scholarly journals The Enduring but Unwelcome Role of Party Intent in Treaty Interpretation

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 44-48
Author(s):  
Andrea K. Bjorklund

Party “intent” is not one of the tools that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) gives to treaty interpreters. To be sure, party intent is presumably reflected in the “object and purpose” of the treaty, but it is not a separate criterion; in fact, the VCLT implicitly excludes party intent from playing an interpretive role. Yet many decision-makers, counsel, and academics persistently look to party intent for guidance when interpreting treaties. The most favored nation (MFN) debate illustrates why party intent endures as an interpretive touchstone: treaty language, even when analyzed in context and in light of the convention's object and purpose, does not always lead to clear answers. Both Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath and Stephan Schill, in their different ways, depart from traditional VCLT analysis and hark to party intent as a reason to endorse a modified approach to treaty interpretation. Yet they also illustrate why party intent is an imperfect tool: party intent is too malleable to be a conclusive guide to treaty meaning.

Author(s):  
Hobér Kaj

This chapter discusses the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty. The ECT is a multilateral treaty during the negotiation of which approximately fifty States participated, albeit to varying degrees. It goes without saying that in such a setting, there are many competing interests to take into account, often resulting in ambiguous treaty provisions. Indeed, almost every dispute based on the ECT involves issues of treaty interpretation. The law applicable to the interpretation of treaties is international law, unless the parties to the treaty in question have agreed otherwise. For all practical purposes, the most important international document when it comes to treaty interpretation is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention defines ‘treaty’ as ‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’. There is little doubt that the ECT is covered by this definition. Article 26(6) of the ECT provides that disputes under it are to be resolved on the basis of its provisions and ‘applicable rules and principles of international law’. The chapter then considers Articles 31—3 of the Vienna Convention, which deal with the interpretation of treaties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-200
Author(s):  
Danae Azaria

Abstract This article argues that the International Law Commission (ILC) interprets international law. In recent years, in documents intended to remain non-binding, the Commission has made interpretative pronouncements about a treaty in force, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and customary international law reflected therein. This development is called the ‘codification by interpretation’ paradigm in this article. This article argues that interpretation falls within the ILC’s function, and it analyses the effects of the Commission’s interpretative pronouncements. It explains that the ILC’s interpretative pronouncements are not per se binding or authentic. However, they may trigger an interpretative dialogue with states. The ILC’s interpretative pronouncements may constitute a focal point for coordination among states, a subsidiary means for determining rules of law and a supplementary means of (treaty) interpretation. The aim of the ILC’s ‘codification-by-interpretation’ paradigm in the four topics considered in this article is to introduce clarity and predictability into secondary rules on the law of treaties, thus ensuring the clarity and predictability of primary treaty rules across all fields of international law. The ILC endeavours to convince states to use international law as a medium by which they regulate their affairs.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 60-63
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel

This essay underscores the importance of background understandings in general international law for interpreting brief, open-ended clauses such as most favored nation (MFN) clauses. Contrary to Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath's claim, I suggest that often interpreters of MFN clauses cannot limit themselves to the text, context, and preparatory materials of a specific MFN clause. A common international negotiating technique, including for investment treaties, is to rely on the general background understanding of what a clause typically means in international law—its default meaning. I also argue that MFN clauses have played a surprisingly limited role in the international investment regime to date. In the main, they have functioned as a stepping stone for procedural and substantive guarantees found in third-party investment treaties. This use, and the limited role of MFN clauses in investment treaty awards, stands in sharp contrast to MFN clauses in the trade regime.


Author(s):  
Gardiner Richard

This chapter offers a nuanced account of one of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’s seminal contributions to international law — a single set of interpretative ‘principles’ if not actual rules. It addresses two questions. The first is in what sense are the Vienna rules on treaty interpretation ‘rules’? The second is how are the rules to be used in interpreting treaties? The answer to the first question provides much of the answer to the second one. But the second is worth additional attention, mainly because the rules’ application in practice reveals interpretations that do not stand out from simply reading them.


Author(s):  
Borgen Christopher J

This chapter examines treaty conflicts and the systemic fragmentation of international law more generally. It focuses on fragmentation through the optic of conflicting obligations between treaties, as well as, to a lesser extent, between a treaty and another source of law. The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the causes of normative conflict. Part II examines the various ways a treaty can conflict with another treaty or source of law. Part III surveys different techniques for addressing normative conflict via conflict avoidance clauses, treaty interpretation, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the classic canons of treaty construction (lex prior, lex posterior, and lex specialis). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the broader theme concerning international law’s systemic fragmentation.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-76
Author(s):  
Benny TAN Zhi Peng

The International Law Commission recently completed its work on the controversial issue of the effects of armed conflicts on treaties, culminating in the adoption of a set of eighteen draft articles and an annex. The Commission's efforts are nothing short of commendable, but this article argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the role of supervening impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances in determining the effects of armed conflicts on treaties. Although both doctrines may in fact appropriately apply in the context of armed conflicts, the mere referencing of them in the adopted draft articles gives rise to several problems. In particular, the two doctrines were codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties without their application to armed conflicts in mind. Some changes to the draft articles are proposed to address these difficulties.


2017 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-150
Author(s):  
Jörg Kammerhofer

For international lawyers, the Vienna Convention rules of treaty interpretation are ‘the only game in town’; they have had the whip-hand for several decades now. Yet is this belief in the power(s) of the Vienna rules justified? Behind the claim that they are the law lies a theoretically much more interesting, yet fundamentally unsustainable second argument. It is that rules of interpretation are somehow independent of – and replace – the legal epistemic process, the ascertainment of the law’s meaning-content. These rules are seen as serving a different function, i.e. to regulate the process of the applicative construction of meaning by the organs of international law. They are doctrine’s attempt to control how treaties are construed by tribunals. However, as a matter of legal theory there are severe limits to what such rules can do. Given these limits, we will reconstruct the possible meanings and uses of the Vienna Convention rules.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 759-803
Author(s):  
Anna Ventouratou

Abstract This paper examines the role of general international law in the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, using the rules on state responsibility as a case study. It identifies and discusses instances in WTO case law where such rules were applied directly or were taken into consideration in interpreting relevant WTO provisions. The analysis demonstrates that direct application of general international law for the determination of indispensable matters not regulated by the WTO Agreements is part of the inherent powers of WTO adjudicative bodies. Moreover, under Article 3(2) Dispute Settlement Understanding and Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, WTO adjudicative bodies have an obligation to take into account general international law in interpreting relevant WTO provisions. The paper delineates the methodology for assessing the interaction between general international law and WTO law and highlights the importance of adhering to this methodology to provide clarity and legal certainty regarding the scope and content of WTO obligations.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 49-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martins Paparinskis

On the big questions, Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath are plainly right. Dogmatic presumptions about the necessary effect of particular clauses and woolly notions of systemic teleology may distract the interpreter from the task of finding the meaning that represents the intentions of the parties, best articulated in the specific terms chosen. Customary rules on treaty interpretation, reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), are meant to be flexibly adapted to the case in hand. But in applying their insight to the small print of the interpretative question, Batifort and Heath are less persuasive. Can most favored nation (MFN) clauses be generally relied upon to, as they put it, “import” substantive standards of treatment of investment protection law? The authors are critical of the apparent consensus in favor of an affirmative answer—they call it “conventional wisdom”—and in this regard seem to me to be significantly overstating their case.


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