Kimberly Prost

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 243-244
Author(s):  
Kimberly Prost

This is one of the issues that is perhaps the most challenging for judges who come to international courts from a national context. It is particularly important that a judge understands the political context in which they are judging. There is a tendency to say—and I have heard many colleagues at the ICTY and International Criminal Court (ICC) saying—“I am going to keep completely out of the politics because that's none of my business, I'm here to just to do my judicial role.” With great respect I think that is a fundamental mistake, because the reality is if a judge is going to defend her independence on an international court, she really has to understand the political context in which she is defending it.

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger S. Clark

The crime of aggression will be included within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court once agreement is reached on its definition and the conditions for exercising jurisdiction. The author discusses the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the now concluded Preparatory Commission for the Court to complete the drafting. He suggests how the mental and material elements of the offense might be structured consistently with other offenses in the Statute of the Court. Probably the biggest intellectual hurdle is that of “conditions.” A number of states, notably the Permanent Members of the Security Council, insist that there must be a predetermination of an act of aggression by a state made by the Security Council. Others believe that the predetermination can be made by the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice. Yet others claim that all decisions must be made by the International Criminal Court. The political choice between these positions has still to be made.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Nathan T. Carrington ◽  
Claire Sigsworth

Although legitimacy is crucial for courts’ efficacy, the sources identified as legitimizing domestic institutions are weaker or absent altogether for international institutions. We use an original, preregistered, nationally representative survey experiment to show that perceived home-state interest strongly affects the legitimacy afforded by UK citizens to the International Criminal Court. Importantly, this relationship is moderated by nationalism. Our findings have implications for state actors in a position to act vis-á-vis international courts, elites seeking to alter opinions toward courts, and courts themselves weighing possible institutional costs of acting against noncompliant states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 31-38
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

This chapter discusses the author’s transition from being a teacher to being an international criminal Judge. The life of a Judge is much more circumscribed by rules and traditions than the life of a teacher. Both national and international courts have typically adopted codes of professional and ethical conduct, which often include or are accompanied by disciplinary rules to ensure compliance and accountability. It is important to understand that the core mandate of an international criminal court is to try individuals within a governing legal framework and to determine whether—given the specific evidence presented and admitted by the court—the responsibility of an individual accused of international crimes has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The chapter then recounts the author’s experience as an international criminal Judge and assesses whether academics make good criminal Judges.


2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell ◽  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

International courts have proliferated in the international system in the past century, with one hundred judicial or quasi-judicial bodies currently in existence. While the supply of international courts has increased substantially, state level support for international courts varies across states, across courts, and over time. This paper focuses on the cross-sectional and temporal variation in state level support for a particular court, the International Criminal Court (ICC). The authors argue that domestic legal systems create different predispositions with respect to states’ willingness to join adjudicatory bodies and the design of their commitments to international courts. Negotiators involved in the creation of the ICC pushed for rules and procedures that mimicked those of their domestic legal systems to help reduce uncertainty regarding the court’s future behavior and decision-making processes. This interesting process of legal bargaining led to the creation of a sui generis court, one which represents a mixture of common law and civil law systems. The hybrid nature of the court’s design enhanced the attractiveness of the court to civil and common law states, making them significantly more likely to sign and ratify the Rome Statute. Empirical models demonstrate that common and civil law states were fervent supporters of the ICC in preliminary negotiations and that they have shown higher levels of support for the Court since the ICC’s inception in comparison to Islamic law or mixed law states.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manisuli Ssenyonjo

AbstractOn 4 March 2009 the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that it was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, the president of Sudan, is criminally responsible under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as an indirect (co)perpetrator for war crimes and crimes against humanity (but not for genocide). The Chamber issued a warrant for the arrest of Al Bashir making him the third sitting head of state to be charged by an international court following Liberia's Charles Taylor and Yugoslavia's Slobodan Milošević. Since then the ICC has been accused of making a "political decision" and that it is "part of a new mechanism of neo-colonialism". This article examines the ICC's decision against the background of the situation in Darfur. The article concludes that although the ICC decision and warrant cannot be considered political and neo-colonial in nature, the decision and warrant can be criticised as selective. It calls on the ICC to broaden its scope of investigations and for the international community to affirm its support for the ICC and insist that Sudan and other states cooperate fully as required by the United Nations Security Council.


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