The Limits of Authoritarian International Law
Tom Ginsburg's concept of “authoritarian international law” (AIL) is as important as the one it references, Thomas Franck's “right to democratic governance.” It underlines how the promise carried by Franck was betrayed in the bitter turn of history that ended the emerging hope for democracy ruling all nations in the world after 1989. This hope had developed by fits and starts as the slow fulfilment of the Kantian project for “perpetual peace” amongst a world federation of democratic republics on which the League of Nations and the United Nations were built. To the now-universal acknowledgment of the grave domestic setbacks to human rights and democracy, Ginsburg's article adds an account of the international setbacks which followed. Its chief importance is in raising the question of the emergent authoritarian traits of international law in the wake of these setbacks. With my appreciation of Ginsburg's formidable treatment, including a title that will mark, like Franck's, an important moment in the field, I will challenge some of his conclusions and offer counterpoints in the present essay. In particular, I will (1) suggest the irrelevance of the three “evils of AIL”; (2) highlight the significance of 2006 as the date when AIL started rising; (3) emphasize the importance of U.S. isolationism in the rise of AIL; and (4) argue that the better investment to counter that rise is in nonviolence.