Rawlsian Objectivity

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-564
Author(s):  
C. M. MELENOVSKY

AbstractIn a 1981 letter to H .L. A. Hart, John Rawls sketches a view of moral objectivity that substantially differs from that of contemporary constructivists. The view he describes does not rely on constitutive features of agency as Korsgaard's does, and it does not bottom out in a form of realism as Scanlon's moral theory does. Instead, Rawls's view grounds objectivity on the fundamental conceptions that could be shared in wide reflective equilibrium. Constructivism grounds objectivity in a kind of intersubjectivity, and Rawls finds the relevant kind of intersubjectivity in the alignment between fundamental convictions. This article develops this Rawlsian view of objectivity and highlights its strengths.

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
william d. casebeer

sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. his case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning.


2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-562
Author(s):  
edward stein

if, as is not implausible, the correct moral theory is indexed to human capacity for moral reasoning, then the thesis that moral heuristics exist faces a serious objection. this objection can be answered by embracing a wide reflective equilibrium account of the origins of our normative principles of morality.


2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister

One of the reasons for ongoing interest in the work of political philosopher John Rawls is that he developed novel methods for thinking systematically about the nature of justice. This paper examines the moral and epistemological motivations for Rawls’s method of “reflective equilibrium,” and the tension between them in Kai Nielsen’s use of “wide reflective equilibrium” in the service of critical and emancipatory social theory.Une des raisons de l’intérêt soutenu pour l’oeuvre du philosophe politique John Rawls est qu’il a développé de nouvelles méthodes de réflexion systématique au sujet de la nature de la justice. Cet article étudie les motifs moraux et épistémologiques soutenant la méthode d’ «équilibre réflectif» de Rawls, et les tensions entre eux dans l’utilisation par Kai Nielsen d’ «équilibre réflectif étendu» au service de la théorie sociale critique et émancipatrice. 


2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 219
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen

Wide reflective equilibrium [WRE] is a distinctive coherentist method of justification or explanation or both, depending on the domain or purpose for which it is deployed. I deploy it principally as a method of justification for accounts of morality and normative political and social theory. But it is also used in many domains from the philosophy of mathematics and science to ethics and aesthetics. When deployed in domains as I deploy it for here, WRE starts with a cluster of societies’ specific considered judgments and uncontroversial empirical beliefs and theories and seeks to forge them into a coherent whole along with other considered judgments at all levels of generality. I use it here principally for a justification of political liberalism where it can and should be used for an internal justification, as John Rawls uses it, and as an external justification as Richard Rorty uses it. I use it for both. While these two modes of justification are distinct, they are compatible and importantly so. And for a more complete justification, both are required.L’équilibre réflectif étendu est une méthode cohérentiste distinctive de justification ou d’explication ou les deux, selon le domaine ou la fin pour laquelle on le déploie. Je le déploie principalement comme méthode de justification de comptes rendus de moralité et de théorie politique et sociale normative. Mais on l’utilise aussi dans plusieurs domaines à partir de la philosophie des mathématiques et de la science jusqu’à l’éthique et l’esthétique. Lorsqu’il est déployé dans des domaines comme je le déploie ici, l’équilibre réflectif étendu a comme point de départ un groupe de jugements considérés et de croyances et de théories empiriques non controversées spécifiques des sociétés et cherche à les organiser en un tout cohérent avec d’autres jugements considérés à tous les niveaux de généralité. Je l’utilise ici principalement pour justifier le libéralisme politique où l’on peut et on devrait l’utiliser pour une justification interne, comme le fait John Rawls, et pour une justification externe, comme le fait Richard Rorty. Je l’utilise pour les deux. Quoique ces deux modes de justification soient distincts, ils sont compatibles et ce de façon notable. Et pour une justification plus complète, il faut les deux.


Author(s):  
John D. Arras ◽  
James Childress ◽  
Matthew Adams

This chapter considers the method of reflective equilibrium, and how it has been used in the context of debates in bioethics. It uncovers the method’s origins in the work of John Rawls and explores how it came to be adopted by Beauchamp and Childress as the unifying method of bioethics. After distinguishing between narrow and wide versions of reflective equilibrium, the chapter proceeds to discuss some problems with the view. The preliminary difficulty that is raised about wide reflective equilibrium in particular is that it is too comprehensive and indeterminate to be useful in bioethics. The chapter ends by outlining deeper concerns with the view, and to what extent internal morality’s conception of “coherence” possesses justificatory force.


1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Depaul

The resurgence of interest in systematic moral theory over the past ten to fifteen years has brought to the fore debates concerning issues in moral epistemology, in particular, questions regarding the correct method for moral inquiry. Much of the controversy has focused on John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. One merit claimed for this coherence method is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. Several of Rawls’ prominent critics have charged that Rawls’ loosely assembled rabble of starting points are not epistemically hefty enough to hoist a moral theory upon their shoulders. Perhaps unwittingly, these critics cling to the two level conception of theory construction, for they both defend general principles as the only appropriate starting points for theory construction and insist upon viewing Rawls as one working within the two tiered conception who opts for more particular judgments as starting points.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 54-63
Author(s):  
Lucas Viana Silva

Trata do caráter objetivo dos juízos morais a partir da proposta ética de John Rawls. Inicialmente, apresenta a discussão acerca da objetividade dos juízos morais como uma questão relevante do discurso metaético contemporâneo. Em seguida, apresenta o equilíbrio reflexivo, ponto de sustentação dos juízos morais na teoria ética de John Rawls, como procedimento adequado no estabelecimento das bases para uma sociedade bem ordenada. Por fim, explicita como o equilíbrio reflexivo pode garantir objetividade aos juízos e à normatividade morais, sem recorrer ao realismo moral como fundamentação dos mesmos.Abstract: It comes to the objective character of moral judgments from the ethics proposed by John Rawls. Initially presents a discussion about the objectivity of moral judgments as an issue of contemporary metaethical discourse. It then presents the reflective equilibrium, support point of moral judgments in ethical theory of John Rawls, as proper procedure in establishing the foundations for a well-ordered society. Finally, it states as reflective equilibrium can ensure objectivity to the moral judgments and normativity without resorting to moral realism as justification for the same. Keywords: Metaethics. Moral objectivity. Moral realism. Moral judgments. Reflective equilibrium. Constructivism 


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