The Council on Wage and Price Stability: A Retrospective

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 400-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hopkins ◽  
Laura Stanley

Applying benefit-cost analysis in the White House regulatory oversight process served as a basic mission of the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) during its seven-year lifespan (1974–1981). This paper reviews that CWPS experience, which involved filing comments in over 300 proceedings at more than 25 federal regulatory agencies. The paper draws on those CWPS public comments (filings), identifying persistent and pervasive deficiencies in the economic analysis regulators then and now often use as support for new regulation. CWPS filings fostered greater acceptance of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decisions; such analysis is now required by executive order.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-70
Author(s):  
Susan E. Dudley

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Executive Office of the President coordinates the federal government’s regulatory agenda, reviews executive branch agencies’ draft regulations, and oversees government-wide information quality, peer review, privacy, and statistical policies. Remarkably, its regulatory oversight functions, and the benefit-cost framework underlying them, have not changed significantly through six very different presidential administrations. This article examines the evolution of executive regulatory oversight and analysis from the 1970s to today, exploring the reasons for its durability and whether the current imposition of a regulatory budget challenges the bipartisan nature of regulatory practice.


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W Hahn ◽  
Paul C Tetlock

In response to the increasing impact of regulation, several governments have introduced economic analysis as a way of trying to improve regulatory policy. This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of government-supported economic analysis of regulation. We find that there is growing interest in the use of economic tools, such as benefit–cost analysis; however, the quality of analysis in the U.S. and European Union frequently fails to meet widely accepted guidelines. Furthermore, the relationship between analysis and policy decisions is tenuous. To address this situation, we recommend pursuing an agenda in which economics plays a more central role in regulatory decision making. In addition, we suggest that prediction markets could help improve regulatory policy and improve measurement of the impact of regulation.


1997 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH J. ARROW ◽  
MAUREEN L. CROPPER ◽  
GEORGE C. EADS ◽  
ROBERT W. HAHN ◽  
LESTER B. LAVE ◽  
...  

The growing impact of regulations on the economy has led both Congress and the Administration to search for new ways of reforming the regulatory process. Many of these initiatives call for greater reliance on the use of economic analysis in the development and evaluation of regulations. One specific approach being advocated is benefit-cost analysis, an economic tool for comparing the desirable and undesirable impacts of proposed policies.


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