Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc.

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Daskal

In Google v. Equustek, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered Google to delist all websites used by Datalink, a company that stole trade secrets from Equustek, a Canada-based information technology company. Google had agreed to do so in part, but with respect to searches that originated from google.ca only, the default browser for those in Canada. Equustek however, argued the takedowns needed to be global in order to be effective. It thus sought an injunction ordering Google to delist the allegedly infringing websites from all of Google's search engines—whether accessed from google.ca, google.com, or any other entry point. Google objected. The Canadian Supreme Court, along with the two lower Canadian courts that considered the issue, sided with Equustek (para. 54). The ruling sets up a potential showdown between Canadian and U.S. law and raises critically important questions about the appropriate geographic and substantive scope of takedown orders, the future of free speech online, and the role of intermediaries such as Google in preventing economic and other harms.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have repeatedly emphasized thepublic interest in testing the validity of patents, weeding out patentsthat should not have been issued. But there is one important group ofpeople the law systematically prevents from challenging bad patents.Curiously, it is the very group patent law is supposed to support:inventors themselves. The century-old doctrine of assignor estoppelprecludes inventors who file patent applications from later challenging thevalidity or enforceability of the patents they receive. The statedrationale for assignor estoppel is that it would be unfair to allow theinventor to benefit from obtaining a patent and later change her tune andattack the patent when it benefits her to do so. The Supreme Court hastraditionally disfavored the doctrine, reading it narrowly. But the FederalCircuit has expanded the doctrine in a variety of dimensions, and appliedit even when the benefit to the inventor is illusory. Further, the doctrinemisunderstands the role of inventor-employees in the modern world.More important, the expansive modern form of assignor estoppel interferessubstantially with employee mobility. Inventors as a class are put underburdens that we apply to no other employee. If they start a company, oreven go to work for an existing company in the same field, they will not beable to defend a patent suit from their old employer. The result is a sortof partial noncompete clause, one imposed without even the fiction ofagreement and one that binds anyone the inventor comes in contact withafter leaving the job. Abundant evidence suggests that noncompetes ingeneral retard innovation and economic growth, and several states prohibitthem outright, while all others limit them. But assignor estoppel is afederal law doctrine that overrides those state choices.It is time to rethink the doctrine of assignor estoppel. I describe thedoctrine, its rationale, and how it has expanded dramatically in the past25 years. I argue that the doctrine is out of touch with the realities ofboth modern inventing and modern patent law, and that it interferes withboth the invalidation of bad patents and the goal of employee mobility.Should the Supreme Court take up the doctrine, it is unlikely to survive inits current form. Rather, it should – and will – return to its much morelimited roots.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-833 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy B. Flemming ◽  
Glen S. Krutz

The expanding public policy role of high courts heightens concerns over whether societal and political inequalities affect the outcomes of litigation. However, comparative research on this question is limited. This article assesses whether status inequalities between parties and differences in the experience and resources of attorneys influence the selection of cases for judicial review in the Supreme Court of Canada. A series of statistical models reveal that governments are more likely than other parties to influence whether leave is granted but that the experience and resources of lawyers, unlike in the United States, have little impact. The decentralized, low volume and high access features of the Canadian process may explain this finding.


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.


Federalism-E ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Goldlist

The role of the Supreme Court in the practice of Canadian federalism, specifically the extent of its power and the effects of that power, is a hotly contested issue in Canadian political science. While some scholars have argued that the Court has taken on too political of a role that must be restricted, this paper develops the Court as a constitutional ‘umpire,’ whose rulings serve the important, but limited, functions of allocating political resources to incentivize negotiation, and establishing jurisdictional boundaries for said negotiations, leaving specific policy decisions to political, as opposed to legal, actors. Concerning the net outcome of the Court’s jurisprudence on the distribution of legislative powers, this paper illustrates the Court’s overall balancing approach, with grants of power to one level of government met with increases in authority to the other, in all major policy areas. Thus, ultimately shown to embrace both a limited and impartial approach to constitutional adjudication, the Court has done much to enhance its democratic legitimacy and constitutional utility.


Author(s):  
Leclair Jean

In Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the unwritten constitutional principles of federalism and democracy dictated that the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province gave rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to the federation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire. To understand this astonishing decision, the author first examines how, over time, in Canada and Quebec, issues of identity(ies), constitutional law, and democracy came to be formulated in absolutist terms, making political compromises next to impossible. Only then does he analyse the Supreme Court’s decision and attempts to explain why the latter chose to decide as it did.


Federalism-E ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Allison O‘Beirne

The Supreme Court of Canada has an absolutely undeniable role in intergovernmental relations. As the country‘s only constitutionally entrenched body charged with the resolution of division-of-powers disputes, its decisions and rulings are always certain to influence the way in which governments interact with each other. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has come to be less highly regarded as a method of resolving the disputes that arise between governments [...]


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