenic risk score was non-significantly associated with a higher number of beads drawn (B = 0.47, 95% CI −0.21 to 1.16, p = 0.17); whereas IQ PRS (B = 0.51, 95% CI 0.25–0.76, p < 0.001) significantly predicted the number of beads drawn, and was thus associated with reduced JTC bias. The JTC was more strongly associated with the higher level of psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) in controls, including after controlling for IQ (B = −1.7, 95% CI −2.8 to −0.5, p = 0.006), but did not relate to delusions in patients. Conclusions Our findings suggest that the JTC reasoning bias in psychosis might not be a specific cognitive deficit but rather a manifestation or consequence, of general cognitive impairment. Whereas, in the general population, the JTC bias is related to PLEs, independent of IQ. The work has the potential to inform interventions targeting cognitive biases in early psychosis.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giada Tripoli ◽  
Diego Quattrone ◽  
Laura Ferraro ◽  
Charlotte Gayer-Anderson ◽  
Victoria Rodriguez ◽  
...  

AbstractBackgroundThe “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias is associated with both psychosis and general cognition but their relationship is unclear. In this study, we set out to clarify the relationship between the JTC bias, IQ, psychosis and polygenic liability to schizophrenia and IQ.Methods817 FEP patients and 1294 population-based controls completed assessments of general intelligence (IQ), and JTC (assessed by the number of beads drawn on the probabilistic reasoning “beads” task) and provided blood or saliva samples from which we extracted DNA and computed polygenic risk scores for IQ and schizophrenia.ResultsThe estimated proportion of the total effect of case/control differences on JTC mediated by IQ was 79%. Schizophrenia Polygenic Risk Score (SZ PRS) was non-significantly associated with a higher number of beads drawn (B= 0.47, 95% CI −0.21 to 1.16, p=0.17); whereas IQ PRS (B=0.51, 95% CI 0.25 to 0.76, p<0.001) significantly predicted the number of beads drawn, and was thus associated with reduced JTC bias. The JTC was more strongly associated with higher level of psychotic-like experiences (PLE) in controls, including after controlling for IQ (B= −1.7, 95% CI −2.8 to −0.5, p=0.006), but did not relate to delusions in patients.Conclusionsthe JTC reasoning bias in psychosis is not a specific cognitive deficit but is rather a manifestation or consequence, of general cognitive impairment. Whereas, in the general population, the JTC bias is related to psychotic-like experiences, independent of IQ. The work has potential to inform interventions targeting cognitive biases in early psychosis.


2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 263-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuj C. Desai

In their 2008 bookNudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”


Author(s):  
Julian Le Grand ◽  
Bill New

This chapter examines the so-called nudge ideas based on libertarian paternalism and asymmetric paternalism, both of which seek to provide a practical approach to the trade-off between well-being and autonomy. Nudge policies are government interventions that seek to change the context in which people make choices—the “choice architecture”—so as to nudge them to make decisions in the direction that the government wants. “Libertarian” paternalism is paternalism because the policies involve government intervention in individual decision making with the intention of promoting the individual's own good, but libertarian because the individual maintains a range of choices similar to those that he/she had without the intervention. After considering the relevant definitions, the chapter considers the case for and against libertarian paternalism and concludes by highlighting the principal defense of libertarian paternalist policies: their effectiveness in terms of their impact on well-being and autonomy when compared to alternative paternalistic policies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Brown

Interventions framed through a behavioural lens, particularly ‘Nudge’, are gaining credence in US and UK policy circles, not least around healthcare. Key tenets of this ‘libertarian paternalist’ approach are discussed and related to sociological theory. The influential position of nudge begs sociological engagement, indeed its recognition of ‘choice architecture’ is partially congruent with sociological conceptions of structure-embedded agency. Though recognising the significance of norms, the analysis of nudge fails to appreciate their depth in terms of time, materiality and the socio-cultural. The potency and variable consequences of these social factors are emphasised through Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field. This framework alongside various sociological approaches to risk and uncertainty are proposed as potentially fruitful paths of critical engagement.


Author(s):  
Aleksandar Mojašević

The paper aims to inform the domestic public about the basic concepts of behavioural economics, its historical development and intellectual basis, the application of its findings in policymaking, and its effectiveness in current practical application. In the first part of the paper, the author presents the basic concepts of behavioural economics: the nudge, the choice architecture, the libertarian paternalism, cognitive biases, and others. The second part of the paper provides a concise overview of the critiques directed at behavioural economics and libertarian paternalism (Posner's critique, Mitchell's critique), and a review of the empirical validity of certain behavioural economics phenomena. The third part presents the use of behavioural findings to inform the design of public policy in different domains (the behavioural public policy), along with numerous examples, mostly from the practice of the Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom.


1967 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 177-206
Author(s):  
J. B. Oke ◽  
C. A. Whitney

Pecker:The topic to be considered today is the continuous spectrum of certain stars, whose variability we attribute to a pulsation of some part of their structure. Obviously, this continuous spectrum provides a test of the pulsation theory to the extent that the continuum is completely and accurately observed and that we can analyse it to infer the structure of the star producing it. The continuum is one of the two possible spectral observations; the other is the line spectrum. It is obvious that from studies of the continuum alone, we obtain no direct information on the velocity fields in the star. We obtain information only on the thermodynamic structure of the photospheric layers of these stars–the photospheric layers being defined as those from which the observed continuum directly arises. So the problems arising in a study of the continuum are of two general kinds: completeness of observation, and adequacy of diagnostic interpretation. I will make a few comments on these, then turn the meeting over to Oke and Whitney.


1966 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 170-180
Author(s):  
D. L. Crawford

Early in the 1950's Strömgren (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) introduced medium to narrow-band interference filter photometry at the McDonald Observatory. He used six interference filters to obtain two parameters of astrophysical interest. These parameters he calledlandc, for line and continuum hydrogen absorption. The first measured empirically the absorption line strength of Hβby means of a filter of half width 35Å centered on Hβand compared to the mean of two filters situated in the continuum near Hβ. The second index measured empirically the Balmer discontinuity by means of a filter situated below the Balmer discontinuity and two above it. He showed that these two indices could accurately predict the spectral type and luminosity of both B stars and A and F stars. He later derived (6) an indexmfrom the same filters. This index was a measure of the relative line blanketing near 4100Å compared to two filters above 4500Å. These three indices confirmed earlier work by many people, including Lindblad and Becker. References to this earlier work and to the systems discussed today can be found in Strömgren's article inBasic Astronomical Data(7).


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