scholarly journals United States Initiates Withdrawal from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 631-634

On February 2, 2019, the United States formally notified Russia that it would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in six months and that, effective immediately, it was suspending its performance under the treaty in light of Russia's material breach. This decision came more than three months after the Trump administration indicated that the United States was planning to withdraw from the treaty.

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-141

In October of 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States would withdraw from four international agreements. On October 3, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran. Later that day, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that the United States was also withdrawing from the Optional Protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both withdrawals were triggered by pending International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases grounded in these treaties that were recently brought against the United States. Two weeks later, in an escalation of the ongoing trade dispute with China, the United States gave notice of withdrawal from the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the international body charged with overseeing the international mailing system. Finally, on October 22, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would be terminating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. Unlike other withdrawals undertaken by the Trump administration, this latest round involved three Article II treaties to which the Senate had provided its advice and consent. In addition, the international commitments withdrawn from in this round were long-standing ones, with U.S. participation in the UPU going back as far as 1875.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Berliner ◽  
Jake Hecla ◽  
Michael Bondin ◽  
Austin Mullen ◽  
Kelsey Amundson ◽  
...  

On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Kazuki Hagiwara

The United States suspended the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) ‘in accordance with customary international law’. However, State practice prior to the International Law Commission's codification of the law of treaties did not contribute to clarifying the extent of a right to suspend and the proper conditions for its exercise under customary international law. The few instances regarding suspension due to a serious breach did not demonstrate how the treaties in question were suspended but were a mere reference to a right of suspension in diplomatic or political documents. Against that backdrop, this article seeks to delineate what customary rules the United States believed it was observing and to clarify to what extent those rules are identical to or different from the codified rules on suspension in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Convention). Because the codified procedural safeguards or the mechanism of acquiescence under Article 65 of the Convention were considered as the progressive development of international law, it appears possible to suspend the INF Treaty unilaterally outside the Convention and under the customary rules by which the United States is bound. The INF Treaty was suspended by the United States and by Russia in sequence. That Russian suspension appears to have been an exceptio non adimpleti contractus to prevent the asymmetric execution of the INF Treaty that had been previously suspended by the United States.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler ◽  
Joshua Baker ◽  
Laura Considine

This chapter uses the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a case study to explore the relationship between trust and verification. It argues that the acceptance of verification measures has to be considered an act of trust, since it implies the acceptance of one's vulnerability as a result of an altered perception of the trustworthiness of one's opponent. More specifically, the chapter illustrates how Gorbachev's notion of trustworthiness toward the United States changed through the influence of his inner circle, his understanding of the dynamics of a security dilemma fed by mutual fear and mistrust, his trusting actions toward the development of a common security on an international level, and his personal relationship with Ronald Reagan.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Dorf ◽  
Michael S. Chu

Lawyers played a key role in challenging the Trump administration’s Travel Ban on entry into the United States of nationals from various majority-Muslim nations. Responding to calls from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which were amplified by social media, lawyers responded to the Travel Ban’s chaotic rollout by providing assistance to foreign travelers at airports. Their efforts led to initial court victories, which in turn led the government to soften the Ban somewhat in two superseding executive actions. The lawyers’ work also contributed to the broader resistance to the Trump administration by dramatizing its bigotry, callousness, cruelty, and lawlessness. The efficacy of the lawyers’ resistance to the Travel Ban shows that, contrary to strong claims about the limits of court action, litigation can promote social change. General lessons about lawyer activism in ordinary times are difficult to draw, however, because of the extraordinary threat Trump poses to civil rights and the rule of law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-609

The Trump administration formally recognized Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela on January 23, 2019, making the United States the first nation to officially accept the legitimacy of Guaidó’s government and reject incumbent President Nicolás Maduro's claim to the presidency. In a campaign designed to oust Maduro from power, the United States has encouraged foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations to recognize Guaidó and has imposed a series of targeted economic sanctions to weaken Maduro's regime. As of June 2019, however, Maduro remained in power within Venezuela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 1027-1035

In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced a plan to roll back various steps taken by his predecessor toward normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. A senior official for the administration announced the plan in a White House press briefing:The President vowed to reverse the Obama administration policies toward Cuba that have enriched the Cuban military regime and increased the repression on the island. It is a promise that President Trump made, and it's a promise that President Trump is keeping.With this is a readjustment of the United States policy towards Cuba. And you will see that, going forward, the new policy under the Trump administration, will empower the Cuban people. To reiterate, the new policy going forward does not target the Cuban people, but it does target the repressive members of the Cuban military government.


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