scholarly journals Human Shields: Complementary Duties under IHL

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 317-322
Author(s):  
Beth Van Schaack

The phenomenon of human shields challenges core tenets of international humanitarian law (IHL), including its careful dialectic between the imperatives of humanity and military necessity. Although the principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality are well established in the abstract, consensus remains elusive when these concepts are applied to situations involving human shields, who blur the boundary between civilians and combatants. And while the prohibition against using human shields is absolute, it is too often honored in its breach in today's asymmetrical conflicts. Indeed, resort to human shields has become attractive precisely because it exploits protective legal rules to the detriment of those principled armed actors who value—and thus strive for—IHL compliance. These parties, in turn, are struggling to adapt their operations to a practice that has become “endemic” in the modern battlefield.

2022 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-126
Author(s):  
Virajati Adhazar ◽  
Suhaidi Suhaidi ◽  
Sutiarnoto Sutiarnoto ◽  
Jelly Leviza

Self-defense as an inherent right owned by a country is regulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter and due to the use of Space-Based Missile Interceptor (SBMI) weapons in space, the 1967 outer space treaty must also be guided. Because Article 4 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the use of weapons in space, the legality of using SBMI weapons is questionable. Therefore, this study was conducted to determine the legal provisions, forms of state accountability and the process of prosecuting compensation for countries using these weapons according to international law. The results of the study indicate that the use of SBMI weapons does not conflict with international law, because it is based on Article 103 of the UN Charter which states that if there are provisions in other legal rules that are contrary to the UN Charter, the UN Charter must be guided. So that self-defense actions based on Article 51 of the UN Charter do not violate the law. The party that must be absolutely responsible is the country that started the conflict, because it has violated the rules of international law in Article 2 paragraph (4) of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. The compensation process is carried out according to the rules of the space liability convention 1972 and if in practice the party who is responsible does not show good faith in providing compensation, then it can be continued by referring to the dispute resolution process in the UN Charter.


Author(s):  
McCosker Sarah

This chapter examines ‘domains’ of warfare, which are generally understood as the operational environments in which armed conflict occurs, and to which international humanitarian law (IHL) therefore applies. Until recent decades, domains of armed conflict have been largely predicated on geospatial conceptions, denoting the physical places where armed conflict has customarily occurred: land, sea, and air. General IHL applies across all these areas—including the fundamental principles of humanity, military necessity, and proportionality; restrictions or prohibitions of certain means and methods of warfare; and basic rules requiring humane treatment of persons and respect for civilians and civilian property. Over time, however, the particular exigencies of land, sea, and air warfare have led to the development of some specific IHL rules and principles tailored to each of those environments. Discussing domains of armed conflict therefore offers a window into the historical development of IHL. It shows how the emergence of new operational environments and new means and methods of armed conflict catalyses efforts at legal regulation, which can lead to the development of new domains or sub-sets of IHL. The chapter then considers how the idea of a domain might apply to armed conflict in outer space, and armed conflict involving cyber operations and other emerging capabilities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Buchan

Under international humanitarian law it is prohibited to make the object of attack a person who has surrendered. This article explores the circumstances in which the act of surrender is effective under international humanitarian law and examines, in particular, how surrender can be achieved in practical terms during land warfare in the context of international and non-international armed conflict. First, the article situates surrender within its broader historical and theoretical setting, tracing its legal development as a rule of conventional and customary international humanitarian law and arguing that its crystallisation as a law of war derives from the lack of military necessity to directly target persons who have placed themselves outside the theatre of armed conflict, and that such conduct is unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective. Second, after a careful examination of state practice, the article proposes a three-stage test for determining whether persons have surrendered under international humanitarian law: (1) Have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a positive act which clearly reveals that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities? (2) Is it reasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time for the opposing force to discern the offer of surrender? and (3) Have surrendered persons unconditionally submitted to the authority of their captor?


Author(s):  
Nils Melzer

This chapter examines the provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL) concerning the distinction between legitimate military targets and persons protected against direct attacks. It explains that the practical application of the principle of distinction in contemporary armed conflicts has become increasingly difficult because of a number of factors. These include the growing asymmetry of military confrontations, the intermingling of armed actors with the civilian population, and the increasing involvement of civilians in the conduct of hostilities.


Author(s):  
Victoria Arnal

Abstract The destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflicts has gained increasing political momentum and visibility over the last two decades. Syria, Iraq and Mali, among others, have witnessed the intentional destruction of their cultural heritage by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) that have invoked Islamic law and principles to legitimize their actions. The response of the international community has predominantly focused on the material aspect, to the detriment of the significant impact on the associated intangible manifestation of cultural heritage in local communities. This article argues that several Islamic legal rules and principles may, more adequately than international humanitarian law, safeguard the intangible dimension of cultural heritage in certain contemporary armed conflicts in Muslim contexts. It aims to demonstrate the importance of drawing from multiple legal traditions in order to enhance the protection of intangible cultural heritage in armed conflicts and to strengthen engagement with the relevant NSAGs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
حلا الدوري

After establishing and completing the rules of the international humanitarian law, what occupies the thoughts and minds of the researchers has become the effectiveness of those legal rules because the international community has created the International Humanitarian Law to decrease the agony and misery of war and to deter anyone who may violate these rules. Without a mechanism of implementation, the international umanitarian law becomes mere ideal expression of ideas, and to activate its, there must be some mechanism to be implemented and to be respected. The mechanism could be supervisory, monitoring, or preventive or even judicial to implement the rules of the international humanitarian law in case of violation of these rules especially with regard to the protection of civilians and spreading the rules of the international humanitarian law. Despite the existence of the comprehensive and detailed international humanitarian law which are highly approved and agreed upon as a complete system of protection but it is unfortunately accompanied by a general tendency towards ignoring and disobeying them.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem M Giladi

This article explores the significance of the reference, in proportionality analyses, to proper purpose and legitimate ends, given the traditional aversion of international humanitarian law (IHL) to questions of (political) legitimacy. It demonstrates the centrality of that aversion in doctrinal assertions concerning the goals, characteristics and operational strategy of IHL yet argues that, at its historical and conceptual foundations, the law draws on a construction of war that presupposes legitimacy of the political type. That construction remains embedded, though implicit, in contemporary proportionality analyses.Thus, the instrumental understanding of war by Carl von Clausewitz poses several challenges to entrenched contemporary doctrinal claims about the law, how it operates and the effects it produces. This provides an impetus for critical reassessment of the aversion to politics and the interaction between the humanitarian, military and political spheres in the operation of IHL norms. Such critique helps to identify novel strategies of humanitarian protection in war outside the confines demarcated by orthodox doctrine.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosuke Onishi

This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by thejus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that whichjus ad bellumplays in international conflict.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
James Gallagher

<p>The concept of military necessity is of fundamental importance for International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Criminal Law (ICL) and International Law, generally. States and individuals have used military necessity as a justification when extraordinary situations “require the adoption of measures departing from the normally applicable law in order to protect basic values and fundamental interests.”1 Measures adopted on the grounds of necessity have been accepted at international law by international courts and tribunals, state practice, and international legal doctrine. This paper will analyse and explain the origins of military necessity under IHL, and how military necessity’s use has developed and influenced the behaviour of actors at international law, primarily during times of armed conflict. Furthermore, this paper will seek to establish the role that military necessity plays at ICL. This will be done by analysing various case law examples of international tribunals where the tribunals have been asked to determine whether military necessity constituted a legitimate justification for a particular course of action taken by an individual, primarily in positions of command. This paper will highlight the circumstances where a legitimate finding of military necessity existed, and will contrast this to occasion where actions did not meet the required threshold. It will also seek to determine how military necessity is interpreted and understood by various international organisations such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United Nations (UN), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The paper will begin with by providing an overview of the origins of military necessity under IHL and how it has evolved in its interpretation and usage by authors writing on military necessity, and states seeking to utilise it.</p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-170
Author(s):  
Sabin Guțan

Abstract Drones are new means and methods of warfare which, apparently, are similar to combat aircrafts. A big difference between the two categories is the human personnel involved. Compared with airplanes, carrying a human crew on board - this one carrying out combat operations from inside the aircraft - drones do not have inside human beings, being coordinated from the ground (or sea) - the military actions carrying out from the place where the operators are. So the question arises: what kind of rules of international humanitarian law are applicable to the use of drones in armed conflicts? Starting from the rule that legal rules apply to legal relationships between people (but not directly to objects or animals), I analyze to what extent these means and methods of warfare are subject to the rules of armed conflict on land, sea or air.


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