Prosecutor v. Bemba et al.

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-479
Author(s):  
Jonas Nilsson

The case against Jean-Pierre Bemba, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido is the first case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) dealing with offenses against administration of justice. The case is exceptional in terms of scope and size in comparison to other international prosecutions dealing with this kind of offense. The charges concern a systematic scheme aimed at producing false testimony of a large number of witnesses. Five people, including members of a defense team in another case before the ICC, carried out this operation over a period of many years. The case also involves several interesting evidentiary and procedural issues, including the overall regime for admission of evidence before the ICC.

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-322
Author(s):  
Anna Oriolo

Although the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor (otp) of the International Criminal Court (icc) that entered into force in 2013 unquestionably provided a more comprehensive set of ethical standards for all members of the Office (both staff members and elected officials), it does not fully meet the current needs to balance the powers and faculties of the Prosecutor in compliance with fair trial principles, the credibility of the Court and the sound administration of justice. Notwithstanding the adoption of the Code, a controversial prosecutorial action in the Bemba et al. case led to a request to disqualify the entire staff of the otp. This paper takes the opportunity to remark on the ethical standards applicable to icc prosecution lawyers and specifically the role of icc judges as the ‘ultimate guardian of a fair and expeditious trial’ in outlining the criteria to assess the conduct, good standing and professionalism of the otp.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 70 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 70 deals with acts punishable by the Court as offences against the administration of justice. These acts may be divided into three categories: those involving perjury or false testimony; obstruction of the activities of the Court; and solicitation of bribes. The principles and procedures governing the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over offences under this article shall be those provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The maximum penalty for article 70 offences is five years imprisonment; a fine is an alternative as well as the possibility of both being imposed. Fines may be set for each individual offence or count, but cannot exceed in total 50 per cent of the convicted person's assets, ‘after deduction of an appropriate amount that would satisfy the financial needs of the convicted person and his or her dependants’.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 1123-1149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mayeul Hiéramente* ◽  
Philipp Müller ◽  
Emma Ferguson

Through the most recent proceedings initiated by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Walter Barasa, the issue of proceedings for alleged offences against the administration of justice pursuant to Article 70 of the Rome Statute has gained relevance for both legal practice and in the academic field. The regime established by the article differs significantly from the one applicable to the ad-hoc tribunals as it shifts power from the Chamber to the Prosecution. This article aims at exploring the implications this changed legal framework has for the upcoming legal proceedings, taking into account in particular the rights of the accused and the risks of the OTP’s investigatory and prosecutorial monopoly. It will further explore the legal tools available to ICC judges in order to remedy these implications and discuss the possibilities for applying lessons learned.


2021 ◽  
pp. 109-114
Author(s):  
B. I. Nedilko

This article is devoted to the analysis of the Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo case of the International Criminal Court. He was a Congolese politician, as well as the founder and the head of non-governmental armed group, named “Movement for the Liberation of Congo”, which members committed number of crimes during armed conflict in Central African Republic. The importance of this case lies in the fact, that it was the first case of the International Criminal Court, where the accused was charged with crimes, committed by his subordinates, and not by the accused himself. This article reveals the main contradictions between the judgments of the Trial Chamber, which found Bemba guilty, and the Appeals Chamber, which acquitted him. The legal basics of the institute of personal responsibility of commanders and other superiors in international criminal law, which were formed in the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Bemba case, are highlighted therein. The author addresses and analyzes the grounds for recognizing commanders and other superiors guilty for committing crimes by their subordinates. It was discovered, that Article 28 of the Rome Statute requires the commanders to take only necessary or reasonable measures to prevent or punish the crimes, committed by their subordinates, not all possible measures at the relevant time. The Trial Chamber should specify what exactly the accused had to do to prevent or punish the crimes, as well as inform the accused of it prior to the hearing. It is also necessary to take into account objective circumstances, that could prevent the commander from adequately responding to the commission of crimes by his subordinates, especially if they operated in the territory of another state. The commander's ability to take the necessary or reasonable measures to prevent or punish the crimes, committed by his subordinates, should be analyzed in relation to each individual crime he is charged with, and not in relation to all the actions of subordinates as a whole. At last, the Appeals Chamber provided an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether the measures, taken by the commander, were sufficient.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 57 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 57 sets out the functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 39 of the Rome Statute established the existence of the Pre-Trial Chamber. It required the creation of a Pre-Trial Division of not less than six judges, and was to be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial experience. The Pre-Trial Chamber is ‘responsible for any matter, request or information arising out of the situation assigned to it’, subject to the authority of the President of the Pre-Trial Division to assign a matter, request, or information to another Pre-Trial Chamber ‘in the interests of the administration of justice’.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 267-272
Author(s):  
Nancy Amoury Combs

When a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) dismissed the court's very first case before trial, it made headlines worldwide. The Trial Chamber dismissed the case because the prosecutor repeatedly failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. He did so because he had obtained the evidence from the UN and NGOs pursuant to confidentiality agreements that prevented disclosure without permission, which the UN and NGOs had not granted. The prosecutor, stuck between two competing obligations—the disclosure obligation that he owed the accused and the confidentiality obligation that he owed the UN—adhered to the latter, a decision that the Trial Chamber deemed to “rupture” the trial process to such a degree that a fair trial was impossible.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Prior to the adoption of article 33 of the Rome Statute, those who established international criminal tribunals contented themselves with a blanket prohibition on the defence of superior orders. However, article 33 declared that superior orders is a defence when three conditions are met: the accused must be under a legal obligation to obey orders of a government or superior; the accused must not know that the order was unlawful; and the order must not be manifestly unlawful. To date, the defence of superior orders appears to have been invoked in proceedings at the International Criminal Court only once, in a case involving charges under article 70 relating to the administration of justice and not to one of the core crimes listed in article 5 of the Statute.


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