The Law (and Politics) of Forced Displacement: Toward a History of the Present

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 111-115
Author(s):  
Itamar Mann

It is a tremendous honor being here today and participating in this esteemed panel on the “Law (and Politics) of Displacement,” which Jill Goldenziel has organized. I would like to share some research Umut Özsu and I are working on. This is a work in progress, but I still think its outlines are worth discussion, by way of historical background. I hope the project also demonstrates quite well why several of us at the International Migration Law Interest Group at the American Society of International Law have been thinking that migration should become more central to the discipline of international law; as central, say, as international humanitarian law.

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neve Gordon ◽  
Nicola Perugini

Abstract Assaults on hospitals have become part of a widespread warfare strategy, propelling numerous actors to claim that belligerents are not being held accountable for attacking medical units. Acknowledging that international humanitarian law (IHL) offers medical units protections, belligerents often claim that the hospitals were being used to shield military targets and therefore the bombing was legitimate. Tracing the history of hospital bombings alongside the development of legal articles dealing with the protection of medical units, we show how, from the early 20th century, international law has introduced a series of exceptions that legitimize attacks on hospitals that were framed as shields. Next, we demonstrate that the shielding argument justifies bombing hospitals because they have ostensibly assumed a threshold position in-between the two axiomatic poles informing the laws of war – combatants and civilians. We argue, however, that medical units tend to occupy a legal and spatial threshold during war and, since IHL does not have the vocabulary to acknowledge the liminal nature of medical units and identifies between liminality and criminality, it introduces several exceptions that help belligerents legitimize their attacks. By way of conclusion, we maintain that the only way to address the deliberate and widespread destruction of medical units is by reforming the law through the introduction of an absolute ban.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


2005 ◽  
Vol 87 (859) ◽  
pp. 525-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Fidler

AbstractAt the intersection of new weapon technologies and international humanitarian law, so-called “non-lethal” weapons have become an area of particular interest. This article analyses the relationship between “non-lethal” weapons and international law in the early 21st century by focusing on the most seminal incident to date in the short history of the “non-lethal” weapons debate, the use of an incapacitating chemical to end a terrorist attack on a Moscow theatre in October 2002. This tragic incident has shown that rapid technological change will continue to stress international law on the development and use of weaponry but in ways more politically charged, legally complicated and ethically challenging than the application of international humanitarian law in the past.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This book is concerned with reparation for human rights and international humanitarian law breaches committed by or attributed to international organizations. These breaches constitute internationally wrongful acts which, according to the International Law Commission’s Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, give rise to an obligation on the offending organization to afford reparation. However, in practice, the obligation to afford reparation is unimplemented. The book explores why this is. It considers how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and, particularly, their application to remedies and reparation owed to individuals. It reviews the various gaps in the law and the limitations of existing redress mechanisms. The book analyses the cogency of the arguments and rationales that have been used by international organizations to limit their liability and the scope and functioning of redress mechanisms, included by the resort to lex specialis principles. It is postulated that the standards of reparation must be drawn from the nature of the breach and the resulting harms and not by who is responsible for the breach. In this respect the book is an exercise in the progressive development of the law. Having determined that existing redress mechanisms cannot afford adequate or effective remedies and reparation, the book explores how to move towards a model that achieves greater compliance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 801-818
Author(s):  
Amanda Alexander

AbstractThis article looks at the development of the concept of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It contends that the ICTR’s interpretation of crimes against humanity is generally seen by international lawyers as a commendable, but unsurprising, step in the historical development of this category. In much the same way, the ICTR’s historical account is considered to be a standard attempt by a war crimes court to relate a liberal history of crimes against humanity in a way that upholds civilized values. Yet, although the historical and legal work of the ICTR appear unexceptional, this article will argue that they do demonstrate a particular conceptual approach towards warfare, history, humanity, and the nature of international law. Moreover, this is a conceptual approach that is quite different to that taken by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The article suggests that these differences, and the invisibility of the change, are due to the ICTR’s reliance on familiar narrative tropes. These narratives were established through poststructuralist theory but could be expressed in a variety of more or (often) less theoretical forms. By exploring the influence of these narratives on the Tribunal, it is possible to examine some of the ways in which conceptual change is facilitated and knowledge is created in international law. In particular, it shows how theories that are often considered marginal to international law have had a significant impact on some of the central provisions of international humanitarian law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N Schmitt

This article responds to the two articles published in this journal that criticise the approach taken by the International Group of Experts (IGE) who prepared the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Their authors took issue with the approach of the majority of the IGE over the question of whether data qualifies as an ‘object’ under international humanitarian law such that, for instance, cyber operations that target civilian data violate the prohibition on attacking civilian objects. The majority of the experts took the position that the law had not advanced that far and that pre-existing law could not be definitively interpreted to encompass data within the meaning of ‘objects’. In this article, the Director of the Tallinn Manual Project responds to the authors' criticism of the majority view by explaining and clarifying its reasoning.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (863) ◽  
pp. 599-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Fallah

AbstractCorporate actors are taking on an increasingly significant role in the prosecution of modern warfare. Traditionally, an analysis of the law applicable to corporate actors in armed conflict commences with inquiry into the law as it applies to mercenaries. As such, the rise of the private military industry invites a reconsideration of the conventional approach to mercenaries under international law. This article critically surveys the conventional law as it applies to mercenaries, and considers the extent to which corporate actors might meet the legal definitions of a “mercenary”. It demonstrates that even mercenaries receive protection under international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
V. A. Bugaev ◽  
A. V. Chaika

The article discusses the problems of the relationship between international law in general and, in particular, international humanitarian law and the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation in determining responsibility for international humanitarian crimes. The analysis of the emergence of international humanitarian law, its fundamental principles and their reflection in the law of Russia and the Russian Federation.


Author(s):  
Emily Crawford

Levée en masse – the spontaneous uprising of the civilian population against an invading force – has long been a part of the modern law of armed conflict with regard to determining who may legitimately participate in armed conflict. The concept originated during the revolutionary wars in America and France, and was incorporated into the first codified rules of armed conflict. However, despite the prevalence of the category of levée en masse in the modern laws of armed conflict, there have been few, if any, instances of levée en masse taking place in modern armed conflicts. This article examines how and why the category of levée en masse developed. In doing so, this article situates the concept and evolution of levée en masse within the history of international humanitarian law more generally.


Author(s):  
Kleffner Jann K

This chapter addresses the scope of application of international humanitarian law. International humanitarian law regulates, and as a rule applies in times of, armed conflicts. Accordingly, it is also referred to as the law of armed conflict or jus in bello. The three interchangeable terms denote the only branch of public international law that is specifically designed to strike a balance during armed conflicts between preserving humanitarian values, on the one hand, and considerations of military necessity, on the other by protecting those who do not or no longer directly participate in hostilities and by limiting the right of parties to the conflict to use armed force only to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict, which is to weaken the military potential of the enemy. While international humanitarian law specifically regulates situations of armed conflicts, it does not automatically supersede all other areas of public international law in the event of an armed conflict. The chapter then focuses on the law enforcement aspects, the continued relevance of rules of international law of peace during armed conflict, and the relevance of humanitarian law in peacetime and post-conflict military operations.


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