scholarly journals Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL)

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Monika Zalnieriute
Keyword(s):  
Search Engine ◽  
Data Privacy ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
National Data ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.

Trade Union Liability for ‘EU-Unlawful’ Collective Action

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Malmberg
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Alternative Understanding ◽  
The Eu

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has made it clear that collective action taken by trade unions under certain circumstances might violate the freedom of services and the right of establishment under the Treaty (Articles 49 and 56 TFEU). However, the Court has not addressed the issue of which remedies are to be available against a trade union arranging such an ‘EU-unlawful’ collective action. This question was dealt with by the Swedish Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) in its final judgment in December 2009. The article discusses this judgment and presents an alternative understanding of the EU law requirements concerning remedies for EU-unlawful collective actions.

scholarly journals Pojęcie współmałżonka w prawie unijnym – uwagi na tle orzeczenia w sprawie Coman (C‑673/16)

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Ewa Kamarad
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

The Term ‘Spouse’ in EU Law – Comments on the Judgment in the Coman Case (C‑ 673‑16) The paper concerns the judgment of 5 June 2018 issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Coman case (C‑673‑16), in which the Court for the first time defined the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. It discusses the consequences of the judgement and its relation to the traditional mechanisms of private international law and the EU principle of mutual recognition.

scholarly journals Exploring the Autonomy of the European Union Legal Order

2021 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-88
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts ◽  
José A. Gutiérrez-Fons ◽  
Stanislas Adam
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Building Walls ◽  
The Eu

Two different dynamics govern the autonomy of the European Union (EU) legal order. On the one hand, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is not, i.e. it is not ordinary international law. Positively, on the other, autonomy seeks to define what EU law is, i.e. a legal order that has the capacity to operate as a self-referential system of norms that is both coherent and complete. Yet the concept of autonomy of the EU legal order in no way conveys the message that the EU and its law are euro-centric and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) seeks to insulate EU law from external influences by building walls that prevent the migration of legal ideas. Autonomy rather enables the Court of Justice to strike the right balance between the need to preserve the values on which the EU is founded and openness to other legal orders. The autonomy of the EU legal order is thus part of the very DNA of that legal order as it allows the EU to find its own constitutional space whilst interacting in a cooperative way with its Member States and the wider world.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

Legal conflict between the EU and the republic of Poland regarding polish judicial reform

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Eu

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.

scholarly journals The independence and impartiality of the hybrid CETA Investment Court System: Reflections in the aftermath of Opinion 1/17

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Fanou
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Court System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access ◽  
The Eu

In its recent Opinion 1/17, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) examined the compatibility of an external judicial body, the Investment Court System (ICS) under the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), with EU law. At a time when judicial independence has arisen as one of the main challenges for the rule of law in the EU, this article discusses the Court’s findings in relation to the compatibility of the ICS with the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal.

Mixed Agreements: The EU Law Fundamentals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
The Eu

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union

Calls of Duty: Romanian Politicians’ Deontological Discursive Strategies for Securing Free Movement in the European Union

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-66
Author(s):  
Saila Heinikoski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Discursive Strategies ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

This article discusses how the right to free movement within the European Union is presented as a matter of obligation, a duty of the other EU member states, in the discourse of Romanian Presidents and Prime Ministers (2005–2015). An examination of speeches and other statements from these politicians illuminates Romanian political reactions during the period when Romania became an EU member state, and reflects perceptions of Europeanness and European agreements. These issues take on an additional contemporary significance in the context of the Brexit negotiations, and they also add to the broader debate on whether EU norms and obligations are seen as being both just and equally applied. By analysing different types of argumentative topoi, I examine the deontological (obligation-based) argumentation employed in the free movement context. Furthermore, I examine to what extent these arguments are invoked in support of the right to free movement and who this right applies to. I argue that for Romanian politicians, deontological free movement arguments are connected to other states’ compliance with European treaties and to demands for equal application of European rules without discrimination, or the delegation of responsibility to others. This manifested itself most frequently in the calls for the EU and its member states to do their duty by treating Romanians equally to other EU citizens.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

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