What Makes OIRA Work: A Commentary on Jim Tozzi’s “Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Past, Present, and Future”

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-75
Author(s):  
Howard Shelanski

Jim Tozzi has for several decades been among the most dedicated and perceptive commentators on the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Indeed, Tozzi is arguably better suited than anyone to be the keeper of the OIRA flame: from his position in charge of the Office of Regulatory and Information Policy, OIRA’s predecessor organization, Tozzi contributed to the development of Executive Order (EO) 12291 and then stepped in as OIRA’s first Deputy Administrator. Since that time, he has been a steadfast defender of OIRA’s critical role in bringing rigorous analysis, quality control, and policy discipline to Executive Branch regulation. I share Tozzi’s view, and indeed that of all former OIRA officials I have spoken with, of OIRA’s importance to the regulatory state. Preservation of the strength and independence of the office is to me the principal criterion by which policy proposals that effect OIRA should be judged.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Tozzi

AbstractThis article has three sections, each of which deals with an Executive Order. The first section, “Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Past,” emphasizes the critical role that Executive Orders played in the formation of OIRA. More specifically, OIRA owes its initial existence to the establishment of a centralized regulatory review system, the Quality of Life Review, which initiated Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of environmental regulations through the issuance of a directive from OMB. Every subsequent President expanded OMBs powers through the issuance of Executive Orders which culminated in the Iconic Executive Order 12291. The section concludes with the recommendation that a select class of Executive Orders, and OMB Directives, be designated as “Iconic” by the National Archivist in consultation with the OIRA, and then given substantial deference by incoming Administrations. The second section, “OIRA Present,” describes an Executive Order issued during the Kennedy Administration which remains in effect but was promulgated prior to the establishment of OIRA and therefore recommends that a new Executive Order be issued which gives OIRA specific authority to participate in the conduct of interagency reviews of Executive Orders. The third section, “OIRA Future,” describes an Executive Order which implements a regulatory budget (RB) and institutionalizes a mechanism for controlling the size of the administrative state. This final section of the article recommends that the aforementioned Executive Order be reviewed and modified based upon the outcome of a request for public comments, and rules with demonstrated positive net benefits should no longer be accorded an automatic entitlement for issuance as a final rule absent their inclusion in an RB.


1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-111
Author(s):  
David M. Barrett

Two dominant characteristics of President Lyndon Johnson's political style were (1) openness to diverse views and information and (2) extreme secrecy surrounding the advisory process. The two characteristics were in tension, but inextricably linked and served serious purposes: openness brought Johnson policy proposals and political analyses from diverse, credible sources, while secrecy kept his options open until the moment of presidential decision and improved the chances of turning proposals into government policy. I reject characterological analyses which over-emphasize sub-rational causes of Johnson's inclination to secrecy and which contend that he was closed off from diverse advice. The roots of Johnson's style resemble those of post-World War II pluralists, who (like LBJ) were influenced by Franklin Roosevelt's presidency. They and Johnson saw presidents facing a deadlocked democracy and heading an unresponsive executive branch, thus only political skillful and assertive presidents could overcome that dilemma.


1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 512-518
Author(s):  
L. F. Schmeckebier

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order or Reorganization Plans under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.A. Reorganization Plan No. III, under authority of the act of April 3, 1939 (53 Stat. L. 561), was transmitted to Congress on April 2, 1940; it will become effective 60 calendar days thereafter; a resolution disapproving the plan was adopted by the House of Representatives, but was rejected by the Senate. The changes made by this plan are as follows:Administrator of Civil Aëronautics. The designation of the Administrator of the Civil Aëronautics Authority is changed to Administrator of Civil Aëronautics.


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-702
Author(s):  
L. F. Schmeckebier

As in previous lists, mention is here made only of units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order under general authority vested in him.Advisory Committee of the Coast Guard Academy. Created by Public No. 38, 75th Congress, approved April 16, 1937, to examine the course of instruction and to advise the Secretary of the Treasury in regard thereto. Committee will consist of five “persons of distinction in the field of education,” who shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and who shall serve without pay, but who shall be reimbursed for actual expenses of travel.


Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige

The president of the United States is commonly thought to wield extraordinary personal power through the issuance of executive orders. In fact, the vast majority of such orders are proposed by federal agencies and shaped by negotiations that span the executive branch. This book provides the first comprehensive look at how presidential directives are written — and by whom. The book examines more than five hundred executive orders from the 1930s to today — as well as more than two hundred others negotiated but never issued — shedding vital new light on the multilateral process of drafting supposedly unilateral directives. The book draws on a wealth of archival evidence from the Office of Management and Budget and presidential libraries as well as original interviews to show how the crafting of orders requires widespread consultation and compromise with a formidable bureaucracy. It explains the key role of management in the presidential skill set, detailing how bureaucratic resistance can stall and even prevent actions the chief executive desires, and how presidents must bargain with the bureaucracy even when they seek to act unilaterally. Challenging popular conceptions about the scope of presidential power, the book reveals how the executive branch holds the power to both enact and constrain the president's will.


Author(s):  
Douglas L. Kriner ◽  
Eric Schickler

This chapter focuses on two direct pathways through which congressional investigations can produce concrete changes in the specific policy area targeted by the investigation. First, investigations may provide the impetus for new legislation that otherwise would not have passed in its absence. Investigative hearings can spur congressional action and generate political pressure on the president and members of his party to vote for and sign legislation that they may have otherwise resisted through the filibuster or veto. Second, even when investigations are not followed by legislative action compelling the administration to change its behavior, high-profile committee inquiries into executive-branch actions may bring enough political pressure to bear on the White House that it opts to make concessions rather than continue a bruising public fight with the legislature.


Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron

This chapter delves into the depths of one of the most important developments within modern American politics, the creation and institutionalization of executive privilege. In facing a fervent Congress in the grips of McCarthyism, Eisenhower issued a letter denying testimony to the Senate for the Army-McCarthy hearings. His letter included a memo from Attorney General Brownell that claimed the president had an inherent constitutional privilege to deny information to Congress or the public if it was in the public interest and for national security. This action institutionalized the Cold War Paradigm in the executive branch and created an extra-constitutional power for the president. Eisenhower issued several executive orders concerning classification and public dissemination of government information, along with the creation of the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Commerce Department to oversee these policies. Eisenhower claimed historic precedent to justify his inherent constitutional power, regardless, it showed a learned response that changed executive power. Congress would respond in 1955 by creating the Special Subcommittee on Government Information chaired by Rep. John Moss, given jurisdiction for oversight on all executive branch information policies and practices. With the issue of freedom of information institutionalized in Congress, a 12-year legislative power struggle would unfold between Congress and the White House ending with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.


Author(s):  
Stephen Skowronek ◽  
John A. Dearborn ◽  
Desmond King

This chapter considers depth in staff, exploring the role of White House officials tasked to bridge the president’s personal direction with the institutional presidency and the executive branch at large. These staffers are normally part of the presidential party, collectively representing the different wings of the president’s electoral coalition. In the Trump administration, the White House staff jostled for influence and favor throughout the president’s first year. Trump bristled at their efforts to establish regular processes and to control the flow of information. The president saw management of that sort as an impingement on his authority to act on his own instincts and to direct his subordinates at will. Differences over the issue of trade afford a brief, but sharp, illustration of the tension between an institutional presidency and the personal direction of a unitary executive.


2019 ◽  
Vol 152 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S141-S141
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Talmon ◽  
Alejandro Wolf ◽  
Mariam Molani ◽  
Kimberly Martin ◽  
Jeff Jacobs ◽  
...  

Abstract Objectives To describe the Advocacy Journal Club, a novel method to expose pathology residents, fellows, and faculty to critical regulatory and policy issues that affect the practice of laboratory medicine and the importance of involvement in advocacy initiatives. Methods Six voluntary conferences were held for UNMC faculty, local pathologists, and residents during a 1-year period. Each featured a unique, 50-minute interactive discussion led by a faculty member on a topic related to systems-based practice, public health, and/or legislative reform in health care. The six topics included Stark Law, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA), Laboratory Developed Tests, Executive Branch Influence on Health Care, Local Coverage Determinants, and Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA). In addition, all participants completed an 8- to 10-question pre- and posttest. After the completion, a survey to assess the quality and efficacy of the series was administered. Results Between 5 and 11 residents attended each session. Both residents and faculty demonstrated a marked increase in their posttest scores. In the final survey, 92% stated they gained an understanding of how policy affects their local laboratory and 100% a better appreciation of how involvement in pathology organizations’ advocacy efforts impacts the laws, rules, and regulations that affect laboratory medicine. Most (92.3%) reported that topics of the Advocacy Journal Club are important to pathology training and 100% reported that the format was effective. Conclusion The journal club format is an effective method to teach both residents and faculty about health policy and other issues impacting laboratory medicine and the critical role that participation in the advocacy efforts of pathology societies plays in affecting the future of the specialty.


Author(s):  
Philip Joyce

The United States Congress, despite its poor reputation for policymaking, has substantial analytical capacity. While congressional committees possess some of this capability, most of the expertise resides in its three support agencies—the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Within their relative portfolios each of these three agencies has provided the Congress with the ability to make policy, challenge policy proposals coming from the president, and hold the executive branch accountable. All of these agencies face the challenge of providing thorough and credible analyses within the confines of the legislative process and timetable. Further, they must maintain their credibility for nonpartisan analysis in the midst of a political environment that is only growing more polarized. These agencies supply a great deal of high quality information. The challenge for the Congress is how to make better use of this analysis in crafting more effective public policies.


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